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1 
BIG MAN, LITTLE MAN 
  
 
 
For a brief time in Cleveland, I was the man of power. I had 
what no black man in this country has had before: direct control of 
the government of a predominantly white population. That power 
came to me because I seized a situation that had made me seem 
like a savior to men who ordinarily look on blacks as an alien and 
vaguely dangerous force. 
 Most of what you hear about the power structure is so much 
easy talk. We feel the vague presence of a monolith out there, 
some well-defined but hidden body with an organization that can 
act for it. But the monolith is a myth. There were no times in the 
country when certain men, the great captains of industry, could 
command what they wanted; they could bring together the 
resources of a community by the overwhelming presence of their 
personal wealth, power, and control over others, and perhaps our 
notions about the power derive from those times. 
 In the spring of 1966, I was re-elected to my third term as a 
state legislator. I had been the first black democrat ever elected to 
the Ohio General Assembly, and in 1965 I had lost, by an 
excruciatingly narrow margin, my first run to be mayor of 
Cleveland. My brother Louis, and I had a law firm of five black 
lawyers on Public Square, but I was dedicated to politics, I didn't 
love the practice of law the way Louis did.  
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No white law firm accepted black lawyers in those days. Very 
few do now. So, like other young black lawyers in those days, no 
matter how talented, I was a jailhouse lawyer--a little real-estate 
business, some divorce work, and the kind of criminal defense 
cases you pick up by hanging around the municipal courts in the 
morning. 
One day about 9 A.M., the secretary buzzed me on the intercom 
and said, "Mr. Cyrus Eaton wants to speak with you." 
"Sure," I said back, "and you're Jackie Kennedy." 
"Seriously," she said, "it's Cyrus Eaton." 
"You get back on the phone and ask him which Cyrus Eaton." 
After a minute she called back and said, "He says he is the 
Cyrus Eaton who is chairman of the board of the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad." 
I agreed to get on the phone, fully expecting a joke and fully 
expecting to take it out of her or somebody else's hide. Then on the 
other end of the wire is this crisp, fine old English-sounding voice 
with a slight quaver, just too authentic not to be true, saying, "Mr. 
Stokes, my name is Cyrus Eaton. I wanted to talk to you about 
representing me in a lawsuit, and I was wondering when you 
would be able to see me." 
Now, in a situation like that, it is very important to stay cool. 
"Are you kidding?" I blurted. 
He was not kidding. Within the hour I was standing in the 
vestibule of his office. 
Before me was a legendary figure, one of the world's wealthiest 
men -- a capitalist who had long fought for peaceful coexistence 
and trade within the communist countries. Finely combed silver 
hair, skin a healthy red color, he was dressed as he usually dresses, 
in a dark double-breasted suit, a crisp white shirt with no wrinkles 
in the collar, and a navy-blue tie with small polka dots. He walked 
briskly out of his office and said, "Mr. Stokes, thank you so much 
for being willing to come and see me," and then escorted me back 
into the office. 
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Inside Eaton's offices, it is difficult to remember you are in the 
citadel of an international operation. Silent people seemed to 
glide in and out of rooms. No hurry or frenzy, no ringing phones. 
The pace was so easy it felt like a private home. We talked. 
For the next five years we talked, through the time I worked 
with him on the Cleveland Trust Company lawsuit, and on through 
my years as mayor, as Eaton became a trusted friend and adviser. 
In that first talk, Eaton told me the Cleveland Trust had filed a 
suit asking the court to order Eaton to desist making his public 
charges against the bank's practices. Eaton had been telling 
anybody who would listen that the bank's board of directors was 
voting its own trust-held shares of stock, which was prohibited by 
Ohio law. He asked me to defend his former administrative 
assistant, Gordon Watson, whom he wanted to join him in the 
lawsuit. I would be working alongside Eaton's personal lawyer. 
And so began my education in the byways of the power of big 
business. Patiently, in session after session, Eaton and his aides 
explored the growth and life of the Cleveland Trust empire for my 
benefit. I began to see how over the years its president, George 
Gund, had amassed a pyramid of trust holdings that gave him and 
his hand-picked board of directors voting control over the very 
economic life of northern Ohio. Eaton understood it as a man who 
had been part of it, and that is the best understanding there is. 
Before the stock market crash of 1929, Eaton had been on 
Cleveland Trust's board of directors. After the crash, Eaton was 
forced to liquidate his stock in the trust company, and Gund used 
that to force Eaton out. Gund rightly saw Eaton as the main threat 
to his own continuity as the dominant force at Cleveland Trust. 
Eaton never forgot; the feud between the two men was as personal 
as it was financial. In this case, Eaton had what he felt was a clear-
cut case overriding his personal motivations; that is why he 
brought Gordon Watson into it. Behind the legalities, though, was 
Eaton's desire to see Gund's carefully built empire torn away. 
Gund at the peak of his power ruled over the largest trust 
holding operation in Ohio and one of the largest in the country, an 
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accumulation of $2 billion shares of stock. At one time he sat on 
the boards of fifty-two different corporations. Sitting there, 
representing, say fourteen percent of the firm's stock, Gund pulled 
the levers. Gund had Cleveland's economy by the neck. You don't 
have to be a high school graduate to see that when a man or his 
representative sits on the boards of three competing coal 
companies, as Gund did, there is not going to be much 
competition. He also determined which firms got which contracts. 
The beneficiary of all these associations was not likely to be the 
consumer. Nor was the consumer going to benefit when Gund 
controlled affairs for two of the city's largest department stores. 
The list is long. It was just the sort of situation you would expect a 
newspaper to investigate. Unfortunately, controlling interest in the 
Plain Dealer, the largest morning newspaper in the state, was held 
by Cleveland Trust. 
Gund was an extraordinarily conservative man; the effect this 
had on the use of risk capital in Cleveland is only too clear. The 
old industries were carefully protected from any new, competing 
interests that wanted to come in from outside. Young businessmen 
within the city with ideas for new development found that venture 
capital was held intractably within Gund's marmoreal fist. At a 
time when Cleveland should have been growing and shifting away 
from its old, fat, but increasingly impotent interests; these men 
drew closer together, ignoring the need for vigorous competition. 
This is a form of dry rot.  
And so it turned out that the only man who both understood the 
situation and was willing to fight it was Cyrus Eaton, himself one 
of the great entrepreneurs. Eaton had been devoting a considerable 
amount of his time trying to alert people to the dangers of this 
concentration of power; he was talking not only to his own 
associates but to congressmen, senators, and state legislators. That 
was what prompted the trust company to file suit against him. They 
wanted to shut him up. This evidence of their fear of Eaton is a 
startling thing by itself, and I would come across it again and again 
later when I was running for mayor. These powerful men, who can 
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play many trump cards the public never sees when the game goes 
against them, were afraid one man, fighting alone, but -- and this is 
important -- fighting in public. 
Watch the game. The case was tried in July 1967. Gund died 
during the trial; he was succeeded as president by George Karch 
(who has since liberalized and loosened most of those old ties, 
making Cleveland Trust a more responsible institution). Judge 
John V. Corrigan ruled in our favor, and Karch immediately 
announced he would appeal. By the time the case reached appellate 
court, I had been elected mayor and my brother Louis argued the 
case. The appellate court eventually reversed Corrigan's ruling, but 
meanwhile a much more fascinating struggle was going on in the 
state legislature. From under the tables and out of sleeves, new 
cards were beginning to appear. Even before the case actually went 
to trial, the Cleveland Trust Company, through it lobbyists and 
friendly legislators, was moving to amend the state law to make its 
voting practices legal. 
During this time I was reelected to my third term as a legislator, 
in November 1966. Then occurred a graphic lesson in the 
protection of special interests. I had a good working relationship 
with Republican Governor James A. Rhodes and with Roger 
Cloud, leader of the Republican majority and Speaker of the House 
of Representatives. I went to Cloud to talk about my new 
committee appointments. He said, "Carl, you can have any 
committee you want with the exception of banking." 
I asked, "Because of Cyrus Eaton and the Cleveland Trust 
fight?" 
"That's right," Cloud said. 
When the amendment was introduced in the legislature, I went 
to see Rhodes. I wanted to explain to him why it was wrong for 
Cleveland Trust to vote it's trust-held shares. 
"Carl, Cyrus Eaton is one man," he said, "There are a hundred 
banks in this state that will be affected. One man never beat a 
hundred. That's all" 
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So the legislature did amend the law and made our issue moot. 
The members of the banking committee that passed the legislation 
on to the floor were persons who the lobbyists had determined 
were either neutral to their interests or on their side. The people are 
not really represented when the work of government is being done. 
The day-to-day business of a legislature is to pass laws that affect 
the fundamental economic life of their state or, in the case of 
Congress, the nation itself. The men who really do the work on 
those laws, working on language construction and persuading 
legislators, represent special interests. The people's lobby is 
supposed to be the legislature itself, but the men elected to it 
almost never are specifically knowledgeable about the industries 
and interests they are asked to pass judgment on. And, when these 
men want information, the only people they have to turn to are 
lobbyists and others with vested interests. 
I learned a lot from my contact with Cyrus Eaton and the power 
structure's fear of him. In the spring and summer of 1967, when the 
same power structure was grooming me as the man to back in the 
mayor's race, I was invited to the most exclusive clubs in 
Cleveland to talk to them about myself and what I hoped to do for 
Cleveland. It became clear after a couple of these lunches that 
these men had two things on their minds -- the fear of another riot 
and the possibility of an alliance between Stokes and Cyrus Eaton. 
At one of these luncheons, I was talking to five men who would 
have to be numbered among the very top bankers and industrialists 
in the state. Now, when you have men like these in that kind of 
corner, the thing you do for the sake of frankness and fun is drive 
them up a wall. I decided to get the thing out in the open, the way 
Eaton would. Here is approximately what I told them on several 
occasions, until my advisers told me I'd better cut it out: "I can't 
understand you. From the outside, you fellows represent the 
brilliant leaders in business and industry. You are powerful men 
and you represent powerful men. But you are almost saying that if 
Cyrus Eaton becomes involved at all in city government, there 
would be nothing you powerful men could do." 
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Oh, my. They almost trampled each other to be first to deny 
they had any fear of Eaton. It was just that Eaton was not the "kind 
of person" they wanted involved in city government. I had to ask 
them what in the world they thought Cyrus Eaton would want with 
the city of Cleveland. What did we have that he could be interested 
in? Of course I knew perfectly well that it was a simple fear, born, 
in many cases, of the talk of their fathers. The fear came out of the 
old family transactions in Cleveland, in the baronial days when 
there were no rules, regulations or laws and it was always a 
question of who was the strongest, smartest, most powerful man. 
Far too often for their comfort, Cyrus Eaton had won. 
One of the main things I learned from Eaton was their rule -- 
unwritten but as rigid as a fist -- against getting involved publicly 
on issues. That is the rule for the power structure, the business 
community, those very private men at the tops of our businesses 
and industries. They couldn't afford to fight Eaton in the public 
arena because they do too many things the public must not know; 
their deceptions, their intrigues, their dealings with each other must 
stay private. They considered Eaton a traitor: he knew all this only 
too well and yet went on to expose them. Eaton is a confirmation 
of my belief that a man's knowledge of right and wrong is the child 
of his experience. If you want to judge about right or wrong you 
have to have been there yourself, taken your own risks and 
positions. This is an awkward truth for a father to pass on to his 
children, perhaps, but that is why it is an important one -- 
awkward, brittle, dangerous. 
As my talks with Eaton drew on, my own life was changing; by 
the summer of 1967 I knew City Hall was mine for the taking. 
Eventually, I would have to take positions that flew in the face of 
public opinion, I would have to make people learn things they 
wanted to ignore, I would have to make them understand what had 
to be done and the price they would have to pay. Eaton's example 
was a help to me. Out of our relationship grew a confidence that a 
man can take an independent position and win. But also that 
castigation and vilification will come to any man who tries to do 
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something that he thinks is important but that is inconsistent with 
what powerful special interests want. 
It was a curious chemistry and an odd luck that brought Eaton 
and me together at that important time in my life; although the 
worlds we moved in were vastly different, he was my kind of guy. 
But I have always moved easily across social lines that usually 
divide people and keep them from each other. 
I was formed by many forces. If I have been a lawyer, 
politician and TV anchorman, I am still a kid from the public 
housing projects and never forget it. I learned important lessons 
from Eaton, even through his cool, Europeanized sophistication 
and crisp grooming. But twenty years earlier, when I was twenty-
one, I had the honor of learning about the realities of politics from 
John O. Holly, a greasy haired, short, very black, homely man 
from Alabama who had successfully practiced confrontation 
politics in Cleveland a generation before anybody ever heard of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Holly was one of the most remarkable men I have known. His 
fame never went beyond Ohio, but he was a hero to our black 
community in the late 1930's when I was a kid growing up. They 
didn't call it black pride then, but if there was ever black 
consciousness and pride in Cleveland, it came through John Holly. 
It is hard for people now to appreciate how extraordinary a 
phenomenon he was. He came along at a time when Negroes 
completely rejected any leadership from within. To be black-
complexioned even minimized your mobility within the ghetto; the 
Negro community, with its churches and social groups, was as 
strictly hieratic as the brahmin structure of Boston. The black 
politicians of that time -- and this is still true for most -- learned 
only to get themselves insinuated into the white party apparatus. 
They had political expertise, but they never questioned their 
minority status, nor did they question being mere beneficiaries of 
the system rather than entrepreneurs in their own right. Other than 
Holly, none of them had that extra dimension it took to understand 
a mass politics that ignores ward lines. Even later, when younger 
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men with supposedly new understanding came along, they too saw 
politics as an arena for personal aggrandizement and ended up in 
the same kind of subordinate status within the party system that 
choked off their predecessors. 
Curiously, the Democrats and the Republicans were quite 
different in the way they worked their Negroes. A black 
Democratic councilman, for instance, was convinced by the party 
leaders that he could not go beyond the ward lines of his black 
neighborhood. The Republicans had a different discipline, for, I 
think, three reasons. For one thing, Republicans tended to function 
at a higher level, intellectually, than Democrats. And, being an 
elitist and therefore minority party, they hung together more easily. 
Finally, the Republicans were the ones who owned things in town, 
they determined what was going to happen, so they were not 
threatened by having Negroes on countywide tickets. From the late 
1880's until 1962, when I was elected to the General Assembly, 
there was almost always a black Republican legislator from 
Cuyahoga County, but no black Democrats, even though most 
Negroes are Democrats. There were those ironic effects. In 1959, a 
man named Clarence Sharpe, a Republican, ran for county 
commissioner. He carried the vote in prosperous white suburbs like 
Shaker Heights and Lakewood and lost in the black ghetto. His 
own people defeated him, not because they didn't like him, but 
because he was a Republican. 
In such a system a man like John Holly was almost 
unthinkable. Though lacking in formal education and ignorant of 
history, Holly understood that real power was in the hands of the 
man who could put the people together. In the 1930's he organized 
sit-ins and boycotts and took over an absolute leadership that had 
all the recognized black leaders following him. Holly took on the 
local giants, the utility companies, and won. He put together the 
little guys, the Negro masses, for an exercise in confrontation 
politics and had clout. He raised the consciousness of Clevelanders 
about rights and the sheer wrongness of men and women paying 
utility bills to companies where they couldn't get jobs. 
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Holly not only accomplished that, he formed a virtual union of 
the employed Negroes. It was called the Future Outlook League. It 
worked simply enough. Holly went to every store owner. The 
owner was told to hire Negroes or else he would be boycotted. 
Then whenever a black man got a job in that store, he had to 
belong to the Future Outlook League. So throughout the black 
community by 1940 every place had someone black working in it, 
and all these workers were dues-paying members of the league. So 
Holly was supported by his own people, and that made him 
independent. That was the single most important ingredient: self-
sufficiency. Nobody could touch him. 
When John Holly put it all together, the black aristocracy, the 
lawyers and doctors and schoolteachers, had no choice but to 
follow him. The white and black politicians and anyone else who 
depended on Negroes had to follow. It is a good thing the flush of 
victory brought with it so much pride, because it is disconsoling to 
realize that he had to force those black leaders to come up as much 
as he forced the whites to back down. It used to be marvelous to go 
into Holly's office and see those old newspaper clippings on his 
wall. There was one with a picture taken after Holly was released 
from jail -- he'd been arrested during a sit-in -- and it shows Holly, 
Call & Post editor William O. Walker and City Councilman 
Lawrence Payne standing on the steps of the jail. What you see in 
their faces is pride. It's the same kind of feeling some of the black 
councilmen in Cleveland had after my victory as mayor. For those 
four years I was in office, the councilmen and other elected black 
officials had an independence from the party machinery they had 
never contemplated. 
It was not until 1948 that I really got to know Holly and learn 
some lessons from him. I was twenty-one I'd been in the Army 
during the days immediately after the war and then returned to 
finish high school and graduated in 1947. I got involved with the 
Young Progressives, the young people's group of Henry Wallace's 
Progressive Party. At that same time I had become friends with a 
man named Bert Washington, who had been thrown out of his 
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post-office job for alleged involvement with the Communist Party. 
Bert was a local casualty of the Senator Joe McCarthy witch hunts 
of the time. We in the Young Progressives spent long hours with 
Bert Washington arguing the comparative merits of socialism and 
capitalism. And we'd all go to all the political meetings, especially 
when a speaker for Wallace or for Harry Truman would appear. 
We'd go to those meetings and harass the speakers for Truman and 
generally raise hell or get into intense discussions with the young 
people who were for Truman. 
It was through Bert Washington I met Paul Robeson. Paul made 
several trips into Cleveland campaigning for Wallace. After the 
rally, a small group would meet with Robeson at Bert's. There was 
this tall, imposing and yet gentle man, who filled the room with his 
presence, would talk at length of the nationwide effort to rally the 
workingman behind Wallace. He softly talked about the long labor 
struggle, the deaths, imprisonment and economic and social 
ostracism of those committed to raising the level of the working 
poor. Paul Robeson's lessons and example heavily influenced my 
philosophy of government and the positions I later took with 
organized labor. At the same time I was going through the 
exhilaration of this more intellectual approach to government, I 
was learning the hard basics of politics from John Holly. 
Holly was travelling around Ohio putting together the 
Federated County Democrats of Ohio for Lausche. Frank J 
Lausche was running fore his second term as governor. Holly's job 
was to organize the black Democrats for his campaign. I went to 
Holly for a job, and he said, "I need somebody to drive my car." So 
Wallace Connors, a friend of mine, and I drove Holly around the 
state. 
As we'd go down the highway, I'd be asking Holly all sorts of 
questions. Holly loved to talk, anyway, and he was more than 
happy to show off his know-how, which was considerable. How do 
you get to the people of Steubenville? He would tell of such-and-
such a leader there he knew about, and about a woman in town 
whom Holly had known for fifteen years and who was close to the 
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leader, and a man who working in the Highway Department who 
got his job during Lausche's first term as governor. It was like that 
with any town. And then when we'd get into a town, Connors and I 
would serve them while they were meeting. If we didn't bring 
liquor with us, we'd go out and get liquor and some setups and then 
serve them. So we would always be in the room where they were 
talking. We heard the details of how to put together a local chapter 
of a campaign organization: who should go for the money, who 
would see to it that they got a storefront for headquarters, whom 
you should watch out for in town, who was for you, and who only 
seemed to be with who was working against you. This was an 
approach he could take in a town like Dayton, for instance, where 
he was working with C. J. McLin, Sr., an old, established black 
politician. It was different in a town like Lima, smaller and more 
rural, where there was no established leadership and no 
organization. He would have to put it together, and in those cases 
you would hear a lot of threats, telling people who had low-level 
jobs in local government they would lose their jobs, and telling 
others they could get a job if they worked on the campaign. All this 
time I would be asking Holly who was so-and-so and how had he 
gotten to be this and that. 
Holly's responses and the actual experience of being with him 
as he put together a state-wide political machine were my primary-
level education in politics. 
These cumulative experiences taught me to be a hardheaded 
realist in most ways; as one who took to politics as a duck does to 
water, I quickly developed a sure eye and an ability to sense the 
other man's bottom line. 
Such things are necessary for political success. And yet that 
success is hollow without commitment to some social goal that 
carries a man beyond his own petty concerns. This is the paradox 
of political reality: the mainstream (what most people do most of 
the time) is a flowing system for mediating petty concerns, and the 
man who tampers with it does so at his peril; whenever he tries to 
divert its energies for the purposes of the disenfranchised, the poor, 
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he finds himself on the wrong side of the floodgates. Underneath 
all the high talk, the campaign promises, the idealist theories, 
politicians are mostly interested in perpetuating their privileged 
positions. No matter how well a man understands this, no matter 
how hard he is, if he fights for the have-nots he will find himself 
alienated from most of his fellows, and they will do their level best 
to wear them down, to break him. He may, if he is good enough or 
sharp enough or powerful enough, win some particular and even 
important victories. But eventually, he will be driven out. 
Cyrus Eaton may have an empire of his own, but to his 
colleagues he is a pariah. When the energies of the Future Outlook 
League began to dissipate, Holly's independence began to crumble. 
The traditional politicians were able to break him and bring him 
into their fold. Robeson left the country. I am writing this book. 
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2 
HUSTLING 
  
 
 
The poor boy's story is universal. The poor American boy's story is 
the starting point of the American Dream. The poor American 
black boy's story is no dream, believe me, but it does contain one. 
Mine goes like this: I am walking in front of a house. It is cold 
outside, and I can feel the wind cutting through my thin jacket. I 
look into the house through the big picture window and I see a 
white family sitting in the living room. The father throws his baby 
into the air to make it laugh. A fireplace is going, the family is 
warm, happy and alive. There is a fence in front of the house. I am 
outside. 
I haven't the slightest idea how I ever picked up that mental 
image, whether it really happened once and stuck, whether I 
dreamed it or read it in somebody else's life story, whether 
somebody told it to me I just don't know. But, for as long as I can 
remember, that image has been the emblem of my need. I suspect 
that most black children develop such an image. Some learn to live 
with it, some try to escape it, some fight it. I have kicked around 
and been kicked around, grabbed and abandoned several careers, 
and through it all been driven by one demand: How do you not be 
on the outside? How do you not be poor? 
Two years after I was born on June 21, 1927, my father died. 
He was a laundry worker. His name was Charles. I have no 
memories of him. My brother, Louis, two years older than I, has 
taken it on himself to learn more about our father. But for some 
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reason, and perhaps this says something about me, I have never 
really tried to learn much about him. After his death, my mother 
was forced to take on domestic work in the homes of white people 
for twenty years while she was trying to raise Louis and me. She 
worked hard and made so little that she had to accept welfare to 
scrape together enough for us to live. Louis and I saw in her an 
example of how our people are forced into not merely the labor but 
the style of servitude, with it superficial deceits. We all know that 
servility is an act, something we do with our faces and voices when 
we have to. It is generally assumed that the posturing is superficial, 
that there is a 'real' person underneath. But after a time the habit of 
the servant wrenches a man at the roots of his being. What had 
been superficial becomes a radical change, and a man's basic 
outlook on life is ruined. It takes a deeply felt, an abiding personal 
integrity to survive as a whole person. Fortunately for Louis and 
me, our mother is such a person. 
So I grew up poor and black in Cleveland. The facts of our kind 
of big-city poverty have been fully documented in sociology and 
the fiction of James Baldwin and others. The world we knew, 
before we moved into a public housing project, ran from East 
Sixty-eighth Street to East Seventy-ninth Street going east, and 
from Cedar Avenue south to Central Avenue. Everybody in that 
area knew everybody else, knew what they were doing and most of 
the time knew what they were hiding. We had almost no notion of 
anyone's living beyond the horizons of out narrow patch of 
neighborhood. My mother, Louis and I lived on the first floor at 
2234 East Sixty-ninth Street in a rickety old two-family house. We 
covered the rat holes with the tops of tin cans. The front steps 
always needed fixing, one of them always seemed to be missing. 
The coal stove kept the living room warm; we used heated bricks 
and an old flatiron wrapped in flannel to keep warm in the 
bedroom. The three of us shared one bed. 
  
Poor people are herded into such neighborhoods, where survival 
too often means that they are forced to prey on each other. When 
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my mother washed the clothes on Saturday night, she hung them in 
the kitchen to dry. Hanging them outside meant you didn't want 
them anymore. When Louis and I would take our wagon down to 
get the surplus dried peas, flour, rice and dried milk that was 
dispensed to welfare clients, we took along a baseball bat to get the 
food home past the other kids and sometimes even adults. 
And we had some fun, but you won't catch me being nostalgic 
about those times or recommending that it is good for a boy to 
grow up in such conditions. I grew up with a strong, elemental 
hatred for poverty and a deep need to have things, nice things. We 
had a sense of community in that neighborhood, but it was not the 
kind of community in which people should have to live. There is 
nothing glamorous about stealing from a delivery truck, or 
bootlegging, or the numbers racket. 
Yet, because the essential condition of our lives was poverty, 
the men who were successful at these things did have a kind of 
glamour. My uncle, Pughsley Stone, whom everybody called 
Dock, ran an after hours spot next to our house. It was a 
bootlegging and gambling hole, full of tough characters, but none 
of them tougher than Dock. As a child of eight, I saw them 
bringing Dock Stone home all busted up from some fight, and at 
other times I heard stories about him pistol-whipping somebody. 
He was a very rough man and I was proud of him. In a community 
where people live in despair and denial, the man who defies the 
rules and is able to make a living becomes a hero. Dock was one of 
our heroes. 
We were delivered from the most oppressive physical presence 
of our poverty in 1938, when I was eleven. Cleveland was the first 
city in the country to construct housing for the poor with federal 
funds. For some time after the plans for the housing projects were 
known and Mother had made an application for an apartment, we 
lived in day-to-day anticipation of getting out of our rickety old 
house. She would tell Louis and me about steam heat, painted 
walls, beds of our own, but I'm sure these things meant little to us 
at the time. We had no experience to give those words meaning. 
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The day we moved was pure wonder. A sink with hot and cold 
running water, a place where you could wash clothes with a 
washing machine, an actual refrigerator. And we learned what it 
was to live in dependable warmth. For the first time, we had two 
bedrooms and two beds. My mother for the first time had a room 
and a bed of her own. 
For me, the most important advantage of the projects was the 
Portland-Outhwaite recreation center only a block away. The 
swimming pool, ping-pong tables, boxing ring, art classes -- these 
things gave us a structure for our time we'd never had before. The 
center was where I first learned to box, and I got good enough at 
ping-pong to be a member of the city championship team. 
  
Adolescence hits a boy like a fist, and if he is at all close to 
more than one world of activity, he is likely to find himself shoved 
toward the seamier. Until I reached the ninth grade I had been the 
pride of the classroom, getting excellent grades, singing in the glee 
club, that sort of thing. But about that time I began to develop 
other talents -- lagging pennies, shooting craps, playing poker, 
forging my mother's name on a paper excusing me from school. I 
was caught, of course, and my mother was severely disappointed in 
me. I felt her disappointment, but didn't change my ways. Whether 
I would have changed in a different high school I don't know, but I 
went to East Technical High School, which offered the best 
vocational training in the city. It was located in my all-black 
neighborhood, but it was attended by white kids who commuted 
there from all over. The student body, in fact, was about ninety 
percent white. (I wonder how those white kids, now middle-aged 
feel about busing today.) 
East Tech had produced a number of internationally famous 
black track stars in the 1930s and 1940s -- Jesse Owens, Harrison 
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Dillard, Dave Albritton. One of the reasons the black kids were so 
good in that one sport is that they were actively discouraged from 
going out for team sports, football, basketball and baseball. 
I remember spending a good deal of my time in the afternoon 
beating up white kids. We'd go down the halls of the school in the 
afternoon, looking for white boys to beat up. A lot of times I would 
do that by myself. If I caught one white boy standing around by 
himself waiting for a bus, I would just run up and start hitting him. 
My motivation and rationale for this were as illogical and senseless 
then as were the unprovoked attacks on black boys who dared to 
venture into the white neighborhoods. It is impossible for me to 
recall now what was going on in my mind then, what I though I 
was accomplishing. Whatever it was, it had me out looking for 
trouble a lot of the time. I had been boxing at the Portland-
Outhwaite recreation center and was developing a fair reputation; 
maybe I just saw those white boys as a chance to get in some 
training. 
The other sport I was working on then was pool hustling. I ran 
with two fellows, starting when I was about fifteen; one, named 
Albert Williams, we called A. C., and the other, Alton Ausbrook, 
we called Big Al. A. C. was a great pool shot but only when he 
wasn't gambling. Once you put money on the game, A. C. fell 
apart. Atom wasn't as find a shot as A. C., but he was a marvelous 
hustler. I practiced constantly until I managed to learn the best of 
both their styles, and by the time I dropped out of school, at 
seventeen, I was one of the two or three best hustlers in the 
neighborhood. Pool is a wonderfully competitive game, in some 
ways a good analogy for political infighting. It takes a great deal of 
technical skill, a good eye and a smooth delivery. Beyond that, 
hustling requires a man to seize quickly upon his opponent's 
weaknesses. 
During the year between the time I dropped out of high school 
and the time I enlisted in the Army, I learned how to live on the 
street. I badly wanted to be successful, and I was. But I came to see 
that no matter how good I was as a street hustler, it wasn't a way 
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out. At some point I would wake up still tied to the old ways and 
still not secure against poverty. But I also learned the values of the 
people who live that life, the forms of honesty they insist on from 
each other, the things they would and would not do. I learned much 
of it from a prostitute who became a good friend. I'll call her Ruth. 
I doubt that this girl was typical. Her moral stance had a great 
impact on me. An ethics professor might not have little trouble 
finding flaws in her philosophy, but the ethics professor would not 
likely have been born black and a woman and poor in a big city. 
Ruth is now a member of the middle class and a grandmother. At 
the time I knew her she was twenty-five and had had the same boy 
friend since she was sixteen. She is still with him today. It was he 
who turned her out to make money with her body. If she hadn't, 
there is no way they could have saved the money to buy the small 
retail business that has ever since provided their income and 
enabled them to send two children through college and 
professional school. 
Ruth had an unbargainable rate for her services, and performed 
no acts she considered perverse. She defined a difference between 
herself as a prostitute and other girls she called whores, the ones 
who worked the streets and would do it standing up in doorways, 
in the backs of cars, would take whatever they were offered and 
would do anything they were asked. She was even more 
contemptuous of the middle-class girls, both black and white, who 
were merely promiscuous -- they were doing the same thing she 
was and not getting paid for it. What she did, at least in her own 
eyes, was provide a service, a simple, negotiable physical service 
that did not reach below the skin and touch her fundamental self. 
As far as she was concerned she was faithful to her man, and I 
agree with her. Ruth's philosophy served me well over the years as 
I had to make one political compromise or another to achieve a 
desired and needed end. But I never compromised on anything 
basic and fundamental to my personal self and my commitment to 
my people. 
The street life taught me much. I mastered every aspect of it. 
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I understood it well enough to know it led to nowhere, and on July 
27, 1945, just barely eighteen, I joined the Army. This was no 
moral decision. The war was over. I just wanted to get the hell out 
of a world I had had enough of. The Army picked me up out of that 
world and dropped me, of all places, in Alabama, where I learned a 
clean-edged unadulterated hatred for whites. 
We were first taken to Atterbury, Indiana, but that lasted only a 
few days, and then we were off by train for Fort McClellan, 
Alabama. We stopped to eat in Birmingham. The recruits were led 
through the depot; around a restaurant, into an alley and through a 
back door into a large room filled with wooden tables. I was one of 
four acting corporals, and the four of us were standing there while 
the rest of the men were being seated. A white woman in her early 
twenties walked in carrying a huge basin filled with silverware. 
She dumped the contents on the table with a crash and said, "Help 
yourself, boys." 
I told her she was wrong to dump the silver like that. She 
turned, looked me straight in the eye and said, "You may not know 
it, nigger, but you're in Alabama now." 
The stories my mother had told me about the South flooded my 
mind and I realized suddenly that I was helpless. 
The effect on me was so strong that in the thirteen weeks we 
spent at Fort McClellan I never left camp. I was the only man there 
who did not go to town. I wanted the fun and the release as much 
as any man there, but I wasn't going to go looking for it at the cost 
of humiliation or worse. My mother, realizing that my general 
attitude in Cleveland would get me into serious trouble in the 
South, had told me all sorts of horror stories. The stories hadn't 
meant much to me, but I am sure I carried away the notion that in 
the South the white man could kill any black person he wanted to. 
The passing remark of the waitress had brought it all into focus, 
and my fears hardened into hatred. 
After Alabama, we were taken to Fort Lee, New Jersey, where 
we boarded a ship for France, and from there we took trains to 
Germany. Armed with K rations, chocolate and cigarettes, we 
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arrived, the conquering American Army. There was nothing we 
couldn't get, from war souvenirs to women. The excitement of 
Germany for many of us black soldiers was the availability of 
white women. Back home there were always a few available white 
girls, but any time you spent with a white girl in Cleveland was 
stolen. You didn't tell your black friends about it, and you sure as 
hell didn't let any white people know about it. Suddenly, in 
Germany, willing white women were all around us, ready to come 
to camp and service us any time, any way we wanted. Most of us 
took advantage of it brutally. If most of these women were whore 
and camp followers, there were also some who were desperately 
supporting children out there somewhere in the war's rubble. And 
these women reminded me strangely of the street world I thought I 
had left behind me. These women kept their children as well as 
they could. Sometimes the children would be in bed with you. But 
these women kept a dignity of their own, inviolable because you 
could not reach it. The soldier got her body, but she got the food 
and clothing she needed for her children. It was Ruth's philosophy 
all over again. 
But then I found Hilda. We had a kind of free and proud man-
woman relationship that would never have been possible in 
America. We grew extremely close in the months I spent there, and 
as my time began to close around me I almost decided to stay in 
Germany. But the pull of home was too strong. 
Almost immediately on arriving home, I was enveloped in 
everything oppressive about being poor and black and uneducated 
in America. The comforts I had in Germany were gone. I felt 
confined. I wrote the U.S. government, asking whether civilian 
jobs were available in Germany. I quickly learned that without a 
high-school education I was going nowhere. A couple days later I 
registered to return to East Technical High School. 
My attitudes had been changed. The contact with educated 
black men in the Army had made me see a new value in going to 
school More important, I now had money I had saved, and I had 
the G.I Bill. I coasted through the last year at East Tech and 
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enrolled at West Virginia State, a black college outside Charleston, 
West Virginia. 
West Virginia State was no doubt a typical Southern black 
college, giving Southern kids enough education to pacify their 
desire for status in the black community but not enough to arouse 
their desire for more. Fortunately for me, though, there was one 
professor at the school who was not typical. His name was Herman 
G. Canady. He taught psychology and philosophy and had a 
doctorate from Northwestern University. As I think back, I realize 
that in some ways I must have taken him as a substitute father. He 
had a kind of open-door policy, and he taught very informally both 
in class and at his home, goading his students as much as lecturing 
them. 
"You little black bunnies," he would say in class, "you came 
down here to this black school for a nine-month vacation.” 
We would laugh, and he would laugh with us, but he meant it. 
If he thought you were good enough and serious enough, he would 
describe to you how the black faculties in black colleges have the 
function merely of turning over the same piece of dirt in a plowed 
field. All the black colleges do, he would say, is redistribute the 
ignorance. They don't have the money to attract and hold scholars, 
to set up adequate libraries or laboratories. There is no way to get a 
first-rate education in such a place. Go, he'd say to where the 
people who really run this country get their educations. Canady 
was brilliant, skeptical, sarcastically pessimistic. But the depth of 
his commitment and devotion was clear to me. If it hadn't been 
there, he wouldn't have stayed at that school. And I remember that 
after one of those interminable cosmological arguments about the 
origins of things and values, he shocked me by saying, "God made 
it that way." It had never occurred to me that such a rationalistic, 
skeptical man believed in God. But I knew by the way he said it 
that he meant it. I kept more or less in touch with Canady over the 
years. When I was elected mayor of Cleveland twenty years later, 
one of the first calls of congratulations I received came from this 
great old professor, crying like a baby over the telephone. 
31 
 Canady convinced me I was wasting my time at West Virginia 
State, and so in September 1948 I enrolled at Western Reserve 
University in Cleveland. Back home, I went to John Holly for a 
job. I drove him all summer in that Lausche campaign, which 
Lausche won, and then when school started in the fall he got me a 
patronage job as a clerk in an Ohio Department of Liquor Control 
Store in the afternoons. So I had time for morning classes, an 
afternoon job, and a little pool hustling at night. 
I managed to keep my income up to a more or less livable 
standard, but my desire for more or more soon ate away at my 
sense of the need for education. Working for Holly had given me 
my first real look at politics, and it had given me just a glimpse of 
a way out, a way to not be poor and a way to not have to work for 
someone else. I was still casting about, with no sense of a 
particular ambition or vocation. Tired of being a part-time student, 
part-time clerk and part-time hustler, I went to Holly again in 
December of 1949 and asked if he cold get me a job with the 
state's liquor enforcement division. Within two weeks he had me 
on the force. 
 
When I started as a liquor enforcement agent in 1950, I was 
twenty-three, with three years of college behind me. Still without 
any sense of direction, I just wanted some stability and enough 
money to live on without having to scratch for it. My two years 
with the enforcement division changed all of that. I emerged as 
very serious, if scrappy, adult. It hardened my will to take risks as 
well as my need to be out from under the thumb of the white man. 
The enforcement division provided me with an elaborate 
mechanism of legality to back me up, and then it gave me a gun. 
My job, basically, was to assist in closing down bootleg operations 
in black neighborhoods in whatever city I was assigned to. It was 
never written that I would not be enforcing the law in white-run 
places, but it was understood. Sometimes I neglected to understand 
it, though, and that got me transferred to another city. Over the 
months, even though I was wielding a certain quite enjoyable 
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power, I found myself running into the same racism in the 
bureaucratic apparatus behind me as existed in the joints I was out 
to confront. It came to me, finally, working constantly with 
lawyers on liquor cases in court, that those lawyers were the only 
black men I could see who didn't have white masters. In time, that 
feeling became a desperate need. 
I had two guns, the short-nosed .32 revolver I wore, and a long-
barreled .38 police special I kept in the car. Actually, I don't think 
enforcement agents had the legal authority to carry guns then, but 
we all did. I had been trained in some pretty rough arenas in my 
few months as a liquor agent. 
The first town they sent me to was Canton, a town of about 
116,000 just southeast of Akron. At that time Canton was like a 
tiny Las Vegas -- slot machines right along Main Street, houses of 
prostitution right behind it, open poker and blackjack games, all 
amazingly public and, of course, highly illegal. Why they sent me 
there I don't know. I was about six feet tall and hardly weighed 150 
pounds, had a baby face and a moustache you had to be in the right 
light to even see. In Cleveland they had told me to arrest anybody 
with a liquor license who permitted gambling, and we had gone 
around to the different places and done just that. 
Canton was my testing ground. I went into a large, neon-lit bar 
on Main Street, bought a drink, paid for it, and then called the 
bartender over. I showed him my identification and said "Mister, 
you're serving liquor here and that's against the law. You have to 
go to jail." He broke into laughter. 
"Really, mister," I said, "I'm not kidding." 
He called some people over and said, "Come here and listen to 
this kid. Now tell them what you just told me." 
"I'm a liquor enforcement agent and I bought this liquor and it's 
against the law for you to sell liquor. Now you have to go to jail." 
There was more laughter. 
"What are you going to do if I don't go with you?" he asked. 
"I'm going to have to take you," I said. 
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"Punk, get on out of here," he said. "You don't understand 
what's going on. You aren't taking anybody to jail." 
"Yessir," I said, "I'm going to take you to jail, one way or 
another." 
At that point I took out the pistol they had told me I could wear 
and hit him on the head. Blood popped out all over, and he hit the 
floor. I was as scared then as I ever expect to be. I turned and, 
waving my gun at the crowd, said, "Don't anybody move, please 
just don't move, I'm scared, I'm frightened, and if anybody moves 
around here I'm liable to shoot you." 
That bartender went to the hospital before he went to jail, but 
he did go to jail. The word got around in Canton that when the 
young kid says you gotta go to jail, you go. 
As my reputation grew, so did my attitude. Finally I provoked 
an incident that got me transferred. 
The agent in charge of my district sent me to the neighboring 
county, to a small town that was supposed to have a number of 
bootleg joints. I was to meet a deputy sheriff and we would raid the 
places together. The two of us met on the edge of town in the 
middle of the afternoon, agreed to meet in a certain neighborhood 
that night, and parted. I wandered into town looking for a place to 
eat. I had a hamburger and started walking again. At the town's 
sole movie theatre, the feature was 'The Jackie Robinson Story'. I 
had never seen it, so I decided to spend the time watching that first 
of the antisegregation films. I was walking down the dark aisle 
when I heard my name called. I turned and there was the deputy 
sheriff. We walked back to the lobby and he explained to me that 
because I was a Negro I would have to sit in the last five rows on 
the left-hand side of the theatre. I could tell he was embarrassed to 
have to do it, but that hardly mattered. Here was one law-
enforcement officer telling another that he was going to have to sit 
in a segregated section of a theater. It is only a heavy irony that 
The Jackie Robinson Story was playing. But I suddenly understood 
what was going on in that town, what I was being called upon to 
do. 
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I still had some time. I walked out of the theater and into the 
nearest bar. I asked for a drink and was told I had to go behind a 
pillar, all colored people had to get their drinks at the end of the 
bar. 
"Are you kidding?" I asked. 
"No, I'm not," the bartender said. 
"Fine," I said, and showing my identification. Nicely enough, a 
black legislator from Cleveland, Chester Gillespie, a Republican, 
had some years before shepherded through the state House of 
Representatives a bill requiring any establishment that sold liquor 
to operate on an equal-opportunity basis. There were five bars on 
the main street of that town. Within a half hour, I had cited all of 
them. I drove back to Canton, wrote up the reports, put them into 
envelopes, stamped them and mailed them to the state capital. 
The next morning, my boss, Stanley Cmich -- now the mayor of 
Canton -- called me in. He was steaming. He wanted to know why 
I had done whatever it was that I had done instead of what I was 
supposed to do. I said, piously enough, "They were violating the 
law, Chief, they wouldn't serve me down there." 
"You had no goddam business down there trying to get served," 
he said. "You had an assignment to go down there on the bootleg 
joints in the Negro neighborhood." 
"Well, it was still light," I said, "I didn't have anything to do 
and I went into these places and they wouldn't serve me. I had 
assumed that the department was interested in enforcing all the 
laws." 
"Give me the reports," he said. 
"I can't Chief," I said, "I put them in the mail to Columbus last 
night." 
"Get out of here," he said. 
Next day I was transferred to Dayton. 
It was in Dayton that I met my first wife, Edith Shirley Smith, a 
refined, attractive middle-class girl, very remote from the ruffian's 
life I had led. We met in October 1951, at a political party. Ours 
was a brief courtship, we were secretly married two days after 
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Christmas that year. Then the next month I was transferred to 
Toledo, and we had a weekend marriage for the next half year, 
seeing each other only two days a week. Finally in June 1952 we 
had a formal wedding with a Greek ceremony in Dayton, attended 
by the cream of Dayton's black society. 
Only one man on the force, Edward Payne, also from 
Cleveland, had a higher arrest record than I. Payne and I were 
transferred to Toledo at the same time to work together. There was 
bound to be trouble. 
By the time I was assigned to Toledo, I had long been 
disabused of any notions of fairness in the agency's enforcement 
policies. I knew that some spots were allowed to stay open and 
others were routinely closed usually because of some sort of deal 
on the local level. The collaboration wasn't always a payoff; it 
could be as simple as the dropping of a dime -- an old street phrase 
for the practice of protecting your own operation by calling the 
vice squad and informing on other operators. When agents like 
Payne and me come in from out of town, it takes a while to master 
the particular convolutions of local politics. 
In Toledo there was a black man named Jinx Green who ran a 
bar in an almost legitimate manner. I say 'almost' because he did 
have a pool table in the back room that was used, not for shooting 
pool, but for shooting craps. And I say 'manner' because, although 
the bar had the usual signs and furniture and openness of a 
legitimate operation, it happened that Green had no liquor license. 
He had been arrested on occasion, but never closed. Payne and I 
leaned from other bootleggers that Jinx was protected and 
permitted to operate virtually unmolested by the vice squad. 
We noticed Green's odd record in the liquor department files. 
We never asked the Toledo vice squad about him, we just went out 
there. 
It was in the middle of the afternoon. You could look in the 
front windows of Green's place and see the customers sitting at the 
bar drinking, and beyond them, through a curtained door,  you 
could see men shooting craps on the billiard table. We walked in, 
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ordered drinks, paid for them, identified ourselves, arrested the 
bartender, confiscated some whiskey and walked out to Payne's 
car. I had just gotten into the car, next to the arrested bartender, 
and Payne was walking around the car when this middle aged guy 
ran up and yanked open my door. He reached across me and 
grabbed the arm of the bartender, pulling him in front of me and 
yelling. "What do these sons of bitches think they are doing? Come 
on out of there." 
It was so startling that for a moment I just sat there, stunned. 
But before the bartender could get across in front of me, I grabbed 
him and hit the little guy's arm away. By that time, Payne was back 
around the car and he grabbed the fellow. It was an amazing sight. 
Payne was a thick, tough man, and he was having a tough time 
holding on to this wiry little whirlwind jumping around in his 
arms, swearing and raising Cain at the top of his lungs. Payne 
finally got him settled down enough to ask him if he knew who we 
were. He allowed that he understood perfectly well who we were, 
that he didn't give a good goddam, and we had no business 
arresting his bartender. We informed him that the bartender had 
sold us drinks, that it was illegal and we were taking the bartender 
to jail, and we would take him to jail, too, if he didn't quiet down. 
He quieted, and we took the bartender off to jail and booked him. 
The next morning in municipal court, Jinx, the tough, wiry, 
little man, was there and it was at that point we discovered Jinx's 
political strength. The bartender was fined twenty-five dollars and 
costs, with the costs suspended. Green turned to us, right in the 
middle of the courtroom, with the judge and the police listening, 
and declared his place was going to stay open, "and if you ever 
come back I'll kill you." 
Quite an amazing remark from a bootleg operator in the middle 
of an open court. One sees clearly what the word "political" means 
in the phrase "political reality." For the next six months, we left 
Green alone. 
In June, the governor's office sent two young investigators to 
Toledo, both white, to go out with Payne and me. They were new 
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and inexperienced, and the state office wanted them to go around 
with us to get a little street-wise. Payne and I had the highest arrest 
records in the division, so it seemed we would be good teachers. 
What's more, we were going to be accompanied by the agent in 
charge of our district, Al Kopan. Kopan had told us he wanted to 
put on a good show for these young white fellows from the 
governor's office, so we set up three places. The five of us went 
out, made our arrests as clean and quiet as you could ask and began 
driving out of the ghetto. 
Kopan said to Payne and me, "Well, that about cleans this town 
up." 
"Not quite, Al," I said. "there is a place that has been running 
wide open, both liquor and gambling. But the man who runs it said 
if we ever come in there, he'll kill us." 
Now Eddie Payne and I had what we wanted. Kopan coouldn't 
admit he knew about Green's place in front of these fellows from 
the governor's office, and he certainly couldn't refuse to go raid the 
place. And we would have the added advantage of the presence of 
two white agents from outside. 
Kopan looked at me a long minute before he said, "we aren't 
going to have a place like that running in my district. Let's go get 
them." 
The place was full of people. Payne went in first, followed by 
the two young guys and Kopan. I went in last, locking the front 
door behind me. I had changed guns, and was carrying the long-
barreled .38 special. Payne walked to the back of the room, 
grabbed a full glass from somebody's table, held it up in the air 
with one hand and held up his identification with the other and said 
to the bartender, "You're under arrest." 
Jinx came running out of the back room at full tilt. He ran into 
Eddie and hit him in the face at the same time and never broke 
stride. Eddie went sprawling on the floor, and suddenly there were 
two kinds of people, fighters, and fliers. The ones who weren't 
jumping out of windows and dashing for the back door jumped on 
Eddie. Jinx ran to get behind the bar, right over the cash register, in 
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plain view, Jinx had a Horse pistol, a Colt .38 on a long frame. I 
yelled to Kopan to stop him, and the two of us grabbed him just as 
he was getting behind the counter. Everybody was getting involved 
in the fight at this time, everybody but those two white boys from 
the governor's office, who were standing stock still in the middle 
of the room, in the eye of the hurricane. 
Payne had struggles up from the floor, with a couple of guys 
hanging off him. He drew his gun and fired two shots into the 
ceiling. I held Jinx off long enough to get my gun out and yelled, 
"Get back!" Jinx grabbed the barrel of my gun and Kopan did too. 
Just for a moment, the three of us were standing there, all of us 
with our hands on my gun. I forced my arm up as hard as I could 
and fired. Jinx fell back, but Kopan had been holding the end of 
the barrel. The bullet went through the fleshy part of his thumb. I 
wheeled around and shot Jinx twice, one in the stomach and once 
in the thigh, and he fell. I turned and there was a guy coming up 
behind Eddie Payne, about to hit over the head with a bottle. I shot 
the man in the chest and he fell. 
Suddenly the only people in the room were the five agents, all 
standing, and two men lying bleeding on the floor. It was over. We 
called the police. The ambulance came, and that was it. 
Both men lived, and when they had recuperated and their case 
came up they were fined on one liquor-violation count and one 
count of resisting arrest. Payne and I were told not to leave town, 
that the county prosecutor was investigating the shootings. We 
were led to believe charges would be filed against us, or at least 
me. But the head of the state's enforcement division, Anthony J. 
Rutkowski, now a municipal judge in Cleveland, came to Toledo 
and had a conference with the prosecutor. Afterwards, Rutkowski 
told us everything had been cleared up, there would be no charges 
and the shootings would be ruled justifiable. However, Eddie and I 
would be transferred to other districts. I went to Cincinnati. 
The Jinx Green incident was the last straw for me. I wanted out 
of the enforcement job. The job had brought me a number of 
luxuries I had never had before, nice clothes, a car and a classier 
39 
wife than I had ever thought I would be able to marry. Those same 
luxuries just gave me a taste for something better. The men I saw 
who had something better were lawyers. My brother was already in 
law school. A couple of lawyers I had worked with as an agent 
encouraged me, and so in March I had applied to the University for 
Minnesota and had been accepted. Shirley and I sat quietly in 
Cincinnati until September, when we left for Minneapolis. 
My marriage didn't fare well for long. Shirley and I moved into 
a tiny apartment on the third floor of an old building in St. Paul. 
She took a job at a hospital in Minneapolis, but she wasn't happy. 
Almost immediately, we began to have arguments, and by January 
1953 we had broken up. Ours had never been much more than a 
series of weekend affairs; we never developed a strong 
relationship. 
After two years at the University of Minnesota I had a Bachelor 
of Science of Law degree, which was about as negotiable as 
Confederate money. I came back to Cleveland with the 
intermediate degree, moved in with my mother and enrolled in 
night law school at the Cleveland Marshall School of Law. My 
brother, Louis, had just married, and he and his wife had moved 
into their own home leaving mom alone. 
My degree qualified me for nothing, so I turned to Judge Perry 
B. Jackson about a job as a probation office for Cleveland's 
municipal court. The judges make those appointments. I was 
appointed in September 1954, and kept the job through the rest of 
law school. 
The job as a probation officer enlarged my sense of social 
commitment and enraged me. Until then, I had been occupied 
keeping my own head above water. Now I felt relatively secure 
and headed for an independent future. But that job brought me 
again and again into contact with those who were not making it, 
people whose spirits had been broken by oppression, filth, and 
squalor. I was supposed to be their supervisor and guide, but I 
began to see that they needed more than that, they needed 
advocates at the highest levels of government. Being a probation 
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officer can be dispiriting, the feeling of helplessness can be 
overpowering. One night the wife of one of my parolees called to 
say rats had attacked her baby. I drove out there to their filthy 
apartment, bundled up the baby and took them to the hospital. The 
baby's nose and upper lip had been completely gnawed away. The 
doctors saved its life. There is nothing more to say. And what 
could I tell that poor mother? 
I graduated from law school in the spring of 1956 and promptly 
failed the bar exam. I stayed on in the probation department until 
the results of the June 1957 exam were released. I quit the same 
day I learned I had passed.  
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3 
HOW TO GET ELECTED  
BY WHITE PEOPLE 
 
The petty tacticians of local government are fond of talking about 
politics as though it were a game, subject to narrow rules and 
ritual, and arena for private competitions and personal ambitions. 
At the other end of the scale, the theorists and political dreamers 
conceive of politics as synonymous with all social life. Politics is 
both and neither of these. It has levels of play and levels of 
importance. The back-room maneuverings of city councilmen pad 
the pockets of a few and affect little. The protest politics of a 
legion of dreamers can turn the tide in a President's career and 
change the course of a nation. Even though it so often draws mean 
and ordinary men, politics is a grand human activity, and it is often 
cheapened by easy comparisons. The source of those comparisons 
is easy to spot: he is that constant figure, the professional 
politician. The professionals who make their living from political 
life find their levels of play and their levels of importance. There 
have been men of strategic genius whose time never came, and 
men of vast social understanding but no daring. And there are 
those who play only to survive. You see them all around you, the 
bailiffs, the commissioners, the judges, the councilmen. They play 
their game well enough. They keep their jobs and do small favors. 
They go as far as native wit and a knowledge of their people and 
their times will take them. But there are levels where men turn 
petty games into important events. The stakes are higher and you 
have to gamble more to win more. The game is tough and fast and 
sometimes meaningful. 
In the summer of 1957, thirty years old, still poor, but with my 
law degree, I began to move into Cleveland's political arena. Ten 
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years later I was elected the first black mayor of a major American 
city with a predominantly white population. I did things other men 
could or would not do. It came to me not because I had a new 
politics but because the old politicians had forgotten the most basic 
lesson: people, acting together, are power. They don't just have 
power. They are power. 
With $120, my brother and I formed the law partnership of 
Stokes and Stokes, with offices at 10604 St. Clair Avenue, in a 
lower-middle-class neighborhood at the northern frontier of the 
ghetto called Glenville. Louis had already been in practice a few 
years and had some clients. What I lacked in clientele I made up in 
direct referrals of automobile accident cases and criminal cases by 
the investigating police officers. 
In that first year, although I made much more money than other 
freshman lawyers, and as much as some veteran practitioners, my 
more serious efforts were political. I ran the campaign for Lowell 
Henry, a black man on my ward who was running for city 
councilman. It was an easy campaign, pure majority politics. 
Henry was running against a complacent Jewish councilman who, 
it was to turn out, owned more than eighty thousand dollars in 
slum properties. We used that and beat him. 
Running Henry's campaign, I grew closer to some men who 
would be important to me as political confidants and counselors, 
Al Sweeney, Perry B. Jackson and Lawrence Payne. Sweeney was 
city editor of the Call & Post, the Negro weekly newspaper. I 
would bet that from sometime late in 1957 roughly through to 
1971 after I left office as mayor, not a week went by that I didn't 
visit the Call & Post offices and counsel with Al Sweeney or, after 
Sweeney left the city in 1967, with the editor and publisher, 
William O. Walker. 
Perry Jackson, a black Republican, was a former state 
legislator, then a municipal judge, then a judge in the Court of 
Common Pleas. The late Lawrence Payne was Cleveland's second 
black city councilman. Like Jackson, he was a Republican. Both 
men had a sure understanding of the groundwork for political 
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success. That they didn't go farther in the politics themselves is the 
measure of white prejudice during their time. But they laid the 
foundation for me and other young black politicians. Both men 
served as mentors and guides in the early days of my political 
career. 
Also, in 1957, I joined the Young Democrats, an organization 
open to any registered Democrat under thirty-five. It was not 
devoted to any particular progressive ideals, but served as a kind of 
gathering point for the young men who intended to be active in the 
party. I tended to be more liberal than the regular party, simply 
because younger men tend to be more liberal than older men. But, 
like the party itself, it was mostly white. Most of the white 
politicians I was close to in those early years were the men I met in 
that club. 
But the most effective political work I did on my own behalf in 
those first years didn't look like political work at all. Jackson and 
Payne had advised me to get involved with civic groups the Boy 
Scouts, the charity drives, and NAACP and the Urban League. 
And the churches, always the churches. There is no more effective 
political force in the black community than the church. When you 
need good zeal, when you need people out there working for you, 
having a hundred black preachers out there rallying them up for 
you is invaluable, unbeatable. So, during the years after I started 
the practice of law, I did anything I was asked to do in the 
community. 
Judge Jackson would call me and tell me that some small 
church group needed a speaker and I would accept always and 
without question. There were plenty of times that I would end up 
talking to only two or three people, but I would talk and give them 
my whole load. For the civic and civil-rights groups. I would agree 
to be a chairman or co-chairman of particular drives, always 
volunteer work, never elected office. Long before I ran for 
anything, politics was for me a twenty-four-hour-a-day job. The 
party regulars never saw me coming. I had never worked through 
the ward leaders or precinct committeemen, the heelers. I worked 
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through the civic workers, the dedicated volunteer women and men 
who believe a community can be helped, but never think, or at 
least never thought in those days, of politics at all. They didn't 
think of me as a politician either. Later, when I called on them to 
help, they thought of my candidacy as different from that of a 
"regular" politician. I was the one who had worked alongside them 
on that charity drive back in 1959, or in the NAACP membership 
campaign of another year. Whatever our experience had been 
together, it was much more solidifying than the typical political 
relationship. Through this process, I developed a depth of 
relationship with neighborhood people whose existence was 
ignored by politicians other than Jackson and Holly. 
We say that politics is a twenty-four-hour-a-day job. Yet a man 
does have a personal life, a home, a family. These things have 
always been very important to me. Having them reminded me that 
I am in the real world, not outside it. My first attempt at marriage 
was unsuccessful at least partly because I didn't yet know what I 
was doing with the rest of my life. Shirley came to Cleveland 
shortly after I returned from Minnesota, but we didn't see each 
other, and in 1956 I filed for and was granted an uncontested 
divorce. 
In 1957, when I was in the middle of running Lowell Henry's 
campaign, I started to hear about this girl from Mississippi, a 
graduate of Fisk University who was doing graduate work at 
Western Reserve University. She was staying with friends of mine, 
and they were trying to get us together. Finally, the day after the 
primary election in September, I went over to meet her. I was 
feeling proud of myself, Henry had won big, and I was ready for 
something celebratory. And she was. Long, soft brown hair, tall, 
proud-looking and solid, a beautiful girl named Shirley Edwards. I 
told her I was going to be busy with Henry's campaign until after 
the general election. For the next month then I would have lunch 
with her on campus a couple of times a week, and we would go out 
once on the weekends. After Henry won in November, though, we 
dated steadily until, in late December, we decided to get married. 
45 
On January 28, 1958, we were married by Reverends Donald 
Jacobs and A. Fuller in St. James's Church in Cleveland. Carl, 
Junior, and our daughter, Cordi were born in the next three years. 
It wasn't until 1970 that our son, Cordell, joined us. In 1973, we 
agreed to seek a divorce. 
This, of course, was my second marriage to a girl named 
Shirley. They were both born in January and both were Capricorns. 
I met both of them at about the same time of year and married at 
about the same the same time of the year. My first wife signed her 
name "E. Shirley Stokes," since her given name was Edith Shirley. 
My second wife signed hers "Shirley E. Stokes," since her maiden 
name was Edwards. Neither of them liked professional politics. 
In 1958, I changed my mind about being in private practice. For 
one thing, Louis didn't like my political activities invading the law 
office. One of the few bitter arguments we had was that spring 
when I was running my nominal campaign for the state Senate. 
Louis didn't like my using the secretary to send out my political 
materials. I explained to him that I was paying half her salary and I 
could use her to do that as well as typing up briefs. But he just 
didn't want that kind of thing going on in the law office. If I used 
her only for legal matters, I wouldn't be getting my money's worth. 
The kind of law I practiced involved little clerical work. You go 
down to the police station in the morning, a bondsman tips you to a 
case, you get the name and number from a policeman, you talk to 
the accused, and if he can scrape up a couple hundred dollars you 
represent him. This is quick work, cash and carry, no checks, no 
record of money changing hands. Another one of those chinks in 
the edifice of justice. 
I decided to try for a post that would give me a title, and some 
sort of entrée to the political apparatus. I went once again, and for 
the final time, to John Holly. He got Mayor Anthony J. Celebrezze 
to appoint me assistant police prosecutor. By the time I left that job 
in 1962, after being elected to the Ohio Legislature, I had had -- 
including my time as a probation officer and as a defense lawyer -- 
eight years of contact with the administration of justice at its 
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lowest level, the municipal court. I witness that justice is not blind; 
neither is it just. 
White bookies flourish while black numbers writers, pickup 
men and runners were arrested and given fines and workhouse 
terms. White racehorse bookies took their bets in the halls of 
Central Police Station. A white prostitute house operated right 
across the street from the station. But black girls were arrested and 
run through on an assembly line. They were brought in, told by 
their lawyers to allow a finding of guilty, fined, and released all in 
a few hours. The police arrest record looked good, and the judge 
looked good. 
One of the few times I remember a white girl being charged 
with prostitution, her case was quickly thrown out. I was the 
prosecutor in the case. An Irishman whose last name was famous 
in Ohio politics and who hurried to get through his docket so he 
could get to the racetrack was the judge. The girl had been Miss 
Cleveland five years before this arrest. The detective testified he 
had called her for a date and they agreed to meet. He registered in 
a hotel room at East 105th Street and Euclid Avenue. He said he 
asked her how much and she replied twenty dollars. He said he put 
the twenty dollars on the dresser, she took off her clothes and he 
put her under arrest. 
The judge said, "Well, you know that she was Miss Cleveland." 
Yes, the detective said, he knew that. 
"Well," the judge said, "so how do you know that she wasn't taking her clothes off 
for twenty dollars just to let you see her body?" 
"That wasn't the arrangement," the policeman said. 
"She has already denied that she agreed to have intercourse with you," the judge said. 
While the policeman stood there, completely at a loss for 
words, the judge dismissed the case. Such judicial concern for the 
rights of the defendant was never exhibited in cases that involved 
black women, at least not in my presence. 
The courts' willing blindness toward the manipulations of the 
jailhouse lawyers is a perversion regularly practiced on the body 
and ideal of justice. Those lawyers merely hang around 
courtrooms, handling flocks of clients, and using about as much 
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knowledge of the law as the average man could pick up in a week. 
These men did little but convince accused men to plea guilty to 
lesser crimes than they were charged with. The lawyer could 
guarantee the accused man a lesser sentence or a smaller fine. And 
by convincing him to plead guilty to something, he removed the 
necessity for the policeman to testify and made the judge's 
handling of the case a merely clerical matter. The accused man, 
always poor, whether black or white, left the courtroom happy with 
his smaller fine, ignorant of the implications of the fact that he now 
had an incontestable police record. 
Payoffs reflected whatever the traffic would bear. One elderly 
Hungarian judge, now dead, would commit the most outrageous 
legal decisions for a case of liquor. Few judges worked past noon, 
and many headed for the racetrack at midafternoon to be the guests 
of two or three lawyers willing to place their bets, willing even to 
stake them for their losses. Homicide detectives were usually 
willing to lower a charge from first-degree murder to second 
degree, or even manslaughter, if two conditions were met. The first 
was that the man charged with the crime had to come up with some 
money, at times as little as a hundred dollars. The second, but most 
important, was that he had to be a Negro accused of killing another 
Negro. Money, of course, also determined whether a man would be 
charged with reckless driving or the less serious offence of failing 
to keep an assured clear distance, or in another case charged with 
drunk driving or the less serious offence of being in physical 
control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants. 
The bar associations know at least casually about these things. 
The news reporters know, too. But nothing is done. The 
administration of justice is wrenched. But it is not entirely blocked, 
so it is left alone, and the people who have get more, and the 
people who have not get more trouble.  
In 1958, I "ran" for public office for the first time. I circulated 
enough petitions to get my name placed on the ballot in the 
primary for the Democratic nomination from District 25 to the 
state Senate. It took only a hundred signatures, and fifty dollars for 
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the filing fee. I had no serious thoughts that I would win the 
nomination, and didn't campaign beyond the routine appearances 
before the endorsing bodies -- the newspapers, the Citizens' 
League, the League of Women Voters, the Cleveland Federation of 
Labor, AFL-CIO. The seriousness of my effort lay in finding out 
how many people would vote for Carl Stokes just on the pull of the 
name alone. This was part of the political groundwork I had to do. 
I had to find a control factor, a base figure for any serious analysis 
of my political chances. I chose the state Senate race because I 
wanted a district larger than a City Council ward, yet not so large 
that I couldn't find out easily where my votes had come from. 
Without any visible campaign, I pulled 5,000 votes. The man who 
won the nomination received 53,000 votes. But now I had 
something to work with. 
I was determined to run for public office, but I was just as 
determined to do it on my own and in my own way. I had my own 
purposes and ideals, which I knew didn't mesh with those of the 
local Democratic Party.* At the local level, the party exemplified 
neither the national party's ideals nor its power. It had not been 
able to elect a mayor since 1941. The prototypical politician of the 
time was Frank J. Lausche, mayor, then governor and finally 
United States senator, a nominal Democrat who was as 
conservative as any Dixiecrat and as independent as a cat. He was 
the first of what was to be a succession of "newspaper mayors" -- 
elected by the powerful Cleveland Press and its aggressive editor, 
Louis B. Seltzer. 
There are great advantages to having a strong and unified party 
behind you, but those advantages were not going to be available to 
me, not only because the Cuyahoga County Democratic Party was 
 
*But I am a Democrat. I align myself with the continuing philosophy of government expressed by out 
great Democratic presidents, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lydon B. Johnson, and by the 
majority of Democrats in Congress-men with commitment to social programs, men like Hubert Humphrey, 
Wayne Morse, George McGovern and Walter Mondale. 
 
divided and weak, but because I was black. I knew that I couldn't 
count on support from the party once I set out to tackle any office 
49 
beyond the level of city councilman. The party's patronizing 
attitude towards Negroes was all too clear. And I had no intention 
of running for councilman. I had helped put Lowell Henry in, but 
membership in the City Council repelled me. The only interests I 
could see being served by councilmen were petty and pecuniary. 
They counted their success by whether the office brought them 
money -- so much for allowing a new gas station, so much for a 
zoning change, so much for allowing a cheat spot to operate. Being 
elected to the Council wasn't a mandate to legislative 
responsibility, it was a ticket to a bartering system. 
Lawerence Payne said to say, "In figuring out how to win an 
election, if it works out on paper go ahead. If it doesn't, don't try 
it." I decided to project the potential countywide vote I could hope 
for if I ran in the 1960 primary for designation as Democratic 
nominee for member of the Ohio House of Representatives, the 
lower house of the state legislature. Party nominees for lower-
house seats were selected countywide on a "bedsheet" primary 
ballot -- a list of candidates which in Cuyahoga County might run 
to 150, of whom seventeen were chosen. I spent my off hours at 
the County Board of Elections going over the voting records. I 
wanted to find out how the community turned out for black 
Democratic candidates -- and whether they had had the 
endorsements of the local party organization, labor, the 
newspapers, or the Citizens' League. The known factor was that no 
black Democrat had even before allied himself with white 
candidates in the suburbs. I knew that I was running a race that 
turned in the familiarity of the candidate's name as much as 
anything else; in a typical election, the Corrigans, Pokornys, 
Gormans, Celebrezzes and a handful of Sweeneys always won. I 
had determined in the 1958 state Senate primary race that my name 
 
*As Anthony J. Celebrezze's political star rose in Cleveland, a man named Orlando A. Calabrese, a 
former bouncer in one of the randier downtown nightclubs, changed his name to Anthony O. Calabrese and 
ran for the state Senate. He won. 
 
was known enough to pull five thousand votes without a visible 
campaign. It took me several days of note-taking from the Election 
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Board's records, but I ended up with fourteen single-spaced 
typewritten pages of statistics that proved, at least to my 
satisfaction, that if I ran for the Democratic nomination to the 
lower house I could come in fifteenth or sixteenth. 
I called three of my closest friends and showed them my 
blueprint. I handed out a copy of my fourteen-page analysis and 
informed them I was going to run for the state legislature. They 
agreed that the figures were very nice, but wouldn't I be a lot better 
off running for the City Council? They though I was crazy, but 
they agreed to support me if I ran. 
The next move was a larger meeting. I pulled together a group 
of them, this time mostly white men my own age I had met at the 
Young Democrats. Once more, I gave them each a copy of my 
study and went thought it with them patiently, projecting the vote 
in the 1930 primary. This was in December of 1959. I showed 
them where the votes were, where my endorsements should come 
from, where my base vote would be, and what the minimum vote 
was to get nominated at somewhere around the fifteenth or 
sixteenth position. 
They didn't believe I could get the necessary white votes. No 
black Democrat has ever gotten those votes, but the reason was 
that his white political colleagues had always persuaded him to 
keep his black face hidden from the white community. The party 
had told him to keep his picture out of the newspapers and off any 
campaign literature in the white areas. No one had thought to 
challenge the logic. It seemed clear to me that other than those 
with politically popular names, people vote for you because they 
know you; if you don't let them know who you are, there is no way 
in hell you are ever going to get their vote. So even if you lose 
votes because you are black, you can still dip into the band of 
liberal whites if you can convince them you are progressive, 
socially committed, intelligent and, well, one extraordinary black 
man. I had everything to gain and nothing to lose by running 
visible in white suburbia. (Not quite visible: for campaign mailings we 
had two sets of campaign pictures; one for the black community, and 
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another, overexposed and with my mustache retouched for the whites. I 
didn't explain all this to the people at that meeting.) 
Now I needed an entrée to suburban political meetings. I 
couldn't just show up. There had to be somebody who would 
introduce me to the ward club leader and get me on the agenda. 
I needed a slate. How could I persuade suburban white 
candidates for the legislature to get on a primary slate with a 
Negro? For certain kinds of candidates who were running for the 
first time, I had two things to offer. I told them that I was going to 
wage an intensive campaign to bring out the black vote, and that 
by being on the ticket with me they would pull some votes they 
would otherwise not get in the community. Second, I was certain I 
would get the endorsement of the County Democratic Executive 
Committee. They were fresh candidates running against a field of 
"regulars" and were unlikely to get the committee's endorsement. 
Being on a slate with me, their own candidacies might gain by 
osmosis. This bit of maneuvering was certainly against party 
discipline -- if you are the endorsed candidate, you don't first run 
off with some rump ticket. I didn't give a damn about that. I knew 
that the committee wasn't going to endorse until late and that its 
endorsement wouldn't mean but so much anyhow. Those other 
fellows didn't know that, though, and so we formed our slate. As 
soon as the campaigns got under way, I started moving. 
And I mean moving. I would put a hundred miles a night on my 
car, crisscrossing the county, going to the Slovenian card parties, 
the Hungarian Democratic Club, the Irish-American Democratic 
Club, the Polish-American Club. I went into all the suburbs I could 
-- not just the old-guard upper-middle-class suburbs where I knew 
the liberal pockets, but the new bedroom suburbs filled with first- 
and second-generation ethnics, or (as we called them in Cleveland 
before "ethnicity" became an American watch-word) "cosmos," 
short for cosmopolitans. 
It was a marvelous experience. Those white people had never 
been confronted with a Negro campaigning in their clubs before. 
When I entered the room, there was a chill. The chairman would 
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rarely know what to do, so I would walk over to the other 
candidates and ask whom I should see about being called to speak. 
Because of the natural camaraderie that had developed as we saw 
each other every night, I could depend on finding the right person. 
Once I opened my mouth, I had an advantage over the other 
candidates. I was the alien, the exotic, and I knew I could count on 
their complete attention. Then the amazing thing happened. I spoke 
English. Enough has happened since 1960 that it is hard to 
remember now what a shock I was to them. But in those days 
whites, especially suburbanites, had lived in pure isolation from 
blacks. I feel certain that the first word those whites expected to 
hear come out of my mouth was "mother fucker." But standing 
before them was a clean, well-dressed young man discussing the 
biennial state budget appropriations for the maintenance of roads 
and highways, child welfare, mental retardation, and education tax 
formulas. I could feel them melt. Those people disliked Negoes, 
but they didn't dislike Carl Stokes -- didn't, that is, after he had 
talked long enough to show them he was a real human being with 
intelligence and understanding equal to those of the candidates he 
was running among, if not against. 
This was all brought home to me one night in Parma, an ethnic, 
blue-collar suburb of some 100,000. In Cleveland, Parma jokes are 
synonymous with Polish jokes. I was attending some political 
meeting. After I had spoken and answered some questions, a small 
man in a lumberjacket and shirt open to his stomach walked up to 
me. 
"Carl," he said, "I want to meet you. I'm Mr. Kwiatkowski. I like you, you talk just 
like us." 
I thanked him of course. A politician always does. Neither did I 
say anything about his calling me "Carl" while styling himself as 
"Mr." I knew that most of the things I had said had gone right over 
his head. What he meant was that he had never heard a black man 
discuss issues before, and he was impressed. 
 Politics, especially local politics, tends to draw second-raters, 
and I knew that I was bound to look good in that company. 
53 
Besides, I knew that I was intimidating those people just by being 
there among them. I was daring them to show their prejudice. I 
always went alone. There is a certain psychological benefit in 
walking into a room full of whites alone, letting them know that I 
am just as aware as they are that I am not supposed to be there. 
They were already on the defensive when I would go into my 
speech about democracy is supposed to mean in this country. 
Some years later I read Robert Dahl's 'Who Governs?,' which 
presents a theory of ethnic politics in America, based on a study of 
the political history of one town, New Haven, Connecticut. When I 
read that book, I understood instantly that what I was doing was 
what ethnic groups on the way up had always done. Politics today 
may not be what it was before the old machine broke down and 
civil-service procedures ruined the old corrupt patronage systems. 
But the ladder is still there, even if all of the rungs aren't. I saw that 
coalition politics as the Germans and the Irish and the Italians had 
practiced it was still possible. Dahl took New Haven as his 
example, but you can plot the same movement in any large town in 
the country. When the predominant ethnic group moved up the 
social and economic ladder, it moved out or organized politics. The 
people moving out may, at the most, leave one of their own in 
politics as a kind of boss. But it is always true that the group, 
having moved up economically, moves out -- out geographically as 
well as politically. And as they move out they are no longer 
interested in being ward leaders, councilmen, and judges, clerks of 
court or members of the school board, and they leave a vacuum for 
the next group. 
People take it as remarkable that I won the mayoralty in a 
predominantly white city, but it you look back on the history of 
Boston, New York, Chicago, the new ethnic group has rarely been 
in the majority and ordinarily would make up no more than about 
thirty percent of the population. A man in the advance guard of 
that sort of movement makes very certain he has his thirty percent 
locked up and then puts together what he can take from the rest. In 
my own case, I would spend about half the time with the base in 
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the ghetto, and then spread the rest over places where I hoped to 
pick up marginal support. 
And I played my appeals the way they have always been played 
in ethnic coalition politics. The Italian politician would go to his 
own people and talk about the need for Italian participation in 
government, he would rant and rave and cry and moan about his 
Italian pride, about injustice, about Italian culture, all of the things 
that stir the loyalty of the people. He would let his people know 
that he felt Italians should take care of Italians. Then he would go 
all over the rest of the city and talk about democracy, about how 
government is for all of the people, about the need for new 
coalitions for the common good. To outsiders he talked about the 
great melting pot; to Italians he talked about Italians. That's how 
we came to have Italian mayors, and Irish and German mayors. It's 
a game well defined and well understood by the people who play 
it, each in his own turn. It's the way things have been done for two 
hundred years. All the black community of Cleveland needed in 
1960 was someone who could do that same old thing for them. 
I put on major campaign, far more intense than any other 
candidate for the legislature was waging. I rented an office in the 
old Hollenden Hotel, the busiest hotel in the city, and from there, 
Blanche Bolden, my campaign manager, and I put it all together. 
Blanche ran the mechanics. She was a remarkable leader. She 
could mangle the English language, but she had the tough 
eloquence that can get people excited enough to work and work 
hard. When I was elected mayor either years later, I named her 
executive secretary to the service director, one of the toughest jobs 
at City Hall, since it put her in charge of managing the waste-
collection and street-cleaning crews, and she handled it with 
aplomb. In 1969, Blanche was discovered to have a terminal 
illness, and she died a few months later, not yet fifty. 
In 1960, blacks made up only about eleven percent of the 
county population. I intended for that eleven percent to be a much 
higher percentage of my vote. They must learn to "plunk" their 
vote -- that is, vote for my name only instead of voting for all 
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seventeen candidates, as the law permitted. This "plunking" would 
have the effect of multiplying each black vote seventeen times. 
This is one of the oldest methods used by white ethnic minorities 
to increase their voting strength. Now I had to teach my people 
how to do it. In addition, I had to wage a campaign in the ghetto to 
change the habitual voting pattern of a drop-off as a voter makes 
his way down the ballot. I was running in a Presidential election 
year in which delegates to the Democratic National Convention 
were waging a hot primary battle, which would ensure a heavy 
turnout by the white Democrats. This increased the necessity of the 
black voter to vote the legislative ballot as strongly as he did the 
top of the ballot for the presidential delegates. I knew that the total 
vote for state legislators in the county would be a good deal less 
than half the vote in the Presidential race. I had to make sure that 
blacks would make the extra effort to look for my name, regardless 
of any lack of interest in the state legislature. And I used that great 
source of inspiration, the church. I went to as many services as I 
could on Sunday, and during the week I spoke to the study groups. 
Having a preacher mention your name favorably to his 
congregation is worth any number of union endorsements. 
For the rest, I was running on a primary slate with five white 
candidates from the suburbs of Euclid, Garfield Heights, Maple 
Heights, Parma and Lyndhurst all predominantly ethnic and for 
that matter, racist communities. But those candidates wanted to get 
elected. They got me into meetings in their areas, and I 
reciprocated in the inner city. Every Sunday night Jewish liberal 
friends arranged for me to attend a coffee klatsch in someone's 
home in the Heights, a group of three predominantly Jewish 
suburbs east of Cleveland -- Cleveland Heights, Shaker Heights, 
and University Heights. I knew that by continually presenting my 
self to as many whites as possible, I would gain a certain margin of 
votes. I knew some people would forget exactly who I was but 
would remember the same Carl B. Stokes when the saw it on the 
ballot and vote for me. More important, though, was my faith in 
that margin of idealistic, progressive white people who are not 
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caught up in the tide of America's racial paranoia and fear. I 
suspect that that margin doesn't change much, never getting much 
smaller or larger. But it is always there. I knew it mainly from my 
experiences with community groups, the Urban League, the 
NAACP, the Boy Scouts, the United Appeal. In all those activities 
I had worked alongside white people and had found some white 
men and women I didn't have to mistrust. And they knew me. They 
were votes I could get. 
I made the rounds of the two daily newspapers, because the 
mass appeal of their endorsements were an integral part of my 
campaign. The Call & Post was devoting most of its front page 
each week to my candidacy. The one endorsement that was 
necessary, because of the deal I had offered my running mates, was 
from the Democratic County committee. That meant getting the 
nod from the county boss, Ray T. Miller, the man who had put it 
all together back in the 1930's. I turned to Charles V. Carr to 
deliver that. 
Some ten years later at a testimonial dinner for someone else, 
Charles Carr go the biggest hand of the evening and endeared 
himself to me forever when he introduced me by saying that he 
was "the only black politician in the country that doesn't take credit 
for Carl Stoke's victory as mayor of Cleveland." It was of course 
an exaggeration, but the truth was that a good two or three dozen 
people, both black and white, had been claiming personal credit for 
my success. And, to be sure, most of them had done something 
important for me at one of the many crucial times in my career. 
What they forgot , though, was how many crucial times there had 
been and how many activities had engaged me -- too many for any 
one person to take the credit. It was easy for them to miss that 
essential truth because I never built a formal organization that 
would bring all the disparate elements of my support together. I 
never wanted them together; the more that each of them thought I 
depended solely upon them, the better. 
But in terms of the importance to my career, Charley Carr's 
speaking for me to Ray T. Miller in 1960 ranks very high. At that 
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time Charley who was already in his seventh term as city 
councilman, was the Council's majority leader. He was one of 
three men who virtually ran the Council for a decade. The other 
two were the Council president, Jack P. Russell, a wily infighter 
who knew where all the skeletons were, and Russell's crony, Thad 
Fusco, the Council clerk. Those three men and Ray T. Miller had 
lunch together almost every day. Many fates were sealed as those 
men broke bread together. Charley spoke for all the Negroes, 
(whites always like to have one black man who can speak for all 
the Negroes.) I took my case to Charley, and he agreed to support 
me. He took me in to see Miller. Miller asked me a couple of 
questions and then said, "Well, Charley, I can't make any 
commitments at this point. Get his petitions filed and appear before 
the Scanning Committee." 
As we walked out of Miller's office, Charley said, "All right, 
You've got it. You're all set." All that had to be done was for 
Charley to remind Miller later that we had met. There was certain 
to be one black on the endorsed primary ticket, and it would be me. 
The fact is, my meeting Miller was a mere formality. Charley Carr 
told Ray Miller which blacks to endorse. 
Although, Carr got me the endorsement, he really didn't believe 
I was going to win. He was a man from a different generation, 
resigned to a mediating position, wheeling and dealing with 
whoever was in charge. Since Ohio's ratification as a state in 1803, 
no black Democrats ever had been elected to the legislature. None 
had ever won the nomination in the primary election in Cuyahoga 
County.  
The primary election was May 3. In the early counting, I ran far 
behind. I expected that. The counts from the black wards were 
always the last to be tallied. This was a pattern that was to repeat 
itself in all my elections. Because there were so critically close, the 
results were never clear until the small hours of the morning. And 
because the last votes to come in were always pre-dominantly 
black, there were always rumors that I had somebody out there 
waiting to see how many votes I needed to win and then "finding" 
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them. That night in 1960 I went home at about 1 A.M., running 
about thirtieth but still confident that I would win. 
Early the next morning I received a phone call from the late 
Richard Maher, the veteran politics editor for the Press. 
"Congratulations, Carl" he said. "You've just become the first 
Negro Democrat ever to be nominated in the Ohio legislature."  
That was the morning of May 4. It took until the middle of 
September to find out he was wrong. In the unofficial count I 
finished sixteenth, with 26,535 votes. Michael J. Crosser won the 
last berth with 26, 465. William M. Feighan, son of a congressman 
and nephew of a judge, pulled 26, 272, finishing eighteenth, just 
out of the money. But twenty three days later the board finished its 
official tally. In his case it didn't make any difference, he had 
finished too far down the line. But in my case, a few votes made all 
the difference. In the official tally, Crosser picked up 164 votes, 
Feighan gained 184, and I lost 102. Suddenly I was in the 
eighteenth position, and had lost the nomination by twenty-three 
votes. 
I had ten days to decide whether to ask for a recount. I was 
entitled to one recount, for which I had to pay ten dollars a 
precinct. There were more than 2,200 precincts in the county then. 
I called a rally. My supporters showed up and I put it to them. I 
told them that I thought we could focus on 150 precincts, all in the 
black community; that would cost $1,500. They responded with a 
zeal that was overwhelming. What had happened was that although 
I ran an intense campaign, and black people were solidly behind 
me in my effort, most of them didn't really believe I could win; but 
once the vote came in and they saw that I was within breathing 
distance of winning the race, they realized for the first time that 
one of us could make it. And that really put the fire under them. In 
this case, two days after that rally we had the $1,500. Lawyers 
would send checks for twenty-five dollars, poor people would 
come up with one dollar, little kids would come in with dimes. 
And beyond that, when the recount was actually made, we had 
more volunteers than we could use as watchers. The recount of 
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those 150 precincts took two days. When the new results were 
tallied, I was ahead of Feighan by nineteen votes. I had won, and 
Feighan had lost. 
Now comes the tangled part the period of legal maneuverings 
when being the son of a congressman can make a difference. After 
my recount, Feighan was entitled to call for one himself. But he 
didn't quite do that. His father brought in a couple of lawyers and 
called in his own staff and some campaign workers, and they went 
down to the Board of Elections, asking that the board call its own 
recount of the votes in those precincts to justify the figures. The 
board did that, and after this recount Feighan gained, I lost, and he 
was declared the winner by eight votes. 
What was I going to do? I had used up the one recount I was 
entitled to. I conferred with William H. Stein, the president of the 
Young Democrats, who had agreed to act as my lawyer, and we 
presented the position to the board: when the board ordered its own 
recount and changed the final results, it admitted that the official 
count was erroneous. Since it was this erroneous count that we had 
relied upon in requesting our own partial recount, our recount 
should be thrown out and we should be granted a new one, based 
on the corrected official count. 
Our Board of Elections consists of two Democrats and two 
Republicans. In case of a tie, the secretary of state votes to break it. 
The two Democrats on the board voted for my position, and the 
two Republicans voted against it. The secretary of state, a 
Republican, sided with the Republicans. We had lost again. 
Then I had Bill Stein ask the board to consider the matter an 
issue of law and to call in the county prosecutor, to make a legal 
ruling on our position. It was a classic scene. The board is sitting 
before us almost like a court. I'm sitting on one side in front of 
them with Bill Stein. On the other side are Bill Feighan, 
Congressman Michael A. Feighan and his executive assistant, plus 
their two lawyers. The prosecutor comes in and makes his ruling; I 
am entitled to a new recount. One of Feighan's lawyers leans over 
to the other one and says in a low voice, "File it." That lawyer 
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walks to the back of the room and makes a short phone call. He 
nods back to Ned Mann, the lawyer still sitting with the Feighans, 
who stands up. 
"I want to advise you," Mann tells the board, "that we have just filed an 
injunction and a mandamus action against you." 
I'm sitting there with my friend Bill Stein, and there they are 
with an army out there, people standing in the courthouse ready to 
file suits against us when they get a phone call. The mandamus 
action asked the Court of Appelas to restrain the board from 
holding any further recounts and ordered it to immediately issue 
William Feighan the certificate of nomination.  
The county prosecutor argued his position -- actually mine -- 
before the appellate court. Stein, as a friend of the court, filed a 
similar brief.. Feighan was represented by the same two lawyers. 
We lost, three to nothing. We appealed in the Ohio Supreme Court. 
By this time it was almost the middle of September, and we had 
reached the deadline for printing ballots for the general election. 
The Supreme Court ruled in less than a week, four to three against 
me. The Chief Justice, one of the minority unfortunately, wrote a 
separate opinion on the issue, asking, "When is a recount a 
recount?" He said that you cannot base a recount on an erroneous 
count. If you correct the official count, anyone who has relied upon 
the previous one ought, as a matter of law, not be considered as 
having had a recount. Nice logic, it seemed to me, but it didn't 
carry the day. There I was, eight votes down, and the legal war 
lost. That same afternoon, Richard Maher of the Press called me to 
ask what I was going to do. I told him I was going to support 
William Feighan in the general election, and then settle down and 
prepare for 1962. 
The battle over recounts had generated a great deal of publicity 
in all the papers and on television. I emerged from that primary 
much more widely known, and I believe admired, than I would 
have been had I simply won in the first place. I had been shown as 
a serious and competent candidate and a good loser. I was 
legitimized in the eyes of many whites who would normally only 
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have known me as just another Negro. When I ran again in 1962, I 
won without too much trouble. I didn't have to wage anywhere 
near the battle I had waged in 1960. I had made my own people 
realize I could make it. Now that they knew we had it in our grasp, 
they came out with confidence. The same pattern applies to the 
mayoral race of 1965. I didn't quite win in 1965, but a similar 
recount I had then brought me more goodwill from whites, and 
more confidence from the black community. Interestingly, I've had 
more recounts then any public official in Ohio's history. My 
mayoral victories in 1967 and 1969 resulted in recounts. But I had 
won those. 
Also, my system of analysis had been proven correct. I had 
come within two hundred votes of predicting not only the votes I 
would need to be nominated, but how many votes I would actually 
receive. And this was in a very heavily voted Presidential election 
year when John F. Kennedy was running. In Cuyahoga County, 
which is heavily Catholic, that made it difficult to analyze the vote 
from the experience of previous elections. 
Finally, I saw how the black community had perceived the 
recount battle as their fight for equality and justice. Remember that 
William Feighan was not only the son of a congressman, he was 
the nephew of a judge. Edward Feighan, the congressman's 
brother, had sat on the municipal bench for more than a decade. 
With his good political name, he was running for an open seat on 
the Probate Court bench, one of the most powerful political posts 
in the county because of the amount of money that was handled in 
wills and estates. When the battle between me and his nephew was 
getting started, the judge quietly tried to get his brother to call it 
off. He was afraid of backlash from the black community if I lost. 
He had reason to be afraid. That November, the vote against him in 
the black community was overwhelming. It was one of the rare 
times that a Republican beat a Democrat for a judgeship in that 
county. 
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4 
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS 
  
On Monday, January 2, 1963, I made history and began what 
would be a series of changes in the Ohio House of Representatives, 
as I took the oath of office as the first black Democrat ever to be 
elected to the House or Senate of the state of Ohio. 
It was one of the few times in public that I ever saw tears in my 
mother's eyes. She stood in the balcony with my brother, Louis, 
Blanche Bolden, Al Sweeny and a host of those from Cleveland 
who had helped make it possible. The system had worked. 
Traditional ethnic-coalition politics had proven it was as viable in 
1962 for a black man who understood it as it had been for two 
hundred years for Irish, Germans, Italians, Jews, Poles, and other 
ethnic groups. 
In the May 1962 primary election I had ranked ninth of 
seventeen candidates to be nominated out of a field of over a 
hundred aspirants. In the November general election, I ran twelfth 
of seventeen to be elected, and my 291,782 votes exceeded those 
of some of Cuyahoga County's most prestigious political names. In 
a county only eleven percent black, I had received a majority of 
white votes. 
All my planning, analyses, projections, and the hard work by 
myself and so many others had won victory. Now elected victory 
had to be translated into legislative achievement. That, I was to 
learn, was a whole new ball game. I was now in the major league 
of Ohio politics. 
Most of the political leaders in Ohio -- congressmen, senators 
and governors -- started in the state House of Representatives, 
whereas the state Senate seems to be more of a stopping-off place 
for men whose ambitions are not clear. For me, the tedious 
grinding pace and the oppressive conservatism in the lower house 
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eventually became overpowering but for the first few years I felt I 
was actually accomplishing something. I saw important issues 
raised and decided, and found some men who were serious, 
intelligent, committed and honest. 
Sadly, most of those men were not in my own delegation from 
Cuyahoga County. The men elected from my area refer to the 
legislators from the downstate areas almost contemptuously as the 
hayseed members of the "cornstalk brigade." But if a hayseed is a 
thick-headed man who can't think beyond his own narrow 
concerns, then it was the Democratic contingent from Cleveland, 
not the rural Republicans and Democrats, who were hayseeds. 
With the exception of the two or three of the seventeen Cuyahoga 
legislators, when detailed, knowledgeable debates on the budget 
occurred, it was the down-state, small-city legislators who were the 
best informed. Ohio has a national image of being composed of 
small, typically Midwestern towns, or at least typically Midwestern 
people. Yet is has eight large cities, more than any other state in 
the Union. Most of it's ten million people live in those cities. Less 
than ten percent of the people are farmers. Yet of its eighty-eight 
counties, half are still dry, these things mattered in the legislature, 
where each county, no matter how sparsely populated, was entitled 
to at least one representative in the House of Representatives. 
I was elected to a legislature in which Republicans 
outnumbered Democrats five to two and whites outnumbered 
blacks 184 to two. David Albritton, a black Republican from 
Dayton, a former track star who had been a co-hero with Jesse 
Owens in the 1936 Olympics, had already been serving when I was 
elected. 
 As the first black Democrat, I knew I was going to be watched. 
I couldn't afford to make any wrong moves. The only thing I had 
going for me was integrity. In a body like the legislature, where so 
many issues on so many fronts are thrown at a man that he can't 
possibly be knowledgeable on all of them, personal integrity is the 
one virtue that stands out. Nobody can claim universal 
competence. You quickly find that you have to depend on other 
64 
men whose knowledge in special fields is superior to your own. If 
you can't trust them, what are you going to do? I had to be a man 
who could be depended on, could be trusted. 
I worked hard at learning the structure of the legislature and 
learning the men who made it work. I didn't go to the lobbyists' 
parties and I didn't let them buy my dinner, and never accepted a 
favor from a lobbyist that could compromise my position on some 
future vote. The men I worked with in Columbus understood what 
I was doing, and I soon developed a reputation as a legislator who 
did his homework and intended to stay clean of the special interest 
people. In any legislative body, when a controversial vote is taken 
just about everybody knows how it will come out. This means that 
the party leaders on the floor will have canvassed all the legislators 
and will know within a vote or two how an issue is faring even 
before it reaches the floor. I also means that when you are asked 
how you stand on an issue, you have to be forthright, you can't be 
changing your mind. My colleagues never could predict in advance 
how I would stand on any particular issue -- I took some positions 
that were pretty unorthodox by traditional standards; but when they 
asked how I would vote, I told them straight and kept my word. 
My interests in the legislature naturally centered on the issues 
that concerned the people who had elected me -- welfare, housing, 
civil rights, education and mental health. And my concern quite as 
naturally brought me into conflict with the state administration of 
Republican Governor James A. Rhodes, whose main policy was to 
keep taxes down to seduce business and industry. With slogans 
like "Profit is not a dirty word in Ohio," and actions like ten 
percent across-the-board budget cuts in the social-welfare 
programs when the state's participation in those areas was already 
grievously low, Rhodes naturally became my target. Because of 
my position as the first black Democratic ever elected, I was in 
demand as a speaker. All around the state I would speak to groups, 
castigating Rhodes, articulating the social blindness of his actions, 
and itemizing the failures of the Republican majority in the 
legislature. These speeches were usually reported in the local 
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newspapers. When the legislature adjourned during my first 
session, I had done what few freshman legislators accomplish. I 
had gotten legislation passed under my own name, and had 
developed a position as an articulate liberal of integrity who could 
debate the substantive issues on the floor. I was ready for a 
comeuppance. 
My pet legislation was a bill that guaranteed a person under 
arrest the immediate right to see a lawyer. That this right was not 
already in the Ohio Code was in some respects inadvertent. I was 
determined to see it spelled out, though; the issue was too basic 
and important to just assume, I laid all the proper groundwork, 
presented the bill on the floor as persuasively as I could, and got it 
passed. A major and important victory.  
A couple of weeks after adjournment, I got a call from John 
McElroy, the governor's aide. 
"Carl," he said, "I'm calling you to tell you that the governor 
had vetoed one of your bills." 
"He can't do that," I said. 
"Oh, yes,” he said, "the governor can veto." 
"What I mean is, I said, flabbergasted, "that this bill is just too 
vital. He can't have any grounds for a veto." 
McElroy gave me some ambiguous talk about how my bill 
might be in conflict with a provision in another law. I knew he 
wasn't leveling with me, and I wanted to find out why. I told him I 
wanted to talk to the governor about it. He said come ahead. 
Jim Rhodes is a consummate politician of what we call the old 
school He is out of that same mold that produced the Lyndon 
Johnson and Richard Daleys. He stands over six feet tall and looks 
like a football player turned mortician. His gray hair is combed up 
in a small pompadour and then swept back. Although his clothes 
style has changed now, back in the 1960's he wore almost a 
uniform -- blue suit, blue shirt, blue tie. He must have had a dozen 
suits, all the same cost and color. Yet somehow on him it didn't 
look as plain as it sounds. He managed to look natty. 
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Rhodes never went beyond high school, but nobody ever 
questioned his expertise. And he understood power. He was mayor 
of Columbus at the crucial time of suburban expansion for that 
city, the 1940s. Unlike the mayors of Cleveland, who couldn't see 
beyond their own reelections, Rhodes saw that the suburbs had to 
be forced to incorporate as part of Columbus if the central city was 
to survive. Whenever a newly developed area decided it wanted 
water lines, Rhodes laid down his hard line. The suburb either 
submitted to annexation or it got no water. As a result, Columbus 
today has the largest land area of any city in the state. Had the 
same policy been followed in Cleveland, our city would not have 
been strangled economically by the surrounding suburbs who paid 
low sewer and water rates for Cleveland water and used the 
availability of cheap water to attract industry and business from 
Cleveland. After Rhode's mayorship, he was elected state auditor, 
and used his office to embarrass and subsequently defeat the 
Democratic governor, Michael V. Di Salle. Jim Rhodes lives 
politics. 
Until he vetoed my prisoner bill, I had never talked at length 
with Rhodes. I drove down to Columbus. When I walked into the 
governor's office, Rhodes was sitting in his shirtsleeves. He stood 
up and put out his hand, giving me his usual hearty welcome. 
"Hi, Carl, good to see you. How's the legislator from Cleveland?" 
"Fine, Governor," I said, "I came down to see why you vetoed my bill." 
He sat down and grinned at me. "You understand that, don't you?" 
"No, Governor, I don't" 
     "John, he called out to McElroy, "go get Carl's file." 
McElroy came in with a folder full of newspaper clippings. 
Rhodes sat there and rattled off the headlines: STOKES ASSAILS 
RHODES; STOKES SLAMS RHODES ON EDUCATION; 
STOKES SAYS RHODES PROGRAMS RUINING THE STATE. 
The list went on and on. 
"There it is, Carl, you know, you've been giving me hell all over this 
state. And you never heard me say anything, did you?" 
"No Governor, I never did." I replied. 
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"Well, now it's my turn," he said, "I've been laying in the weeds for 
you." 
My political education took a great leap forward. When the 
legislature resumed its session the next spring, the Republican 
governor and the second-term black Democrat from Cleveland 
began to find areas they could agree upon. And when the legislator 
gave speeches, he was much more, shall we say, issue-oriented. He 
attacked the terrible problems that existed in Ohio. He did not 
descend to petty name calling, or even name mentioning. 
There were, of course, more important reasons why on occasion 
I found myself siding with the Republican rather than the 
Democrats. The more important of those occasions arose in late 
1964, immediately after I had been reelected to my second term. 
The United States Supreme Court had made its first one-man, one-
vote ruling, which overthrew and amendment to the Ohio 
constitution that guaranteed each county representation in the 
legislature whether or not it had sufficient population to warrant it. 
Rhodes immediately drew up a plan that involved mapping out 
each legislative district within the already defined congressional 
districts. This would end the bedsheet ballot in populous counties 
like my own. Liberals and good-government groups had advocated 
this for a long time. But Rhodes had built into his plan a way for 
the Republican legislature to gerrymander the districts, 
perpetuating the dominance of the rural areas. The Ohio Democrat 
is a city creature, he doesn't even know what rutabaga looks like. 
When the implications of Rhodes's redistricting plan became clear, 
the Democrats were outraged. 
From my point of view, the Rhodes plan had at least one good 
thing going for it. More black legislators would be elected. I had 
won a second term handily, but I was still the only black Democrat 
elected, and I knew that as long as members of the lower house 
were elected countywide I was likely to stay the only one. Under 
Rhode's plan, at least three blacks would be elected from 
Cuyahoga County alone, and there would no doubt be others from 
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the other large cities. When the issue came up in the Democratic 
caucus, I stood up for it. 
This caused a panic within the party, since each vote was 
crucial. The reapportionment plan had to pass the legislature by a 
two-thirds vote, and the Democrats had just barely enough votes to 
block it. But one or two defections could change everything. Just 
before the issue came up on the floor, both Rhodes and Speaker of 
the House Roger Cloud asked me if I would support the bill and I 
said I would. The bill was brought forth. The vote was in progress 
when suddenly it was stopped. There was a phone call for me. The 
Democrats had arranged to have Bert Porter call at the last minute; 
the Republican leadership had agreed to hold the vote while he 
made a last-minute attempt to change my mind for me. Albert S. 
Porter, the county engineer, who had taken over as county boss of 
the party after Ray Miller dies earlier that year, was an autocratic 
and stern leader. As county engineer he controlled more patronage 
jobs than any other public official in the county, and that gave him 
at least an apparent clout that was seldom challenged. Except by 
me. When he called this time, I doubted that it occurred to him he 
had no club to wield. 
He told me that he had heard I was going to vote with the 
Republicans on the reapportionment bill. I said, "That's right, 
Bert." 
"I'm calling to ask you to change your mind," he said, "You're a young 
fellow and I think you have a bright career ahead of you with the 
Democratic Party. You're the first Negro Democrat to serve in the legislature 
from Cuyahoga County." 
"No, Bert," I said. "from anywhere in the state." 
"Well, yes, and that makes it more significant. What I want to do is see 
to it that you don't hurt that career." 
 "I don't see how I could hurt my career, Bert. As I see it, I get elected 
because I went out and put votes together that had not been put together by 
anyone before, and you didn't have anything to do with that. And in addition, 
I haven't seen the Democratic Party electing any blacks around the rest of 
the state. Under this plan, black legislators will be elected." 
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"I want you to know that our party doesn't turn on black and white. 
We're Democrats." 
A fine old street verb came to my mind when he said that, but I held my 
tongue. I asked him if he had anything else to say. 
"Yes," he said, "I want to caution you that this is such an important vote 
to the Democratic party that I would doubt very much that you'd be a 
welcome member of the party if you insist on voting this way." 
"Bert, they're waiting for me on the floor. I'll tell you what I'm going to 
do. I'm going right out there and vote with those republicans just like I was 
going to do before you called. Thank you. Goodbye." 
When I went back to the floor, the Republican leadership 
approached me and told me they would have the votes, and that I 
could change my vote if I wanted to patch things up with my party. 
I told them I wanted my vote to stand. So the bill passed by one 
more vote than it needed. 
The coalition between me and the Republicans paid off. I put 
through a strong fair-housing law; reform of the state welfare 
system; a law giving a person the right to designate that his organs 
be used after his death to save another's life; and major revision 
and reform of the state's approach to financing and staffing of 
mental health facilities. 
I learned how to function in the legislature in my own way 
during my first term and during the first few months of my second 
term. But after that point, my positions on issues often coincided 
with my political ambitions, which lay elsewhere. By the spring of 
1965, I had begun to see that I had a fighting chance to run for 
mayor. I did run and nearly took the prize the first time. When I 
was reelected to the legislature in 1966, I had my eye continually 
on two possibilities, running for the U.S. Congress or running 
again for mayor. 
In 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Ohio's 
congressional districts would have to be redrawn, along with the 
state legislative districts. Cuyahoga County's four U.S. 
representatives -- two Democrats and two Republicans -- were all 
veterans, wielding considerable seniority, and therefore power. It 
happened that most of the black community, because of the 
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segregated housing pattern, lived within the boundaries of the 
Twenty-first Congressional District, represented by Charles A. 
Vanik, A Democrat, a Czech and a sometime liberal. Michael A 
Feighan, representing the twenty-second District, was the other 
Democrat. The Twentieth District, which included the old-guard 
suburbs of Shaker Heights and Cleveland Heights, was represented 
by a rock-ribbed Republican, Francis M. Bolton. The other 
Republican, representing the remaining republican suburbs, was 
William E. Minshall. 
The legal authority to set the lines of the new districts lay with 
the state legislature, but in fact the drawing of the lines was put 
into the hands of local party leaders to work out. The leaders of 
both parties in Cuyahoga County agreed that they wanted to keep 
their incumbents. The most threatened was Vanik, a long-time 
congressmen who had good relations with the black community he 
represented, but would obviously soon face strong opposition from 
a black candidate. Bert Porter handled this situation by carving the 
black ghetto in half, giving Vanik some and Feighan most of the 
rest. The blacks were in a minority in both districts, therefore, and 
unable to elect their own man in either. 
The party leaders and the political writers at the white daily 
newspapers explained that this plan would benefit Negroes, giving 
them influence in two districts rather than one. This is the kind of 
influence we had for a hundred years. Those whites were happy to 
segregate us for their purposes, but when the segregation happened 
to become a political benefit for our purposes, it became wrong. 
They proceeded with their plans to redraw the district lines and 
politically integrate the blacks, while leaving them residentially 
segregated and politically impotent. I pleaded our case with Bert 
Porter, but it was a waste of time. 
The plan was submitted to the legislature. When it reached 
committee I formed a contingent of black leaders and white 
liberals and made another presentation to get the lines redrawn. 
The redistricting plan passed over our objection. I pulled the 
NAACP lawyers together and we filed suit in federal court, 
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charging that the redistricting violated the equal protection fo the 
laws and the one-man, one-vote principle. The suit was filed in 
1965. The U.S. district court ruled against us in 1966, and in the 
congressional election that year all the white incumbents were 
reelected. 
Comes 1967, another mayoral election year. Ralph S. Locher, 
the incumbent, is being roasted by the media. I think I can beat 
him. But what I would really like to do is get those congressional 
lines changed and run for Congress in 1968. The NAACP suit has 
been lying in the U.S. Court of Appeals for nearly a year. It is 
summer, and the deadline for filing petitions for mayor is fast 
approaching. I heard that the court had made its decision. 
Unfortunately, a Plain Dealer reporter, James M. Naughton, 
claimed a reliable source told him what the major decision would 
be and he ran a front-page story in the Sunday paper claiming the 
decision supported the NAACP position. I would have my district. 
I could sit out the mayoral race. But I didn't count on judicial 
vagary -- or reportorial inaccuracy. When the decision was 
announced on Monday, it went the other way, two to one against 
the NAACP position. 
We appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Three weeks after I 
was elected mayor, the court overruled the appellate decision. 
Victory was ours. The lines would have to be redrawn. A few days 
later I was in Columbus and met with Governor Rhodes. We 
discussed the decision of the court and he said, "We'll bring out 
your congressional district, Carl." 
It was my district. I had fought for it. Now three black 
Democratic councilmen lined up to run for it -- George Forbes. 
Leo A. Jackson, and George White. They hadn't supported me in 
my fight against the party to create a district a black could win in, 
and I'd be damned before I'd let them reap the benefit. I ran my 
brother Louis -- who had been one of the lawyers who argued the 
case -- and put behind him all the machinery which had just elected 
me as mayor. In the May 1968 primaries he soundly defeated all 
three of them -- soundly thrashing them in their home precincts. In 
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the November general election he defeated the Republican 
candidate and became the first black congressman ever to be 
elected from Ohio. Now in his third term, Louis is Chairman of the 
Congressional Black Caucus, a member of the powerful 
Appropriations Committee, and a nationally recognized political 
leader. 
My last shot as a maverick in the legislature came in the spring 
of 1967, when Jim Rhodes called me to his office to ask me to 
support his pet project, the Ohio Bond Commission. The 
commission, whose creation would have to be submitted to the 
Ohio voters for approval, would sell bonds to pay for all sort of 
projects and services that are normally paid for with tax monies. 
Rhodes had promised no new taxes, and the Bond Commission 
scheme would bring in $1.7 billion without taxes. 
The commission also happened to be a gigantic Republican 
pork barrel. The plan, once it was presented, was immediately 
denounced bitterly by organized labor and the Democratic Party. 
Instead of using actual income from taxes for essential services, 
the commission plan would have committed the state to 
extraordinary debt in the future. 
Rhodes appealed to me on the basis of what could be done 
through the commission. He pointed out that without new taxes 
there were not about to be any major improvements in spending for 
education, housing, health and welfare needs. I stood up in the 
Democratic caucus and said that unless the Democrats could come 
up with an alternative that would get these things done, I had no 
choice but to go with a proposal that at least benefited heavily for 
the plan -- both Cleveland dailies gave it a fervent editorial support 
-- and the entire business community, which saw it as an endless 
source of goodies and gratuities, was for it. I remember one terrific 
editorial in the Press that included my picture, along with three 
others, next to a text headed "Four Courageous Men." I already 
knew I would be running for mayor against the party's incumbent 
and couldn't expect their or labor's support. Further, I didn't see 
Cleveland or Ohio organized labor as any great friend of the black 
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man. Two years later, the Ohio AFL-CIO was still bitterly 
opposing a graduated state income tax. Why? Because union 
members are now middle-class and no longer are dependent on 
public-assistance programs financed from taxes. 
In any case, my stand was morally and practically right and had 
benefits in goodwill with the newspapers and business interest and 
didn't hurt anyone else. When the votes were counted in May, the 
Ohio voters expressed their own opinion and defeated the 
commission issue two to one. 
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5 
CARL JUNIOR 
  
Not all my battles were being fought in the legislature. I fought one 
at home that benefitted not only my own son but many young 
black boys who followed him.  
My son, Carl Junior, became five years old in 1963. Shirley 
went to the nearest public school to register him and discovered 
that the kindergarten class he would be attending already had 
thirty-seven children enrolled. This was early summer and parents 
were still registering their children. When I returned home from 
the legislature, she told me about it and asked me what I though we 
ought to do. Now, I had watched the deterioration of education in 
the public schools, and I was determined that my boy would get 
the maximum of the best education available. I had a friend in 
Columbus who had sent his children to University School there, a 
school connected with Ohio State University, and I assumed there 
would be such an institution in Cleveland. I told Shirley to look for 
a University School and left the matter with her. The next week 
she said she had found a private school called University School, 
but when she called she was told that no Negro children had ever 
attended there. 
I was not pleased. In the previous ten years I had worked on 
any number of civic campaigns and had worked with some of the 
city's "outstanding citizens," the civic-minded heads of the most 
prestigious law firms, businesses, industries, and utilities, men who 
publicly campaign against, among other things, racism. Here was a 
private school, obviously in the control of some of these same 
men, that appeared to be maintaining privately the very policies 
that they were decrying in public. 
Shirley and I went to the school and talked to the head of the 
elementary grades, Jonathan Ingersoll. He told us that he had been 
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trying to get the board of trustees to change its policy. No Negro 
child would be accepted. Others had applied and been turned 
down, he said-usually sons of physicians who lived in the suburbs. 
They had never fought the policy because they didn't want the 
publicly known that their children had been denied admission to 
this prestigious school. Now, I was a politician, a man who lives in 
the public, and I didn't give a damn about the prestige thing, I 
wasn't about to handle the matter quite so delicately. I told Mr. 
Ingersoll that I was going to make an application for Carl Junior 
and that he could expect that the school's experiences with me 
would me somewhat different from its past experience with black 
parents. (I later learned that Ingersoll had been forthright with us. 
He had in fact fought the issue, but had never won his case.) 
It happened that another black family was trying to enroll their 
son in the school at the same time. Dr. Sylvester Davis and I had 
grown up together; his family lived on East Seventieth Street when 
I lived on East Sixty-ninth. He was trying to enroll his son, who 
was the same age as mine. Ingersoll told me that Dr. Davis had 
applied and that he had had to tell him the same thing. I thanked 
him for his comments and asked for a list of the members of the 
board of trustees of the school. 
Shortly after we made the application, we received a reply from 
Roland McKinney, Jr., headmaster of University Schools, 
explaining to us that our son, Sylvester Davis, Jr., would not be 
accepted. McKinley's secretary had put Davis' letter into my 
envelope and mine into his. I immediately sat down at my own 
desk. 
 
  August 1, 1963 
Dear Mr. McKinley: 
       Ordinarily I would have had some problem in answering your letter 
of July 28, 1963, in that the envelope addressed to me and my wife 
contained a letter addressed to Dr. and Mrs. Sylvester S. Davis. The letter 
informed them that their child Sylvester Jr., had not been accepted for 
enrollment. Since, however, I knew that their problem was identical to mine, 
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namely the peaceful, uneventful acceptance of a young child who happens to 
be a Negro into a school which, from all appearances, has always been 
restricted to white students only, I was able to reason that that tradition 
would permit an identical form letter to both Negro families, regardless of 
the proper identification. No other ordinarily insignificant secretarial error 
could have so well dramatized an institutional policy. 
       Now I accept the fact that at the late date we applied for Carl's 
admission there were no vacancies. I appreciate in full Mr. Ingersoll's 
unsolicited effort to take this opportunity for University School to meet the 
challenge of these times by increasing the quota by two and accepting these 
two young boys. I do regret the arbitrary decision that this would not be 
done, which was made unilaterally by the board president and concurred in 
by you. 
       I reject the consideration of space as the basis for this decision, 
having seen the remodeling currently in progress creating larger classrooms. 
       My most basic reaction to this whole matter, however, lies with the 
information given that should a vacancy occur, neither of these boys would 
be accepted as a matter of course from the current waiting list. This, I 
understand, would require "further consideration." I doubt that this position 
would fare well under the test of public reaction. 
       Finally, the perdurance of this policy of segregation and 
discrimination by University School cannot help but affect my reaction to 
the public posture of some of your more widely known board members. I 
have worked closely with many of them in inner-city community affairs. 
There can be no reconciling of their 60-minute speeches on fair play and 
equal opportunity at community lunches in Cleveland and their endorsement 
and support of a suburban school's segregation policy where they themselves 
determine the policy. 
  Very truly yours, 
                                                     Carl B. Strokes 
 
 
Under the signature, I noted that a copy of my letter was being sent 
to all of he trustees as well as the officers and member of the 
corporation of the school, some forty-two people. 
My phone started jumping off the hook. Here is William Laffer, 
vice-president of the school and at that time president of the board 
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of trustees of Forest City Hospital, which is operated by black 
people and serves the black community: 
"Carl, this is Bill Laffer." 
"Hi, Bill." 
"I just got a copy of your letter to University School." 
"Yes?" 
"You were calling me a racist in there." 
"No, Bill. The facts might, but I didn't." 
"Well, we're certainly going to do something about this. You'll hear from 
me." 
"Okay, Bill." 
A couple of board members called and said they had never 
noticed there weren't any Negro children at the school. 
Ralph Besse, the president of the electric utility in Cleveland, 
wrote me a long letter explaining to me that I certainly knew better 
than to think that the school's policy in any way reflected his 
personal policy, and that he couldn't understand why such 
treatment was accorded me and that he hoped in the future other 
black parents would take the opportunity to register their children 
in University School. I never did understand that little piece of 
woolgathering, but I knew I had found him at home. 
A couple of days later I got a call from the headmaster. Would I 
come out and talk with him. Certainly. I went out, and he gave me 
about twenty minutes' worth of talk about being the new 
headmaster there, about the schools he had worked for in the East, 
and how certain he was that I was quite wrong in assuming that the 
school was excluding Negroes, that the school had no policy at all 
on such matters. I told him finally that, since he was new, he had 
no way of knowing what had been the school's policy. He replied 
that they couldn't have such a policy, because it was like the 
schools in the East where he had worked, and they didn't have such 
policies, and besides, he had gone to an Ivy League university 
where blacks had been admitted for years, and it was his personal 
policy that blacks should not be excluded. 
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I was beginning to understand what he was doing. He wasn't 
about to let my boy go to his school; he wanted to convince me to 
be quiet. 
"Have you spent the last half hour talking to me in the hope that 
I am going to withdraw the assertions I made in this letter?" 
"I don't know if you should withdraw the letter," he said, "but 
certainly you say some things there about this school that are 
simply not true, which I don't think should be permitted to stand 
unchallenged. You should understand that there is another side." 
"The only side I care about, Mr. McKinley, is that my boy is 
being refused admission to this school because he is a Negro. I 
guess that is as far as you and I can go, because there isn't one 
thing in that letter I am about to change, and I am telling you I 
mean it. I am not one of those Negroes who cares about having 
people know that my son was refused admission to this prestigious 
school. Your prestige means nothing to me. And I am not going to 
keep silent about those men on your board who say one thing at 
civic functions in Cleveland and then take another attitude once 
they cross those suburban lines. They may be able to get away with 
it, but not without everyone I am able to reach knowing about it." 
Oddly enough, Mr. McKinley called me back the next day. He 
was interested in reconsidering Carl Junior's application. Could I 
bring the boy out. No, he was in Mississippi, and wouldn't be back 
until the Sunday before Labor Day. Could I bring him out then. On 
Sunday? Certainly he wouldn't be making decisions about such 
things at that late date. Well, he didn't know, but he would just like 
to review the application again and talk with young Carl again. 
 Shirley and Carl Junior returned early, but I waited until 
Sunday morning to call the school. Sure enough, Mr. McKinley 
was in his office, as I am certain he is every Sunday morning. We 
took Carl out, and Mr. McKinley sat there and said, "You know, 
we have reviewed the application , and, since we have had some 
changes in the kindergarten class, we would like to have Carl join 
us as part of the school, which of course was our position all along. 
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We would like to know if he can attend class starting Tuesday 
morning." 
At such times it is hard not to strike out, but you hold yourself 
in and you don't do it. You act as graciously as possible, you say, 
"Yes, Mr. McKinley, we'll be glad to have him here," and you 
shake hands and smile, gentlemen all, for this is the way gentlemen 
act, and we are, first and last, all gentlemen. 
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6 
HOW TO TAKE THE HALL 
By 1965 it was becoming clear to me that the ethnic machine that 
had run Cleveland for more than a generation was running out of 
steam. 
Three years earlier, President Kennedy had been casting about 
for an Italian to put into the Cabinet had settled on Cleveland's 
Mayor Anthony J. Celebrezze for the Health, Education and 
Welfare slot. According to Cleveland's charter, when the mayor 
leaves, the post goes to the law director. Ralph S. Locher, my 
former boss when I had been assistant prosecutor, had been hand 
picked as the perfect law director. He was Romanian, a dedicated 
worker, and he posed absolutely no political threat since he had 
never run for political office. But suddenly, with the Presidential 
appointment, Locher was in by default. Conservative and patriotic, 
Locher was the ideal public servant to see to the ethnic community. 
But the years of neglect were beginning to show. School 
integration was the issue that exposed the wounds. In the spring, a 
group of blacks and white liberals attempted to disrupt 
construction of a new school being built in the ghetto; their 
argument was that the school was placed just far enough within the 
lines of the black arena to perpetuate an all-black student body. 
 In the confusion of the sit-in, a white minister was accidentally 
run over and killed by a bulldozer. And in the Murray Hill area-
Cleveland's Little Italy-there were a series of running battles 
between blacks and whites over the few black children attending 
the elementary school. All this served to boost the popularity of the 
racist president of the School Board, Ralph McAllister, a man 
whose only political sense lay in the ability to create an endless 
series of frightening sentences that always referred to the black 
community as "them." Screams of lackluster government were 
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being directed at Locher from all directions, mostly from lackluster 
men. 
I had been paying attention to al this when I began to get word 
that two shrewd veterans of the political scene were launching an 
effort to draft me for mayor. 
Geraldine Williams is a dedicated campaign worker. She stayed 
with me from 1965 through the 1967 campaign, and I named her 
one of my administrative assistants. Jean Murell Capers is one of 
the brightest politicians ever to come out of Cleveland. She 
understood what it takes to mix economics, politics and social 
forces into that curious admixture we call power. And she knew 
where the country ought to be going in relation to the needs of 
black people. But there was also a flaw there. 
Jean was riding high in the late 1940's and through the decade 
of the 1950s. She was a member of the City Council from 1949 
until 1959, when the black community turned away from her. In 
that year the white establishment, the local Democratic Party and 
the newspapers all turned on her and she lost her seat to James 
Bell. She had somehow forgotten things she knew better than 
anyone else about maintaining a political organization and staying 
close to the people. Her association with a major rackets figure 
became the subject of a newspaper expose, and other rumors of 
misconduct combined to discredit her permanently. Despite her 
political savvy, Jean never got over her political loss and in 1965 
was still trying to find a way back in. 
Jean and Geraldine announced in February that they were going 
to draft me for mayor. I read about it in Columbus. They hadn't 
talked to me about it in Columbus.  
 It was clear to me that Jean had a hustle in mind. I am 
confident, though, that she never intended things to turn out as they 
did. I understood that Jean wanted me to be her candidate, and I 
assumed that she really wanted to use me to force certain 
concessions from the 'regulars' in the race. That is not a new 
gimmick. You put a man you know is not going to win into a race 
to scare the incumbent. They you go to the party bosses and agree 
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to pull your man out if they will give you something else you want. 
This is especially effective for a black politician in a white city -- 
you can negotiate the entire black vote because the white party 
bosses believe you can control it, whether you can or not. 
I give Jean credit for not coming to see me and talking to me 
about her draft-Stokes movement, because she knew perfectly well 
I would never agree to it. Not only that, if I did agree to go along 
with her hustle, then she would owe me something. This way, 
everything was in her hands. 
The newspapers carried a running account of their efforts in my 
behalf collecting petition signatures. I kept quiet. When the 
reporters would ask me about it, I was able honestly to deny any 
knowledge. Meanwhile, though, Al Sweeney, the Call & Post city 
editor, and I began going over the figures from my legislative 
races. We figured out that although blacks made up only thirty- 
five percent of the actual population, they comprised thirty-nine 
percent of the vote. Ralph McAllister declared himself an 
independent candidate. Ralph J. Perk, later my successor as mayor, 
announced he would run as a Republican. If I filed as an 
independent candidate, that meant a four-way race. Our thirty-nine 
percent loomed large. We decided to let the draft-Stokes 
movement build its own head of steam. 
One night Geraldine called me at my home to say that a 
delegation from the draft-Stokes group wanted to visit me and talk 
about the petitions. I told her I would be in Columbus and they 
could visit me there. I could just as easily have met them in 
Cleveland, but I wanted to establish my remoteness from them. 
Sweeney and I decided that we would give the group a goal that, if 
they attained it, would touch enough people to set up a viable 
jumping-off place for a campaign. At that point, we would set up 
our own group and publicly disassociate ourselves from Jean. 
Geraldine and a small group came to Columbus. I told them, 
"Get twenty thousand signatures and I will run." You needed 
fifteen thousand to file as an independent. Geraldine swallowed 
hard and said, "Okay." She returned to Cleveland, and the next day 
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I saw newspaper stories quoting her as saying that I had not 
committed myself but that I had not stopped them. 
As the filing date drew near, I saw articles saying that the group 
had over fourteen thousand signatures. I decided to go see William 
O. Walker, the publisher of the Call & Post. I told him I wanted to 
run for mayor, thought I could win and explained how Sweeney 
and I figured it would work. He said that if I wanted to run, the 
Call & Post would support me. 
"We have some problems, though," I said, "You know Jean Capers is 
involved with this draft effort." 
"Yes," he said, "and I don't think it's good for you." 
"Well, we aren't too worried about that. We plan to get her out of the 
whole movement. But what we have to do is put together the framework to 
displace her." 
I told Walker that what I really needed from him, beyond his 
support, was his contact with the leading members of the black 
bourgeoisie. I wanted to put together a group of impeccable, 
influential men who would support me, a group that Jean would 
immediately see was off limits for her. I wanted the group to be 
headed by Dr. Kenneth W. Clement, and I asked W. O. Walker to 
intercede for me, asking Clement to head the group. 
Walker agreed and that same day he sat down with Dr. 
Clement, who at that time was probably the most prominent civic-
minded professional men in the black community. The white 
media, then and now, sought him out for quotes on all matters 
affecting the black community. Clement agreed to be my man, and 
I immediately set up shop to take the ball game out of Jean's hands. 
 The draft-Stokes group was really very small, and they hadn't 
got as much done as the newspapers reported. I called Geraldine 
and asked her to bring me the petitions. They had just over 6,700 
names, far short of the twenty thousand I had set as a goal. But I 
immediately called a press conference and announced that over 
twenty thousand voters had signed petitions asking me to run for 
mayor, and that a group of distinguished black leaders, headed by 
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Dr. Kenneth W. Clement and William O. Walker had prevailed 
upon me to accept the draft. 
Jean, Geraldine, Sweeney and I knew we really had only 6,700 
signatures. But nobody else did, and we presented the draft 
petitions at the press conference in a "Michigan bankroll," with 
real petitions at the top and bottom of the pile and blank ones in the 
middle. While the television cameras zoomed in and Richard 
Maher, the veteran politics editor for the Press, took notes, I riffled 
through the impressive stacks of petitions. Not one of the fifteen or 
more reporters looked through the petitions for himself. Then I 
dropped a bomb that nearly choked Sweeney. I announced that on 
my birthday, June 21, four weeks away, we would file 35,000 
signatures with the board of Elections and I would run as an 
independent. 
After the conference, Sweeney came up to me and said, "Man, 
what in the world made you say that? Where are we going to get 
thirty-five thousand signatures?" 
I told Al that we would get them. I knew that even for an 
established politician the collecting of signatures is an arduous 
task, taking considerable work on the part of his ward leaders and 
committeemen; the idea of a Negro running for mayor and without 
organized political support getting that many signatures was 
unbelievable -- to them. But past experience had confirmed for me 
that I had a reservoir of supporters the politicians and political 
writers consistently ignored -- preachers, civic and community 
volunteers, and the little people whose interests I'd fought for in 
the legislature. You won't get response to a political appeal from 
these people if you haven't laid the groundwork. But groundwork 
or no, my relying on them this time, for those 35,000 signatures, 
was a bold and dramatic move. 
 I went to my files and pulled out the names and addresses of 
all the people I had worked with in the community and in my 
various jobs as probation officer, prosecutor and legislator. I sent 
them a short letter, asking for their help and explaining how the 
petitions should be filled out. 
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Those letters had just been sent off when I received a call from 
a young white student at Oberlin College named Charles Butts. He 
said he had read about my announcement in the newspaper and 
wanted to help. He told me he had some experience in 
organizational politics and editing a newspaper in Mississippi. It 
was almost summer, the college had just closed, and Butts came to 
Cleveland. We worked hard putting the petitions and the letters 
together. But he didn't believe I could get the signatures, either. 
The next thirty days were marvelous. We worked out of the law 
offices on East Fifty-fifth Street that Louis and I shared with the 
famous defense lawyer, Norman Minor. People were almost 
constantly coming into the office, dropping off petitions and 
picking up new ones. But the impression was deceptive. June 21, 
my birthday and the deadline I had set for the 35,000 signatures, 
fell on a Tuesday. The Friday before, we counted up what we had; 
it was only eighteen thousand names. 
"What in the world are we going to do now?" asked Al Sweeney, who 
carried dramatic front-page pictures and stories each week in the Call & 
Post. 
"All we can do is let the people know we need those names," I said. 
I went to the two radio stations that beamed to blacks, and 
broadcast an appeal. I reminded the black community of the 
challenge I'd established for us. The word spread that Carl Stokes 
needed help. All that weekend and through Monday afternoon, 
people were streaming into our office, dropping off petitions, 
asking if the had time to do another. They came by taxi, by car, on 
foot, on bicycles. Children were bringing them in. We couldn't 
keep up.  
We had some keeping up to do. When relatively uninformed 
campaign workers are out there getting signatures, the often let 
somebody forget to write something-the date or the proper ward 
number or the city. One of the fellows went to a dime store and 
bought a couple of dozen pencils and pens of various colors and 
we cleaned up the petitions so they wouldn't be subject to technical 
challenges. We would complete dates, finish out the spelling of 
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"Cleve," sometimes change a date that was obviously out of 
sequence. 
Monday evening we had petitions all over the floor of the 
offices and up and down the hall. We finished the correcting while 
Charles Butts did the counting. At 9 P.M., Butts came up to me. 
"Something has got to be wrong," he said. "I've counted them three 
times, and I keep coming up with thirty-seven thousand 
signatures." 
We had done it. The next morning, Butts and I had all the 
petitions copied by photostat, to guard against any wrong-doing 
after the petitions left our hands, and took them to the Board of 
Elections. It made a dramatic news conference. We had actually 
picked up a couple of thousand signatures from the white West 
Side. Not many, but some. At the news conference, I was asked if 
the signatures were all from black areas. 
"Oh, no," I said. "Well over ten percent of these signatures are 
from white areas." 
That figure was at least twice as many as we had. But some 
times you have to help white people believe they can forgo their 
prejudices. Stretching the truth in this case made a lot of liberals 
feel proud of themselves, and more able and willing to help later. 
The fact of that signature drive was that the added theatricality of 
my arbitrary deadline and the unnecessarily high goal gave my 
people a challenge and kept the adrenalin flowing. When we made 
it, they were able to congratulate themselves much more feelingly 
than would have been possible in a routine petition drive. They 
didn't think about what would have happened if we hadn't made it. 
I had the added fillip of nine days between filing the 37,000 
signatures and the actual filing deadline of June 30. We picked up 
14,000 more signatures, for a total of 51,000. Very impressive. 
We had been having campaign meetings every Thursday night 
at the Call & Post building. Each time, more people would show 
up. The campaign was organized by blacks and their support was 
my base, the thirty-nine percent. But I knew I needed white votes 
and white workers in the campaign-whites I could trust. I began 
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with Lois Hays, an old friend who served with me on the board of 
Fairhill Psychiatric hospital; she became treasurer and co-
chairman. Her being treasurer was important. Lois' integrity and 
that of her husband, Robert, an investment banker, were vital 
because at every step I had to build a confidence in the white 
community about the legitimacy of my effort. The other co-
chairman was Walter Wills, a black funeral home director widely 
respected in both the black and the white communities. 
Next I went to the Plain Dealer and the Press to ask for their 
endorsements. I had little hope of getting them, but it was 
important to me to let them know that I knew I could win. I wanted 
them to think back on how I had explained to them that I would 
win for the legislature and how they hadn't believe me. Both 
eventually came out for Locher, praising his honestly, his hard 
work and his clean record. His lack of accomplishment and his 
adamant stance against leaders of the black community were not 
mentioned. 
The newspaper endorsements didn't strike me as being the 
products of ill will. But it was different with the local Democratic 
Party. I had gone against Bert Porter, the county boss, before, and 
this time I wasn't even running as a Democrat, but as an 
independent. Everybody knew I was a Democrat and intended to 
stay one. But I ran as an independent to force a four-way race. Bert 
Porter took my campaign as a civil-rights action and did what he 
could to discredit me. He had me barred from speaking at any 
Democratic ward meetings. And organized labor, while not as 
open in its techniques, was more virulent in its opposition. The 
AFL-CIO was notifying it members that Ralph Locher was the 
only "safe" candidate. 
The other group that opposed me, sadly enough, was the black 
politicians in the Democratic Party. I had to run over them. They 
always ran scared, staying safely within the fold of party 
dominance. They had a persistent and debilitating lack of faith in 
or understanding of the black community. They were as certain as 
Bert Porter that I would lose, and they were not about to jeopardize 
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their standing with the mayor and the party by supporting me. In 
the primary, Locher was running against County Recorder Mark 
McElroy, another weak candidate. Locher received 53.6 percent of 
the Democratic vote, but only 23 percent of the black vote. The 
councilman should have seen that we could get the man. 
The popular belief, sometimes encourage by me, is that I 
became a legitimate or serious mayoral candidate in 1967 when the 
Plain Dealer endorsed me. The implications are that until I was 
recognized as a fully functioning, competent man by the white 
establishment, I was not for real. There is a certain truth to that 
implication Until I could impress the white community with my 
competence, they were not about to believe that I was really as god 
as any white man, even a ninth-grade dropout like Ralph J. Perk. 
Until I did that, I knew I could count on precious few white votes. 
But the truth of the matter is, I did my own legitimization, and I 
did it in 1965, and I did it by debating Ralph J. Perk. 
About a week into the campaign for the general election, Perk 
made the sort of statement that has characterized his career, both in 
its disregard of the facts and in its appeal to the anti-tax voting 
blocs. Perk's campaign cry has always been "Economy and 
efficiency, no new taxes." In this case he said that the city could 
meet its needs and being about needed improvements on the 
income it had if it were only run efficiently. When I read this 
remark in the Plain Dealer the next morning, I said to Charlie 
Butts, "I think we've got him. This is our chance to legitimize this 
campaign." 
I knew I had great credibility problems. This especially 
bothered me when I could see it expressed among my own people, 
my base. Of course, the white areas just weren't prepared to 
concede that any black man had the intelligence to run for mayor. 
That is probably the nicest thing they thought. Now I saw an 
opportunity to bridge the gap. 
I arranged with a friend to get an open date at the City Club, 
Cleveland's most popular public forum. The club has for over fifty 
years been the traditional forum for debates and speeches by 
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Presidents, governors and outstanding public and private 
personages. I wired Perk telling him he was wrong in his finance 
remarks, told him the City Club was available and challenged him 
to a debate. Perk had to bit on that one. As county auditor, he just 
had to believe he knew more about finances than a Carl Stokes. 
Few Clevelanders were aware of how hard I worked on the state 
budget in learning its intricate details of state financing. It was a 
great chance for me, the opportunity to demonstrate to the entire 
town that I knew more about city finances than Ralph Perk. Or any 
other candidate for that matter. 
The Monday before the Friday debate, I checked into the 
Hollenden Hotel, and for the next five days I lived in what was 
virtually an intellectual gymnasium. Butts and I had put together 
every document, pamphlet and report on city finances that could be 
found. Much of the time I spent studying them. The rest of the time 
I spent talking to various experts on finances. One of them was 
Locher's own budget director. Butts would be out making 
appointments with everyone he thought could help, and those 
people would in turn recommend others. I developed a depth of 
understanding from the parade of opinions. I questioned and 
probed, and when they left I read and studies. Thursday I started 
writing my speech. That night I called Butts and told him, 
"Charlie, we're going to bust him wide open." 
I had put together a short speech with a stagging set of statics 
and interactable facts about the city. The speech was written so that 
a reporter couldn't take a solid quote from it without including my 
fingers. It was all meat. 
Perk came in with a public-relations gimmick. It was a neat 
example of the point he wanted to make. He had a series of stacks 
of poker chips set up on the table in front of him. He told his 
audience the chips represented the people Laushe had hired, and 
former Mayor Thomas A Burke had hired and Celebrezze had 
hired, and Locher himself had hired. Declaiming, "This is what 
needs to be done at City Hall," he swept his arm across the table 
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and knocked off all the poker chips, clattering across the floor, 
"Clean out that place," he said for emphasis.  
It was the strongest part of his presentation, and it obviously 
had an effect on the audience. 
In my rebuttal I devastated him in one line: "I don't know if Mr 
Perk is right or not that those poker chips represent employees the 
city doesn't need. The one thing I do know is that those chips 
represent people, and you don't smash people." 
The effect on that audience, and on the reporters, let alone Perk, 
was electrifying. I had their rapt attention. I then went into my 
speech, hammering home the documented and unrefutable facts 
supporting the city's need for more money. The speech flowed so 
well, hit so hard, and I was thoroughly familiar with all its facts, 
that there was no contest between Perk and myself on the issues. In 
the question-and-answer period, I inundated him and the audience 
with additional facts, figures and statistics. No histrionics. I 
intended this to be intellectual slaughter, and it was. My hard work 
had paid off 
After that debate one black man came up to me and made this 
remark: "Stokes, I was so proud of you. I never knew that a brother 
could know that much about finances." Now, he didn't know 
whether I really knew that stuff, but it sounded so impressive he 
had to believe I did. It was the reaction I had planned for. Most 
voters can't really judge competence. That is not meant to be a 
denigrating remark -- it is just that a subject like city finances is so 
specialized and complicated that most voters have neither the 
opportunity nor the inclination to master it. I knew that my main 
need was to put together remarks with fluidity and the feel of 
expertise. My speech was assembled not so much to inform as to 
overwhelm. When you campaign for office, you don't care so 
much about educating voters to the issues, you care about 
educating them to you, to give them confidence in your abilities. 
People will vote for a candidate when they won't vote for the 
issues he stands on. The word began to spread in the black 
community, and a new recognition of what I was doing and a new 
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excitement were developing. The realization that an actual black 
man was out there threatening to do something important that had 
never been done before began to be brought home in many ways. I 
was never made more mindful of this than during a parade the 
black ministers staged. They had gotten several convertibles from 
the auto dealers, streamers and banners and whatnot, and 
advertised the parade on the black radio stations. 
Shirley and I were riding up on the back seat of a car, with big 
signs on the side that had my name and mayoral slogan. When we 
passed Central High School, a group of black kids, yelled and 
waved at us. We waved back, and as we did, one of the smaller 
boys jumped up in the air and shouted, "He's colored, he's 
colored!" Then he ran down the street, skipping and clapping his 
hands, yelling "He's colored, he's colored, he's colored!" That little 
boy felt, perhaps for the first time in his life, black pride. 
 For election night, we had two headquarters -- the ballroom in 
the Sheraton Cleveland Hotel downtown and the Call & Post 
auditorium out in the ghetto. Both rooms were filled with a most 
unlikely mix of people. Welfare mothers and wealthy residents of 
Shaker Heights. Ministers, truck drivers, laborers, doctors and 
lawyers, both white and black. Teen-agers and little kids. Out of a 
variety of motives that ran from idealism and personal 
commitment to guilt, people came. People who had previously 
ignored politics. People who had been deliberately excluded from 
politics. They gathered at those headquarters and waited to see the 
results of their work. 
It was a bitter night, the early editions of the Press had 
broadcast, almost as a warning, that black voters were turning out 
in unprecedented numbers. That scared out the whites in the 
afternoon. By the end of the day, it had become the highest turnout 
for any municipal election up to that time. Of some 338,000 
registered voters, 237,000 had voted. Locher received 87,967 
votes. I received 85,675. Perk received less than half of my vote, 
and McAllister got less than half of his. I had lost by less than one 
percent of the vote. 
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I had to move quickly, both to cool the high and bitter feelings I 
knew were building and to let my people know that we had proven 
we could win. It was a difficult speech, but I tried to get across not 
merely that we had a moral victory but that in short order real 
victory could be ours. Their mind had to be taken off the 
immediate defeat. I reminded them of the recounts I'd had for the 
legislature and set a goal of $10,000 for them to raise for another 
recount. They raised it within three days. The recount we had a 
week later did not change the results. But we had taken on an 
incumbent who had the support of the two newspapers, the local 
Democratic Party, organized labor and his twelve thousand city 
employees and we had come within one percent of beating him. A 
far as I was concerned, we had beaten not only Locher but the 
whole traditional establishment of political power, and in two years 
we would take it for good. 
There is one more thing to be said about the 1965 campaign. In 
terms of the politics of coalition, of zeal and commitment, the 1965 
campaign was the high point of my career. Just as, in 1960 my 
campaign had produced the hard work and the excitement and 
people involved that carried over into an efficient machine for 
electing me to the legislature two years later, so in 1965 the 
workers together my effort did so with a dedication that come only 
from working toward a goal that no one else believes can be 
achieved. In 1967, I had the support of much of the power structure 
I had men working with me who understood administrative 
procedures and how to most efficiently use manpower. It was an 
effective, expensive machine. But the human excitement of that 
campaign was at a much lower level. And in 1969, for my 
reelection, it was almost all machine. We hardly needed the 
volunteer help that was an absolute necessity in 1965. Such 
developments are probably inevitable, but to me they are 
disheartening. It is a truism among some socialist philosophers to 
say that the revolution always runs out of fervor. I have seen the 
truth of that, and it is a sad truth. 
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7 
TAKING OVER 
 
Cleveland has been a city in which "caretaker" mayors, men like 
Ralph S. Locher, Anthony J. Celebrezze and Frank J. Lausche, 
could respond mainly to the public relations and ignore the gut 
issues. They were able to survive in Cleveland for a quarter of a 
century, until the years of neglect created problems so obvious, so 
threatening to that sense of order everyone wanted to protect that 
the very people and institutions that created the conditions turned 
savagely on Locher and caused his defeat. 
Over the years, the newspapers, the business community and 
the electorate, comprised primarily of lower-middle-income blue-
collar whites, had successfully resisted taxes and spending in areas 
vital to the basic health of the city. After World War II, when the 
deterioration of our cities became apparent, there was a complete 
failure to respond. City government was praised when it could 
show itself to be frugal. Nobody cared that it wasn't providing 
health services, wasn't enforcing housing and building codes, 
wasn't adequately collecting garbage and rubbish or building 
recreation areas. When I say nobody, I include the newspapers. 
And those same attitudes toward money were causing the collapse 
of our school system. 
The mayors before Locher understood the mentality of the 
people to whom then felt accountable: the Middle and Eastern  
European immigrant who inherited a traditional dislike of 
government; heads of newspapers, who merely reflected the 
failings of most newspaper editors around the country in their 
conservatism and insensitivity to the changes going on around 
them; the business leaders, who, beyond their opposition to taxes, 
were waging their own internal wars which militated against their 
heading toward even routine innovations. And in the government 
94 
itself these mayors were responding to a thirty-three man City 
Council, with its ward system and it parochialism, a Council that 
fought any issue that might benefit blacks, even if whites would 
benefit at the same time. Locher, a mayor by default, tried to 
perpetuate those attitudes under a crisis conditions. Cleveland 
wandered into the late 1960's surrounded by its failures and fearful 
of its future. Ralph Locher could hardly be expected to respond to 
the situation; he had nothing in his background to help him 
understand urban problems or take a principled stand on an issue 
as important as racial conflict. 
The newspapers weren't about to force Locher to face his 
problems. They had themselves partly create and them supported 
Cleveland's petty political situation in which a mayor could make 
himself look good by waging a phony battle against a public utility 
asking for a rate increase. They had themselves not noticed that a 
third of the people were being systematically excluded from 
business and from cultural and governmental institutions. They 
couldn't notice it. They were excluding those people themselves. 
In the summer of 1966, Ralph Locher was walking blindly 
along, tied to this monster. In July it turned on him. Fittingly 
enough, it happened in the Hough area, once Cleveland's proudest 
neighborhood, which had been turned over to the Jews when the 
rich moved out and then turned over to the blacks when it was 
completely sapped. In four days of rioting, four persons were killed 
and ten wounded. There had been more than a million dollars in 
damages. It ended only after Locher, indecisive from the 
beginning, finally called for the National Guard. The Hough riot 
had been preceded by a number of smaller incidents that would 
have alerted any reasonable viewer to the desperate situation: 
roving gangs of white youths beating up blacks, abuse of blacks by 
whites adults, and police who allowed and sometimes participated 
in the act. The entire black community had been enraged when 
Cleveland's police chief, Richard R. Wagner, told a committee of 
the state legislature that the state should keep the death penalty as a 
defense against growing black nationalism.  
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To Wagner, the death penalty was all that stood between the 
black menace and defenseless whites. (Not defenseless himself, 
Wagner roamed the streets of Cleveland during the Hough riot 
armed with a deer rifle.) The statement seemed to call for an 
explanation from Wagner's boss, the mayor. The United Freedom 
Movement, a group formed during a bitter school integration fight 
the year before, sent a delegation of ministers to see Locher. He 
had them thrown into jail. Sit-ins and picketing at City Hall drew 
no response, nor did similar activities at Locher's home. The 
mayor's position was that certain "channels' had to be gone through 
before the mayor would see anybody, and, besides, the mayor 
could choose which persons he would allow to see him. 
By January of 1967 Locher had become everybody's target; the 
man was being destroyed. At the turn of the year the U. S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development cut off all aid to 
the city's chaotic urban renewal program. Locher had picked as his 
urban renewal director a television newsman, Barton R. Clausen, 
with no experience in administration or government, but who 
wrote bitter and critical editorials about the city's failures, and the 
urban-renewal program was soon in the same kind of shape as the 
dilapidated buildings it was supposed to replace. So HUD cut off 
ten million dollars in urban renewal funds. 
Businessmen organized a Little Hoover Commission to study 
various aspects of city government after the Hough riot, and by the 
turn of the year they were beginning to issue their reports. The 
commission's devastated just about every phase of the city 
administration. Most of the problems went back long before 
Locher, but he was the mayor and had to wear the jacket. After 
these business leaders went after him, the real jackals, the 
newspapers, began to tear him to bits. The Plain Dealer devoted 
half the paper and a full editorial page to detailing Locher's 
failures. The Press, preferring to prolong the agony, ran daily 
criticism in the form of front-page editorials with the running 
headline, "Promises, Promises," Nationally, it became popular to 
send reporters to Cleveland to wrote about the urban mess. 
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The mourners began their search for a candidate to defeat 
Locher. He had been rejected, and a replacement was needed. The 
mood of the city was a mixture of futility and fear-futility at not 
being able to get the city moving, and fear of the niggers. 
Curiously enough, that made me obviously the most desirable 
candidate. I had legitimized myself as a politician in the 1965 
campaign, especially in the debates, and the closeness of the 
election and the subsequent recount kept me in the news. I was 
better known than any politician in the county. The businessmen 
could look at my record and see that I was out there fighting for 
their and Jim Rhodes's pork barrel. Clearly, I was a "safe" 
candidate. In the backs of their minds, those white men believed 
that if they put me out front they would by buying off the ghetto. 
Lois Hays, who headed up the finance committee in my 1965 
campaign, introduced me to Bernard A. Towell, a managing 
partner in one of the large investment firms and a member of an 
old established WASP family. It is an index to the desperation of 
such people that a man like Towell, who had voted for Goldwater 
in 1964, now felt he needed me. He told me that a number of 
businessmen were ready to support me for mayor, and he wanted 
me to meet them. Towell, Lois and I began to set up lunches with 
small groups of these leading bankers, businessmen, and 
industrialists. 
I told them that the issue was Cleveland's problems, not 
whether the mayor was black or white, that the city could not 
survive another man who didn't understand the town, all of its 
people and their concerns. I made it clear that I wanted their 
support, but that they shouldn't support me as an insurance policy 
against violence from the black community. Riots are the product 
of unresponsive and repressive societies, I said, and they will come 
whether the mayor is black or white if the people feel desperate 
enough. I told them also that even when a government tries to 
change there can be no guarantee against the expression of 
frustrations that have been building for generations. 
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I got their support. Slowly the movement built, and when I 
formally threw my hat into the ring I had two leading business 
executives playing major roles in the campaign. 
There was another thing going for me. As early as 1961, I had 
been invited to the White House for conferences. In the years 
since, I had been repeatedly invited to Presidential conferences and 
dinners, and it had become clear to the sort of people who watch 
such things what electing me might help the city by bringing us 
into favor with President Johnson's administration. Vice President 
Hubert H. Humphrey called me after my candidacy was official 
and offered to help me in any way he could. "I'll come to 
Cleveland and praise you, or I'll come in and denounce you, 
whatever you think will help," he said. It is understanding like that 
that endears me to the man. But I don't believe in having anyone 
come in from outside to participate in my campaigns; I believe that 
if I can't put it together for myself, an outsider certainly can't do it 
for me. I declined his offer. However, Locher's loss of federal 
funds gave us a chance to attack him at a most vulnerable point. 
When those attacks were coupled with frequent and visible trips to 
Washington, it began to seem to people that President Johnson 
wanted Carl Stokes to be mayor of Cleveland. They were right. 
And it was certainly true that the national Democratic Party wanted 
a black Democrat as mayor of a major city to solidify its support 
from black voters. 
Meanwhile, I was reassembling my organization. The Stokes 
machine was a portable model. Unlike other politicians, I never 
allowed my campaign organizations to live beyond election day. I 
knew where the people were, and I knew how to bring them 
together when I needed them. 
Black politicians who had been able to sit out my 1965 
campaign realized they had better get behind me or get out of the 
way. And a group of black legislators, who owed their jobs to the 
reapportionment I had helped pass, were out working for me. 
The two groups that any regular politician, any regular 
Democrat that is, thinks he can't live without are the party and 
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organized labor. Both these groups informed me they were 
supporting Locher and would give me no help. I was not surprised. 
But I was surprised by the newspapers. I was surprised at each 
of them, for opposite reasons. The Press, the afternoon paper, had, 
under the stewardship of Louis Seltzer, been the most powerful 
political force in town. The paper addressed itself in its idea of 
Cleveland's "little man," the ethnic blue-collar worker and his 
family, a man of inadequate education and marginal income. The 
Press and the Plain Dealer had been roasting Locher continuously. 
I felt I had a chance to get their endorsement. Just months before 
Louis Seltzer had retired from the paper, and Thomas Boardman, 
who had been Seltzer's chief editorial writer, had taken over as 
editor. Boardman is a man of good instincts and goodwill, but a 
weak administrator. He told me that he intended to run the paper 
differently, that he didn't feel the paper should play the power role 
it had under Seltzer. It was only later that I began to understand 
and believe him. 
The Plain Dealer, run by Thomas Vail, a patrician, is more 
subdued, more articulate, and much more establishment-conscious 
than the Press. I asked Vail for the endorsement, but I knew I had 
to depend upon my businessmen supporters to swing him. They 
did. 
It was becoming clear that both newspapers were anguishing 
over their endorsements. We passed the first of September and 
there had still been no endorsement. The primary election was only 
three weeks away. They wanted to endorse a winner, to preserve 
the illusion of their power, but a black man-how do you endorse a 
black man? 
On September 3 the Plain Dealer carried its editorial 
endorsement of Carl Stokes at the top of page one. I wish now I 
had waited to get that paper at home in the morning. As it 
happened, I picked it up the night before in the lobby of the 
Sheraton-Cleveland, and a reporter for the paper was there. When I 
saw the endorsement, I impetuously said, "Hot dog, now we're 
legitimate." He reported it. Nothing wrong with that, but later, 
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when I was having continuing battles with both papers, any time I 
attacked the Plain Dealer, Bob McGruder, the City Hall reporter, 
would drag that quote out again. I often accuse newsmen of having 
short memories. I learned to wish that were particularly true in his 
case. I knew when I saw that editorial we had the election in our 
hands. An endorsement of me from the Plain Dealer would calm 
the fears of the average white voter. It would not make him come 
out and vote for me, but he would be less likely to feel the urgency 
to come out and vote against me. 
Next came the Press, with a sniveling, weaseling non-
endorsement of Locher that said nothing. They endorsed no one. 
What a departure from the hard, strong line laid down by Louis 
Seltzer for thirty years. At least if they had endorsed another 
candidate I could have denounced government by newspaper. Now 
I couldn't even do that. 
But it didn't matter. I had put my black base together solidly. 
Reverend Milan Brenkus, a white West Side minister, and 
Reverend John T. Weeden, head of the black Baptist Ministerial 
Alliance, headed up an interdenominational group of ministers 
who had put together a massive voter registration drive throughout 
the black, Puerto Rican and Appalachian communities, and by the 
time of the election blacks were registered more solidly than 
whites. The Ford Foundation also gave CORE $175,000 to put 
together a voter registration effort. 
Mrs. Coretta Scott King of the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference has since claimed that the SCLC spent $500,000 in a 
registration drive in Cleveland. Our entire election campaign didn't 
spend half that amount. Cleveland's SCLC's director, Reverend A. 
A. Sampson, reported having spent $27,899.40. SCLC should run 
an audit. If their records claim a half-million dollars was spent in 
Cleveland, it has to be the biggest rip-off of all time. 
 
 
With my base intact, my success with business, my exposure to 
white voters, I could see all the pieces fitting together. You learn to 
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expect the unexpected in politics, you even try to plan for it. But 
how could I have ever dreamed that suddenly a threat to all my 
plans, my attempt to put black people in power in the eighth largest 
city in the country, would appear in the form of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., the most honored black leader in America? 
I had put together a delicate, not to say precarious, structure. 
No one outside my campaign organization, and few on the inside, 
understood quite how it worked. The principles were elegantly 
simple. I had on paper what was out there, where the votes were, 
both for and against us. And I had in my head the things I knew 
had to be done to protect the votes for me and neutralize the votes 
against me. The delicacy of the structure lay in the proportion of 
my base vote; or, taken the other way, I had to keep the sixty-two 
percent white population from using its strength against me. 
In 1967, Dr. King's great career was at a low point. He had just 
come out of Cicero, Illinois, with great disappointments, 
discovering just how profound are the white man's hatred and 
prejudice. He desperately needed a victory. The near-success we 
had in Cleveland in 1965 had swept the nation, and in 1967 all the 
national political writers were covering the Cleveland mayoral 
race. They wrote articles on our organization, the use of the 
business community, the registration drives. It began to look like 
we would win. Dr King let us know he wanted to come. 
We had been through it before. In the late spring the so-called 
Big Six, the major civil rights figures, had announced they were 
coming to Cleveland that summer to register every black voter and 
energize the black community. Well, we already had black 
community organized, mobilized and energized. If the Big Six 
came to Cleveland with the various rhetorics, they would create an 
energy that would in turn create an opposite and probably more 
than equal counter-energy. Dr. Clement and I had flown to New 
York and met with those men in a motel right at La Guardia 
Airport. We had explained to them that they could only bring 
problems for us. We were juggling a delicate situation that could, 
with the slightest wrong move, come down around our heads. We 
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had asked them not to come. We had understood why they wanted 
to come. Cleveland was where the action was, at the focus of the 
eyes of the black world. Remember that at the same time Richard 
Hatcher was running for mayor of Gary, Indiana; but Gary was 
predominantly black. A victory in Gary was inevitable, therefore 
comparatively dull. The real action was in Cleveland. But 
fortunately we had managed to head off the move. 
When Dr. King made his decision, Dr. Clement tried to talk to 
some of his aides, to convince them that we already had a winner, 
but that it could be lost if black pride started prodding white fears. 
Dr. Clement told them that we had for the first time the 
opportunity to seize real power by winning a city hall. Dr. King's 
coming would only release the haters and the persons looking for 
an issue to excite racist reaction to what we were doing. 
He was not successful. Dr. King came to town. W. O. Walker 
arranged a meeting between Dr. King and me in his Call & Post 
office. I had met Dr. King at various national conferences since 
1965, but we had never worked together. I felt a towering respect 
for the man, even awe. Facing down the bigots in Cleveland is one 
thing, but I knew I would never have had the nerve to walk across 
that Selma bridge or lead the people against Birmingham's Bull 
Connor. King's courage was of a different order from mine, 
suitable to different places, different actions. 
In our meeting, I explained to Dr. King that I had carefully put 
this whole campaign together. I had worked to get actual white 
votes. I couldn't afford to do anything to aggravate the white voter. 
There was too much at stake. We had everything together, and if 
nothing foreign was introduced we knew how to handle the 
situation. 
"Martin," I told him, "if you come in here with these marches 
and what not, you can just see what the reaction will be. You saw it 
in Cicero and other northern towns. We have got to win a political 
victory here. This is our chance to take over a power that is just 
unprecedented among black people. But I'm very concerned that if 
you come here you're going to upset the balance we've created. 
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You're going to create problems that we do not have now and may 
not be able to handle. I would rather that you not stay." How on 
earth can any black American say that to Martin Luther King? I 
can tell you it was hard. But I knew I had my own way to make it 
hard for whites to live with their own prejudices. I knew that Dr. 
King and I wanted the same things. Finally, I knew my own 
situation, my own town, and I knew I had it in my hand. Once I got 
it, I knew I could do things that no civil-rights march ever did. 
"Carl, I know just what you mean," he said. "We discussed this 
at SCLC headquarters before I come out here. But I am responding 
to the invitation of the United Pastors." 
The United Pastors was a group of about a dozen ministers who 
were in an internal struggle with other ministers and were bidding 
to establish their own community leadership. 
"I understand that, Dr. King, but they're thinking about 
promoting their group, while the question here is whether or not a 
black man takes over audacious power." 
He listened to me, but I could see that he was going to stay. He 
needed to be on the scene of a victory. 
"I will have to stay," he said, "but I promise you there will be 
nothing inflammatory. We'll try to do a job here and our people 
will get in touch with your people, and any time that you feel there 
is something harmful to your overall campaign, just let me know." 
Dr. King did limit his visits and he did conduct his activities in 
a very restrained manner. He helped a great deal in not creating a 
more problems than those posed by his mere presence. And those 
problems were real. Letters with the signature of the Democratic 
Party county Chairman, Albert S. Porter, went out, saying that the 
election of Carl Stokes would mean turning over the city to Martin 
Luther King, a calamity that was meant to sound on the order of 
turning over a daughter or sister. 
Ever since Dr. King's death, I had had to grapple with the 
problem of dealing with a small group of black leaders who grew 
out of the SCLC movement, because they knew of my not wanting 
Dr. King here. Asking Dr. King not to stay was one of the toughest 
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decisions I ever had to make. It was a confrontation with a man 
whose recorded words I turn to for solace and inspiration at 
moments of depression. But it came down to the hard game of 
politics -- whether we wanted a cause or a victory. I wanted to win. 
Our people needed me to win. I had been the architect for a unique 
assembly of interests, and I knew with one wrong move it would 
be just another house of cards. 
In the September 28 primary my margin was more than 
eighteen thousand votes. I arrive at the Rockefeller Building 
headquarters at seven-thirty, about an hour after the polls closed. A 
few minutes later, I walked to the podium and declared myself the 
winner by more than ten thousand votes. The reporters were 
flabbergasted. No other vote projection system was giving me a 
win. But nobody else had Marvin Chernoff. 
Chernoff had a small business selling office machines. He came 
into our camp early in the campaign. By election day, he was 
volunteering more than full-time labors to organize our volunteer 
workers and had become himself one of our most invaluable 
organizers. On election day he put togerther a system of four 
thousand volunteers, with a minimum of three people working at 
each polling place. Chernoff was able to monitor every precinct in 
the city at two-hour intervals. An hour after the election he was 
able to have dependable counts from the precincts he wanted, and 
could predict our victory. Even so, his estimate was conservative. 
It was a remarkable performance. 
Now I had to face the general election and one of the oldest and 
most prestigious names in Ohio politics. I had gone into the 
primary as a Democrat when everybody thought I would avoid it 
and run as an independent to force a three-way race. I had proved I 
could meet a white candidate head on and beat him. 
Actually the primary had turned out to be a three-man race. 
Frank P. Celeste, the sixty-year-old former mayor of a western 
suburb, had been talked into running by his cronies -- and perhaps 
by a newspaper. His being in the race was a kind of added 
insurance that I would win, but it really wasn't important. I beat 
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Locher by more votes than his and Celeste's combined. Beating 
Locher was a heady victory, but I realized that he was an already 
discredited mayor when he went into the race. Seth Taft would be 
different. 
The Taft family had given the nation a President who went on 
to become Chief Justice of the United States, A U. S. senator who 
carried the title "Mr. Republican," and would later send another 
Taft to the Senate. Periodically, the Taft family just seems to spin 
off one of its members out of Cincinnati and into national 
prominence. Seth Taft had moved to Cleveland in 1947. In 1967 he 
was forty-four, was a lawyer with the most prestigious law firm in 
town, had a fine home in the new, rich suburb of Pepper Pike, and 
had a good record of civic involvement and an impeccable 
reputation for honesty and integrity. He had no practical 
background in government and knew little about the political 
jungle. By moving into an apartment in Cleveland just before filing 
deadline, he acquired the label "carpetbagger." He had no vitality 
as a speaker and no personal strength in handshaking campaign 
situations. But he was a quick learner and developed into an 
effective campaigner and formidable debater. He had a family 
name that, big as it was in the rest of the state, was anathema to 
labor, and labor dominates Cleveland. But he was white. That 
ultimately became the major issue as the general election drew 
near. If it weren't for the race issue, I would have won an easier 
victory. But the drubbing I gave Locher had alerted the white 
voters, and I knew that, come November, there were going to be 
more Republican votes than there had been in more than a 
generation. The Plain Dealer's political writer, James M. 
Naughton, now political writer for the Washington Bureau of the 
New York Times, put it extremely, if pessimistically, when he 
wrote that "a white Mickey Mouse could beat a black Carl Stokes." 
The best move I made was to debate Taft. We debated four 
times. But in the second debate I made a serious blunder. It was 
held in the auditorium of a West Side high school in the heart of 
George Wallace country. I quoted the James Naughton line about 
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the Mickey Mouse and immediately realized I had made a mistake. 
The hostility came back to me in a wave, as Taft piously 
disclaimed the presence of any race issue in the campaign. 
The other memorable moment for me was in the final debate, 
held at the City Club and carried live on all three television 
stations. I had been carrying a piece of paper with me for the entire 
campaign, waiting for the right moment. In all of my appearances, 
that moment had never come, but I always had that piece of paper 
with me, waiting. I debated Taft on that final Friday before the 
election. It still hadn't come up at the end of the formal debate. 
Then, during the question-and-answer period, someone asked 
about my poor attendance record in the state legislature. My 
position was that I had achieved more than most legislators by hard 
political work, and that not showing up for trivial votes was 
unimportant. That question had come up on occasion during the 
campaign, but never in quite the right way, and never with Taft 
standing next to me. This time I didn't have to give my position. I 
reached into my pocket and pulled out a letter that had been written 
to me a few months earlier. It was short and sweet. It said, "Dear 
Carl, the reports I hear of your performance in Columbus are 
excellent, and I congratulate you on the job." It was signed "Seth 
Taft" 
By the November 7th election day, it was clear to everybody 
that Taft and I were neck and neck. The Press's Richard Maher 
predicted I would win a narrow victory, but only if the turnout was 
low. On election night, Taft took and early lead as expected, but 
the lead held. At midnight he was still 21,000 votes ahead and 
there were only about 30,000 votes left to be counted. I would have 
to get almost ninety percent of those votes to beat him. At twelve-
thirty I went down to the main room of campaign headquarters and 
talked to my people. The emotions were high and intense, and I felt 
that I had to prepare them for the possibility that we might lose. 
Many of those people were on the edge of a total rejection of what 
we call "the system." They had spent themselves, physically and 
spiritually, on my campaign, and I knew that, if I lost, the 
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immediate impulse from some of them would be to run out and 
tear something up. I had to quiet them plead with them to have 
faith in the democratic process. It was a kind of talk I had to use on 
many occasions when I was mayor, handling the emotions of 
people, trying to keep things from getting out of hand. 
At 2 A.M., Dr. Martin Luther King and Ralph Abernathy of 
SCLC joined me at the Rockefeller Building. At 2:30, It was 
announced that Taft was about to make his victory statement. A 
few minutes later, it became apparent that all the votes left to count 
were coming from the black community, and Taft was getting less 
than five percent of those votes. It was close to 4 A.M. when I 
passed him. The great-grandson of a slave ahd defeated the 
grandson of a U.S. President. Seth and his gracious wife, Fran, 
came to the hotel suite and congratulated me on my victory. Fran 
brought Shirley a beautiful spray of roses. 
When they went down to announce the victory, Al Ostrow, the 
campaign public relations man, was concerned about Dr. King's 
presence. After the speech, Ostrow came to me and said Dr. King 
was calling a press conference. He said I had to stop him or he 
would take all the credit. I told him Dr. King wouldn't do that, that 
he was one of the greatest men in the country and nobody was 
going to stop him from holding a press conference. I certainly 
wasn't going to make things embarrassing or awkward for Dr. 
King. I felt bad enough about the earlier situation. One more note. 
After the election, I publicly promised that for six months I would 
accept no outside speaking engagements. I broke that promise 
when Dr. King asked me to speak at a conference in Chicago. I 
went. 
The jubilation that followed my victory announcement is 
impossible to describe. Our workers and supporters literally 
danced in the street. There is a certain kind of winning that is more 
than a victory, it is a release. A man plays the numbers for years, 
every day the same number, and every day losing. Eventually he 
steels himself against the expected loss, wanting the win badly but 
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afraid to let himself feel the want. One day the number comes in 
and he is set free. Set free. 
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8 
THE "REAL" ESTATE 
 
My advisers and I had a wonderful time the next few weeks 
building plans on the void of our ignorance. I rented a suite in the 
Sheraton Cleveland Hotel, and we would all go over there in the 
afternoons and talk through our position papers on various 
operations within city government. But only two of us -- Joe 
McManamon, my safety director, and Councilman George Forbes -
- even knew where the departments were housed. We went into 
those sessions with wild-eyed dreams of the reforms we would 
wreak on this corrupt machine, only to discover we didn't even 
know where the buttons were. 
There were two reasons for this, one of them part of the local 
design of a city government, and the other endemic to a democratic 
political system. In Cleveland the mayor-elect is inaugurated the 
Monday after he is elected. That gives him only six days to try to 
put together a group of people to take over and to try to understand 
the workings of the machine he is supposed to control. This in the 
nation's eighth largest city, with over 825,000 people. 
The other reasons is built into the political process. Politics is a 
difficult, demanding, exhausting, sometimes exhilarating arena in 
which gladiators win and lose. But a city is a business -- a non-
profit service corporation. In Cleveland, when I took over, it did an 
annual business of $76 million a year, and three years later it had 
grown to more than $100 million. As a politician, a man learns 
what the social issues are and what services he thinks government 
out to provide, and he makes of his understanding political issues, 
campaign issues. But that understanding is an understanding of his 
society, not of management practices. I had never employed more 
than three people in my life, and now I found myself in charge of 
ten thousand. It was not longer a matter of standing in a public lot 
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and saying "elect me and houses will spring up here." Now I have 
this foreman standing in front of me saying that seven of his trucks 
are broken down, and should he double up on the work crews or 
send the men home. 
The trouble with the strong-mayor form of government in a big 
city is that the mayor is administrator, chief political officer and 
chief ceremonial office for the entire city; everything flows to him 
directly. If he tried to directly handle all these duties, he becomes 
immobilized. This is a good argument for the city-manager form of 
government. However, I attempted something similar by naming 
an executive secretary, John C. Little. The first days of our 
administration were awkward, to say the least. I was trying to be 
the administrator, take care of my responsibilities to the press 
(which were legion -- my unprecedented victory had made me an 
international celebrity, and reporters from all over the country were 
descending on our office asking for interviews), run around 
making luncheon speeches, and tend to the political problems that 
were created by our victory over both parties. But every time a 
hard detail came up, or somebody else dropped the ball, John 
would say, "I'll take care of it soon." Soon he was in his office 
every day from eight in the morning until after midnight. 
The constant ruck of phone calls and visits was in itself 
overwhelming. Everybody wanted to talk to me, to see me, touch 
me. So many people who had spent their lives feeling 
disenfranchised by the system now felt that I was their mayor. 
They wanted to come in and talk. Every minister wanted to come 
in and be recognized, all the old neighborhood guys, old school 
friends. One day the Reverend John T. Weeden called and said he 
would like to see me. Figuring I would find a few minutes to stop 
by his office the next day, I suggested I would be glad to do that. 
"Oh, no, Carl, I don't want to trouble you. I'll be there tomorrow 
morning at nine-thirty." There is no way you can say not to a 
treasured friend like the Reverend Weeden, so the next morning he 
comes over and you have to drop whatever you are doing. You sit 
down with him in your office and chat for forty-five minutes. But 
110 
you don't have forty-five minutes, so you'll have to tack it on the 
end of the day somehow. When these people came in I had to talk 
to them, the civic leaders and the people I had gone to for help in 
the campaign. I couldn't refuse. I had said in the campaign I would 
have an open-door policy. But I had no idea what I was saying. 
For those first seven months the entire city was caught in an 
epidemic of euphoria. My election was certainly no mandate. Only 
fifteen percent of the white voters had chosen me; my tiny margin 
of victory was the product of the massive, concerted effort of the 
black community. But the white mentality, and its ability to 
wrench self-congratulation out of the simple maintenance of its 
old, predictable ways, quickly created the myth, faithfully repeated 
in the national media, that Cleveland was a liberal city, committed 
to reform. Fortunately for us, at least then, the people who would 
normally be hostile and suspicious were swept along in the jubilant 
mood, or at least intimidated by it, and we were able to create and 
successfully promote highly innovative, often paragovernmental 
programs that would have outraged a normally circumspect 
Cleveland populace. 
The news media were having a field day. The reporters loves 
us, since things were happening so fast that we were feeding them 
stories every day. There was always a new appointment, a new 
program. We were a journalistic feast. 
But it took its toll. The pace was incredible. We had so much to 
learn, we had to find people to take the key jobs, and we had to do 
it right. Everything had to be right because everything we did was 
in the limelight. Celebrity is a two-edged sword. It was personally 
exhilarating, but the responsibility was a steamroller. I knew that I 
had to be, in that horrible racist phrase, "a credit to my race." That 
meant that I had to be more creative, more honest, more intelligent, 
more available, more witty, more thorough, than any other mayor 
in the country. Every move had to be exciting and a confirmation 
of everyone's confidence in me. I was their boy. That January, for 
the first time in my adult life, my health broke down and I had to 
take a rest. 
111 
I went to the Virgin Islands for two weeks. During that time the 
press turned up an account of how Geraldine Williams, now my 
administrative assistant, was an officer in a club that served as a 
cheat spot. I did something that has haunted me since: over the 
long-distance telephone, I ordered her fired. I will tell that story in 
more detail later, but I throw it in here to point up the condition I 
was in to make such a terrible blunder. I needed so badly to be 
spotless that I threw Geraldine out without personally examining 
the real merits of the situation. 
It was during this time that I learned how valuable my choice of 
executive secretary had become. John Little's father was senior 
partner of the oldest and most prestigious law firm in town, and 
John had practiced corporate and tx law with one of the other 
major law firms. The Little family was old, established, white 
Anglo-Saxon Protestant security. John was a very scholarly, 
thorough strategist and had begun with us writing position papers. 
He would sit in our meetings, quiet for the most part, but always 
very solid in his suggestions. It took me some time to recognize 
how good he was because he was not flashy and aggressive. Every 
administration needs a man like John Little, a man you can trust to 
do the detailed work in your name, a man who keeps a low profile 
himself, and who is committed to your effort. John Little's loyalty 
was, simply a gift. Observers were unanimous in praise of his 
integrity. Getting men like that to work for you has to be done by 
feel. There is nothing in a job application that can tell you the 
important things, and there is no way an applicant can get it across 
by merely professing it. Trust and confidence aren't negotiable 
qualities. 
Shortly after my election, a local foundation put up $68,000 to 
hire William A. Silverman's public-relations firm to assist us, and 
Bill went on to become close to me. He became, in fact, one of the 
handful of those I always called on to sit around and brainstorm 
when a particularly difficult situation arose. He, in turn, brought in 
Marc and Lois Wyse, who had their own advertising agency. The 
two of them brought invaluable perceptions to any discussion, and 
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Lois, who is also a popular poet, brought a quickness and a clarity 
to whatever she wrote that I depended on in delicate situations. In 
April of 1971, when I decided not to run again, I called on Lois to 
draft, in simple language, the complex reasons for my decision not 
to run for reelection. 
It may seem at first glance curious that several of my most 
trusted advisers turned out to be white and engaged in either public 
relations or advertising. But the fact was simply that my greatest 
need for advice was in dealing with how public reaction to my 
conduct would be formed, since all of my actions would reach the 
pubic through the interpretative structure of the white media. I had 
learned to use the media as a campaigning politician, but 
campaigning and governing are very different functions, and 
actions are much more susceptible to interpretive reporting than 
speeches. So these people, all trained and highly sophisticated in 
the vagaries of the white print and television media, could tell me 
how they would react to specific acts of mine. It was a service that 
few people knew about during the years of my administration. I 
was often described as being impetuous, quick to anger, out there 
winging it alone and devil take the hindmost. That image couldn't 
have been further from the truth. 
I had to put a cabinet together. It wasn't as difficult as I had 
feared. We were deluged with applications from ambitious white 
liberals and from black people who hadn't been given chances 
elsewhere. Each department, with its own set of problems and 
importances and priorities, more or less determined what kind of 
man was needed. I had made a campaign pledge that I would fire 
the police chief. My first step was to appoint Joe McManamon, 
former cop then a lawyer, a West Side Irishman who had been one 
of the first on the side of the Cuyahoga River to open his house to 
me for campaign meetings, to be my safety director. 
In the rest of my appointments, none of which were promised, I 
admit I suffered from an excess of idealism. I was certainly 
determined not to give out important posts to political hacks, and I 
succeeded in that. But I also believed that if I chose real 
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professionals I could just let them alone and let them produce. I 
remember telling each of my appointees, "You just do your job and 
leave the politics up to me." And the persons I chose for the most 
part didn't like politics anyway and liked that approach. But reality 
soon caught up with us. A councilman goes to a director and asks 
for a favor that that director isn't required to perform. But the 
politics of the situation demand that you do him the favor because 
he could be useful later when something you want comes before a 
committee of which he is a member. There is just no way to avoid 
politics. 
My next, and in many ways most important, appointment was 
law director. The director succeeds the mayor if he is 
incapacitated, and is acting mayor when the mayor is out of town. I 
had already made a public remark that I wasn't planning to name a 
black law director, yet I fully intended to do just that. 
Paul White had called me right after the election and confided 
that, if I wanted him, he would be available to serve as my law 
director. Paul was then serving as a municipal judge, a job Blanche 
Bolden, Al Sweeney and I had convinced him to run for and 
elected him to, and now he didn't like being a judge, didn't like the 
day-to-day decisions that had to be made. He had gained a great 
deal of weight. He as a big, strapping, very black guy, standing six 
foot three, and weighing more than two hundred pounds. When I 
appointed him, I received city-wide acclaim. Paul had served for 
years in the police prosecutor's office, where his extraordinary 
indecision was mistaken for patience. Everybody, and most 
importantly the police, liked Paul. 
 But Paul quickly came to be the first example of a trait that 
pervaded many of my appointments. He wouldn't move without 
consulting me. I had to listen to every case, every issue that was 
pending in the Law Department. I would be in my office meeting 
with several people and in would walk this huge, imposing black 
man with the firmest grip of the world and a deep, resonant voice, 
and he would whisper some very ordinary problem in my car and 
ask me what he should do. When, in January, I went away to the 
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Virgin Islands for two weeks to get some rest, the Geraldine 
Williams incident hit the papers, and he couldn't cope with the 
situation. He had never dreamed the intensity with which the 
media would concentrate on his actions. 
We had to find a replacement. I sat down with my brother and 
our former law partner, Norman Minor, to talk about Paul's 
successor. Minor was the dean of Cleveland's black lawyers and 
knew them all intimately. The one guy who kept surviving our 
eliminations was Clarence L. James, Jr. executive director of the 
Cleveland Legal Aid Services, whom everybody called "Buddy." 
He had in fact been my buddy, although I didn't even know him. In 
1965, when I was running for mayor the first time, a short, fat, 
very homely girl had shown up in Buddy's Legal Aid office and 
contended that I was the father of her twenty month-old child. At 
that time, Buddy had worked with my brother on several 
committees, but he didn't know me at all. Buddy recorded her 
story, which varied each time she told it, and had her sign an 
affadavit to the one she said was the most accurate. She gave a 
license number for a car that I had supposedly used to pick her up. 
It checked out to a tile company in the heart of the ghetto. The 
interesting part of that incident was the fair play that not only 
Buddy showed me, a man he didn't know, but also the courts and a 
television news reporter showed. It was clear that Buddy didn't 
really believe her story, but he was forced to take her case to the 
courts, which were in turn supposed to automatically issue a 
warrant for my arrest. But it didn't happen. The State Highway 
Police checked out the license and the automobile involved. 
Sanford Sobul, the WJW-TV reporter, checked out the police 
findings and my own whereabouts the night in question. Sobul was 
a veteran police reporter. Buddy James collated all the findings, 
and the court refused to issue the warrant of arrest. Obviously, I 
would have won the case in court. But the very issuance of the 
warrant would have been irretrievably damaging. That girl showed 
up each election year, in 1967 and in 1969, but her story changed 
enough each time that the court could legitimately refuse her 
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request for issuance of a warrant. I was extremely grateful to 
Buddy for the unsolicited fairness he had shown me. I approached 
Buddy about coming with the city and he said no. I finally 
converted him, though, about a month later when I convinced him 
he could accomplish more in two years at City Hall than he could 
in twenty years with Legal Aid. 
There were two departments, Health and Urban Renewal, that 
needed special help. The Urban Renewal Department was a 
scandal. Nobody knew what anyone else was doing. Cleveland had 
initiated the largest urban-renewal project in the country, and had 
failed just as grandly. By the time I took office, funds to the city 
had been cut off by the federal government because of its failures. 
The Health Department simply wasn't doing anything. It had been 
limping along with the little funds and providing almost no real 
services. It was housed in the basement of City Hall, and that was 
the position of priority it had with previous mayors. 
The men I wanted would have to be professionals. 
Professionals have to be paid. Neither of the two directorships at 
that time paid as much as $25,000 a year. I quickly discovered 
when I talked with Edward Logue, who was then regarded as the 
best urban-renewal man in the country, that we would need more 
money. Logue told me he was about to take a job in Boston, but 
offered to be a consultant, helping us to find a man, for a fee of 
$25,000. I had to tell him I didn't even have that much money to 
offer the man we would hire. I then went to the business 
community and laid out my problem. They agreed to help by 
forming a search committee if we would submit legislation raising 
the salary of the urban-renewal director. 
I went to City Council President James V. Stanton, who agreed 
to our raising the salaries. We were able to bring the salaries of the 
urban-renewal director and the director of public health up to 
$30,000. That way we were able to get for these two jobs Richard 
Green, a man who had worked under Logue, and Dr. E. Frank 
Ellis, a dedicated black physician who had given up his practice in 
middle age to do graduate work in public health service 
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administration and to commit himself to the same issues I was 
interest in. 
My other cabinet appointments were made in more routine 
fashion, without the kind of elaborate search committees that we 
found necessary for health and urban renewal. It always turned out 
that one of my advisers or someone in the federal government 
knew of someone else who would be good for a certain job. But 
they were never political hacks. They were bright, well educated 
and committed to public service. The one thing most of them 
lacked was the political instinct. They were, almost to a man, 
politically naïve. But they were honest and proved to be 
incorruptible. 
Mayors and their cabinets come and go, but the men and 
women who really run City Hall, the commissioners, stay on and 
do their work. Finding good middle-management people is much 
harder than finding good directors, and getting rid of bad ones is 
harder than that, since they are all protected by civil service. I 
faced an army of commissioners throughout City Hall that had held 
their jobs so long that their control was impenetrable. But the had 
also held their jobs for so long that they were eligible for 
retirement. The unbroken string of ethnic workers, whose jobs 
were never challenged because they fit the purposes of one ethnic 
mayor as well as another. But they had been there so long that I 
had the opportunity of putting my own men in charge of 
departments and divisions simply through the retirement process. 
But it was also true that I assumed that all those old ethnic 
hands would be against me, and I treated them that way. It was up 
to them to prove to me that they could work with and for a black 
mayor. That was a bad approach. There were good men out there 
that I would have gotten more work out of it I had simply let them 
alone. In my naivete, I had believed that when the mayor speaks, 
things happen. Reality turned out to be somewhat less tractable. I 
remember trying time and time again to move out one of the 
typical old ethnic appointees, a Slovenian, Steve Suhajcik, 
commissioner of fiscal control in the Utilities Department. There 
117 
were classic fights, and he beat us every time. Eventually, he came 
to be a strong supporter and one of our good guys. We could have 
had him sooner. 
I learned the hard way that commissioners are consummate 
politicians. They know exactly what a mayor's political 
weaknesses are, and they know how to exploit them. They can leak 
stories to the newspapers about bad operations at City Hall when 
they themselves are responsible for the conditions, knowing that 
the criticism comes down on the mayor, not them. Or they can do 
things poorly or excessively to irritate the public, knowing that the 
public is responding to its mayor, not the commissioner in charge. 
The wildest example of that in my term of office came early on in 
my administration, when we had our first heavy snowfall at night. 
The snow had started in early evening, and by the small hours of 
the next morning the city lay under several inches of fresh snow. 
The street crews were called out. It happened that Blanche Bolden, 
newly in charge of the crews, decided to make a tour of the city 
about 3 A.M. to see how they were doing. As she drove around the 
East Side, especially in the black communities, she was delighted 
to see that the streets had been plowed and cleaned better than they 
had ever been in the past. Then she crossed the bridge to the white 
West Side. Not one street had been plowed. Wow. When those 
West Siders had to fight that snow in the morning rush hour, they 
would be ready to string me up. It was a canny conspiracy to 
embarrass me. Fortunately, Blanche was out there doing her job. 
She started calling the bosses of the crews and made them get the 
men out on the streets. By the time the morning rush hour came, 
the crews had cleaned away all the snow, and my neck was saved. 
On other occasions I wasn't so lucky. All your fine and noble 
policy decisions don't mean a damn if the functionaries are against 
you. 
By the time I left City Hall four years later, I had managed to 
put black people in the policy and decision making positions in all 
departments of city government with the exception of the Police 
and Fire Departments. And I brought in black craftsmen. The crafts 
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situation was politically interesting. Then unions had managed to 
enact a city ordinance requiring the city to pay the same scale as 
their hiring halls. This was a tremendous concession to the unions, 
won only because they and the City Council were in the same 
ethnic control. I told the unions we were going to hire craftsmen on 
our own, especially black craftsmen who had been systematically 
excluded by the unions. I told them that I knew perfectly well that I 
was going against city regulations, and I knew they could fight us, 
but I reminded them just how public such a fight would be. I knew 
they couldn't afford to have the light of public attention focused on 
their discriminatory practices. So they didn't fight us -- openly. 
Getting those middle management commissionerships took a 
lot longer. It took packing the Civil Service Commission with my 
own people. This had to be done because, other than retirement, 
the only way you get rid of commissioners opposed to you is to 
press charges and the Civil Service Commission has to be able to 
back you up when the man appeals his firing. I suffered a 
tremendous setback because of a police examination scandal, and it 
was two years before I could really make any moves freely. 
We did do it, eventually, with a packed Civil Service 
Commission working closely with my personnel director, Walter 
Burks, and we rewrote all the job descriptions and got black people 
jobs -- good important jobs -- all over the Hall. In the last months 
of my mayoralty in 1971 I issued two reports, called "The Stokes 
Years," in which I listed all the successes of the administration. 
The first was about the housing we had put up, the progress in 
urban renewal, all those good things. The second part was about 
how many black people were in important jobs at City Hall. 
A liberal newspaper reporter told me he was surprised that I 
would put out a report like that. He had evidently assumed I would 
try to keep it quiet. What was I supposed to do, issue a report on 
how many white people I had hired? When Paul Briggs, the white 
school superintendent, made a report about how many black people 
were in the school system he was applauded for his liberalism, his 
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compassion. When I did the same thing, they said, "Aha, it's just as 
we feared." 
It is a sad thing that even with black people at the top and black 
people doing the work, many of the old ways at City Hall hung in. 
Nowhere was this truer than in the Streets Department. I had a 
black director, Ralph Tyler, and he had a black executive assistant, 
Blanche Bolden, and the work force itself, which is mainly made 
up of unskilled laborers, was predominantly black. Yet generally 
we couldn't get the crews to give the same service to the poor areas 
of the city that they did to the rest of the town. It's just a truism; 
black or white, the poor come last. Part of the problem was with 
Tyler himself, who was a nice guy but no administrator. The night 
Blanche Bolden discovered that the crews had plowed the East 
Side but not the West Side, I had earlier called Ralph. I said, "How 
are the snow crews doing?" 
"Fine," he said. 
"How do you know?" I asked. 
"Somebody would have called me if they weren't," he said. 
Thank God for Blanche. 
The same thing was true in the Recreation Department: the 
parks in the middle class areas of town were well kept and the ones 
in the ghetto looked like battlegrounds. This was no strictly a racial 
bias. The parks in the poor-white and Puerto Rican areas of the 
near West Side were also in shoddy repair.` 
I was never fully able to get the bureaucratic machinery in 
motion to change those old ways. It's curious how you can come 
up with exciting new programs and catch the imagination of the 
community, but the basic services, which depend on workers who 
have been doing their job in one way for years, are intractable to 
renewal. Ben Stefanski, my utilities director, came up with the idea 
of putting weighted curtains in Lake Erie, to create large pockets of 
water at the beaches that could be sanitized enough for swimming. 
The pollution in the lake had long since reached the point of 
making swimming a dangerous health hazard. We put up two of 
these structures, one on each side of town, and they were a 
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complete success. We had people visit from other cities to find out 
how we had accomplished those "pools." But most of the city's 
recreation was run by John Nagy, a canny West Side Hungarian, 
who allowed the traditional inequities in park maintenance to 
continue. 
Another area in which I hoped to crack down was slum-
landlordism. I figured I would send out housing inspectors out to 
find violations of the housing code, and we could then cite them, 
fin them or send them to jail if they didn't keep the houses up. The 
record on the major slumlords' land ownership turned out to be so 
involute that prosecution was piecemeal at best. But, worse than 
that, I was informed by my urban-renewal director, Richard Green, 
that he lacked enough inspectors he could trust to do this work who 
were not on the payrolls of the large operators of slum properties. 
We did move forcefully on demolition of old abandoned 
buildings, doubling the number of torn down in any one past year. 
Vigorous enforcement of the housing authority building code 
added millions of dollars to the tax duplicate and cleaned up some 
of the worst eyesores and safety hazards in the poorer 
neighborhoods. Over $224 million in new building of Classic 
Greek design that keynoted our insistence on good architecture in 
new construction. In 1970, Norman Krumholtz, the city planning 
director I had brought from Pittsburgh, dusted off a forty-year-old 
plan for redeveloping the lakefront harbor area at the foot of East 
Ninth Street. I got the Nixon Administration to approve the 
potential $100 million plan to authorize $6 million in planning 
funds. But the City Council blocked final authorization until it 
could name the developers. Over a year after I left office, the 
legislation was still stuck there in a committee box. 
It had never occurred to me how many roadblocks the road to 
progress is strewn with. I did learn to move some of them, and I 
will tell more about a couple shortly, but there was one that defied 
all my efforts. 
Cleveland had the largest urban-renewal program in the nation 
and had demonstrated the least progress. Beginning under Mayor 
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Celebrezze, some six thousand acres of land were committed to 
renewal and federal funds poured in to strip them down. That was 
accomplished with dispatch, rendering thousands of people 
homeless and putting hundreds of small businesses out of business. 
The city officials understood demolition very well. They did not 
understand the relocation of people and businesses at all, and they 
related not at all to the vast rebuilding that was vital. Cleveland 
was not the only city in the country to discover it didn't understand 
relocation and rebuilding needs, but it was the most dramatic 
example. Even worse, in 1966 when the U.S. Civil Rights 
Commission held hearings in Cleveland, Mayor Locher's Urban 
Renewal commissioner, James Friedman, testified that the policy 
of the Locher administration was to permit housing in urban-
renewal areas to deteriorate so that it would be cheaper to acquire 
for clearance purposes. 
In January 1967, the compounding of these failures caused the 
federal government to cut off all HUD funds, including $10 
million in downtown development funds previously authorized. 
With the aid of the first black man to serve in the cabinet of a U.S. 
President, Dr. Robert Weaver, Secretary of the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, I was able to lift that ban and 
get the $10 million restored. The revitalization of downtown with 
its jobs and tax base was clearly vital to the city. But a problem 
remained. A Columbus, Ohio, developer, John W. Galbreath, had 
put up the first building in Cleveland's prime downtown area, 
called Erieview. He still owned several major parcels and was 
talking about, at different times, either an apartment complex or a 
hotel, sometimes both. But that was in the early 1960's. After 1964, 
his public announcements of plans for Erieview became ver 
seldom things. It had become clear that he was sitting on his hands. 
 At least as interesting as Galbreath's reluctance to move was 
why he was the main developer in the first place. Why wasn't 
Cleveland's urban renewal in the hands of Cleveland developers? 
The answer lay in George Gund's firm grip. It was virtually 
impossible to obtain any sizable chunk of investment capital in 
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Cleveland that didn't involve Gund and his Cleveland Trust 
Company. And Gund, who was extremely conservative, simply 
wouldn't allow that kind of money loose for that kind of purpose. 
So when the urban-renewal plan reached the stage of needing a 
developer, it had to go to Galbreath, who could raise his capital 
elsewhere. They made it impossible for Galbreath to refuse, by 
making the land available at a ridiculously low price -- around six 
dollars a square foot. 
I told Dick Green, my urban-renewal director, to approach 
Galbreath and tell him that he would have to start developing his 
remaining parcel or we would revoke the agreement giving him 
option to the land. It didn't take long for me to discover that 
although the power to do it was ostensibly in my hands, the 
effective conspiracy of the business and newspaper interests tied 
my hands. 
First, a prominent bank president came to see me. He explained 
how much it had meant to Cleveland to get Galbreath to come in 
and put up the first Erieview tower, and how if we moved to 
revoke the city's agreement with Galbreath there would 
undoubtedly be a lengthy and costly court suit, during which time 
there wouldn't, of course, be any further development of Erieview. 
He threw in a few more intellectual exercises, but his main mission 
was clear enough. He was telling me not to move against 
Galbreath. 
Next, when I went to the editors of both newspapers, explained 
what I wanted to do and asked for their support, they kept trying to 
change the subject. They would bring in the names of other 
developers in other states who might be interested in developing 
other parcels in Erieview. They made it clear enough simply by not 
addressing the issue, that I would not have their support. 
 Council President Jim Stanton came to visit. He suggested 
that it wouldn't be wise to move against Galbreath unless we had a 
developer to replace him. But you couldn't even talk to another 
developer until Galbreath was out of the picture. 
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Finally, James Davis, a prominent Cleveland lawyer whose firm 
monopolizes bond counseling for nearly every city in Ohio, came 
over to suggest that it really wouldn't be wise to move against 
Galbreath and to try to work things out. 
We did in fact have several meetings with the Galbreath people. 
To no avail. 
Here was prime land, in the heart of the city, lying fallow while 
construction went up all around it. The value of the land had 
soared and was going higher all the time. I have every right, 
through the city's contract with HUD, to revoke the agreement with 
Galbreath. But I came to realize that although nobody could stop 
me, doing it without the support of the business community would 
produce nothing. So I decided, as the old joke goes, not to sidestep 
the issue but to rise above it. We turned our eyes elsewhere. 
And we found housing. 
Some people may recall that HUD cut off all of Cleveland's 
funds again in 1971, my last year in office. But the reasons were 
different. I engineered that one myself. All of the federal projects 
in HUD grants in Cleveland totaled more the $206 million at that 
time. Only part of it was for housing the poor and the elderly. 
Housing was ostensibly under the control of the Cleveland 
Metropolitan Housing Authority, and five member body on which 
I had a minority of two votes. But a pending HUD agreement with 
CMHA on how many housing units would be built had to have the 
approval of Cleveland's City Council. Once that agreement had 
passed, the Council would lose control over housing. And the 
councilmen didn't want to lose control, because they knew 
perfectly well that we would continue our aggressive building of 
housing for the poor in middle-class neighborhoods. They had 
fought such housing in their neighborhoods, and they refused to 
approve the agreement. I wasn't going to be able to get them to 
approve the new agreement through persuasion. I was going to 
have to make their opposition too costly for them to continue. 
I went to Chicago to talk to the regional director of HUD, Frank 
Fischer. I explained the problem and what I wanted to do. He 
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agreed to come into the city, to go before the councilmen and tell 
them with great air of finality that unless the housing agreement 
was passed forthwith, all federal funds for all the projects in the 
city would be cut off. The reality of losing $206 million was an 
effective persuading force, and they eventually passed the 
agreement. HUD restored our funding. 
Housing was one of my true and lasting achievements. When I 
took office there had been no new public housing built in five 
years and there was none under contract. When I left office four 
years later we had built 5,496 units of low and moderate income 
housing at a cost of more than $102 million. No city in the country 
had a record like that. A project that vigorous was bound to be 
highly visible, and, just as naturally, to cause a good deal of 
opposition in neighborhoods where no low-income housing had 
gone before. This was especially true in the middle-class 
neighborhoods where we erected housing for the poor. The 
opposition was not solely a racial matter. it also reflected class 
hostility. We faced the same bright-red angers in Lee-Seville, a 
middle-class black neighborhood, as we did in the white southwest 
side of Cleveland. But, although we were blocked in some cases -- 
Lee Seville was the most dramatic -- we were successful in the 
overall project. 
I had to pick up a club, too, to force Cleveland's banks to be 
more liberal in giving small business loans to black entrepreneurs. 
My finance director, Phil Dearborn, set up a dinner with the 
leading bankers in town. At the dinner I explained to them that 
their policies toward loans for beginning businessmen worked 
against the growth of black capitalism. I recognized that potential 
black entrepreneurs are without the training or experience the 
bankers like to see, that sometimes they have poor credit records, 
and finally that they seldom have sufficient collateral to secure a 
business loan. I suggested to these bankers that to maintain their 
strict rules on these issues would be to keep black people from 
becoming employers who participate in profits, not just wages. The 
bankers were sympathetic but said that they just didn't have the 
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ability to relax their policies though they understood the problems 
Negroes have and felt great compassion for them. 
The next morning I called Dearborn in and asked him how 
much money the city of Cleveland had on deposit in the banks in 
Cleveland. It turned out to be a total of about $50 million. I suggest 
to Phil that we should pull our money out of the five big banks that 
traditionally held the city's funds and spread the money around in 
some of the smaller banks. Phil put that plan into motion, and it 
took only a couple of days before the bankers called and asked 
could we have another meeting. We had a very fine session that 
time, and they told me they had been thinking about the good sense 
I had made at that dinner, and they now felt they could work this 
thing out. And they did. Over the next thirty months, Cleveland 
banks lent some $6 million to black businessmen. The rate of 
default on the loans was about fourteen percent; the national rate 
on such loans is twenty percent. 
We kept many young black businessmen and professionals in 
business by using them as suppliers to the city itself. Every 
Wednesday morning, the Board of Control held its required public 
meeting in the Tapestry Room, adjacent to my office. The board 
consisted entirely of members of my cabinet. I presided as 
chairman. All expenditures for capital improvements and 
purchasing of supplies, goods and services had to be authorized by 
the City Council, but the actual spending of over $100 million a 
year was, by law, the prerogative of the Board of Control. Awards 
were made on the basis of the lowest and best bidder. Able and 
highly qualified black professional firms like the brothers Julian 
and Robert Madison found they were no longer excluded from city 
business because of their race. From the city contracts they 
received the Madisons were able to expand their architectural firm 
from six to twenty-six professionals, to create an engineering firm 
with a comparable number of technicians, and to open New York 
and Washington offices. Black realtors were awarded appraisal 
contracts, a black lawyer was hired to represent the city in an $80 
million rate case involving the telephone utility, and minority 
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producers and manufacturers were actively sought out and 
encouraged to make bids on city contracts. 
I deliberately included the black businessmen in every aspect of 
the award and hiring process, just as they had been deliberately 
excluded before. My actions drew reprisal. White concessionaires 
and suppliers who had enjoyed the former monopoly circulated 
rumors that the blacks were getting jobs because they were paying 
off. The rumors, though false, fell on receptive white ears, and the 
reporters and councilmen missed no opportunity to repeat them. 
As mayor, I found that the race issues worked in strange ways. 
I was able to achieve some great things for my people through 
some of my blackjack methods and through legislative 
maneuverings that produced such things as our Equal Employment 
Opportunity Ordinance. But I also did things for people all over the 
city. At times this amazed the white councilmen. I remember one 
time when Michael Zone, a white West Side councilman, stood up 
on the floor of the Council and said, "They're paving streets in my 
ward!" He just couldn't believe it. Why was the black mayor 
providing his opposition with real services? Naturally, I was giving 
the best service I could muster to own loyal councilmen, but I 
never did it at the expense of other areas of the city. However, 
even though I had provided, as no Cleveland mayor in recent 
history had, substantially equal service to people throughout the 
city, it did not make me more popular among the whites. Those 
white councilmen could sit on their hands for an entire term, but 
when it came to election time all my favors were out the window. 
They could still play off the racism against me and get votes just 
by sound off against us. 
Here is a pretty expensive example. We agree with the 
Cleveland Board of Education to share the costs of erecting six 
new recreation centers, each to be connected to an existing school 
building. The centers cost about $1 million each. It was decided to 
put the first one on the far West Side, in the ward of George Blaha, 
an old Council veteran and a loyal tool of Jim Stanton. We broke 
ground for that center shortly after I announced I was running for 
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reelection in 1969. I chose a day for the groundbreaking that would 
coincide with a ward club meeting in Blaha's ward. I wanted to get 
as much political benefit from the recreation center as I could. 
Blaha was there for all the hoopla and the photographers when we 
broke ground for the center, and the Press dutifully carried a nice 
picture that included both of us, smiling away. 
That night I took my campaign to the West Side. We went to 
George Blaha's ward club meeting. I had with me Helen Lyons, the 
clerk of courts, who was very strong on the West Side, and Richard 
Maher, the political reporter for the Press. We were informed at 
the door that there would be no speakers. I asked to speak to 
George. He was found after an exhaustive search. Suddenly, this 
man who had been so ebullient and effusive in the morning was 
awfully restrained. He told me that he was sorry, but there wouldn't 
be any speakers that night. 
"That's all right, George. I don't want to make a speech," I said. 
"I just want to meet the people. Why don't you go around with me 
and introduce me?" 
"George explained in a number of labyrinthine ways that he 
wasn't free just then to go around with me, but I should feel free to 
go around and introduce myself. 
"I know they would be happy to see me, George," I said, 
"because we just gave them a million-dollar recreation center 
today. Before I leave I want to say a few words, but right now I 
think I'll just go around and shake some hands." 
There were about three hundred people in the hall. I went from 
table to table all around that room. Some people received me 
enthusiastically and openly. Others just sat there and waited for me 
to introduce myself. With some, the hostility was patent and 
unremitting. But I allowed no one to refuse to shake my hand. I 
just held it out there and waited. Some of them sweated blood 
before they took that black hand, but they all did, and, oh, didn't I 
smile and remind them I was running and I certainly would 
appreciate their consideration. Sometimes they just mumbled after 
I said that, but I didn't let them off easy. 
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"After I finished off the hall, I headed for the door. I ran into 
Blaha and he asked then whether I wanted to say a few words, I 
said no, I thought I had met everybody in the room, it wasn't 
necessary. Just as my group approached the door, Jim Stanton 
arrived with his entourage of Irishmen. He nodded to me, but didn't 
say anything. 
We passed through the door into the hallway outside. The three 
of us stood there a moment, just outside the open door of the 
meeting. Then I hear Jim Stanton call in a loud voice, "What did 
you let that nigger in here for?" 
I heard Blaha explain that he hadn't introduced me and hadn't 
let me speak. Helen Lyons turned to me and said, "Did you hear 
that?" 
I said, "It isn't important that I heard it, it's important that Dick 
Maher heard it." 
He heard it. But the Press didn't print it. 
It's not fair for me to say that I was one of only a handful of 
people who cared about Cleveland and understood the fight we 
were in for survival. Trapped in a process that was grinding me 
down, I often felt that I was alone and that most of the people 
didn't give a damn whether the city lived or died and certainly 
didn't care if the poor, the elderly, the unemployed, the sick, all 
those who needed help, lived or died. But then there was 
"Cleveland: NOW!" 
Cleveland: NOW! was an extraordinary demonstration of how 
people can really respond at the maximum and the best that is 
within them. I never deluded myself that it could be a level at 
which people could continually respond, but when the program 
began I had the confidence that they could rise to a level where 
they wanted to respond to problems that human beings have in our 
society, while setting aside their prejudices and hostilities. I felt 
that if people can be brought to that level and persuaded to act, you 
can make considerable gain which will sustain you when the 
pendulum swings the other way and people return to their normal 
lack of concern, or when it goes to the opposite extreme and there 
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is active antagonism toward the less fortunate and members of 
minority groups. 
The program began immediately following the April 4 death of 
Martin Luther King, when the black community and its leadership 
so magnificently kept the peace and enabled Cleveland to avoid the 
eruptions of violence in other cities that followed the assassination. 
I knew that because we had been able to keep the city quiet after 
King's death, the community was at a high level of appreciation 
and receptivity. The issue was, how do we take advantage of this in 
a way that will help the city? The idea cam from Irving Kriegsfeld, 
director of the PATH association, a non-profit housing group, who 
later became director of the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing 
Authority. His idea was to get the community together on the issue 
of financial support for housing and other areas of social concern. I 
asked him to head a group of people in formulating a program to 
take to the community leadership. He drafted it in very broad terms 
with input from members of my cabinet. I took it to the leaders of 
the business community, the heads of the media and small groups 
of community people. Everyone was excited about the program. 
To insure the integrity of the fund raising and raise the bulk of the 
money, prominent businessmen took leading roles -- men like 
Thomas F. Patton, president of Republic Steel, George S. Divey, 
president of Harris-Intertype, George Grabner, president of 
Weatherhead, and John Sherwin, a retired and highly respected 
banker. The three television stations combined their efforts to do a 
film that would show the problems we planned to attack. The only 
real difficulty I had was with the two newspapers, whose editors 
fought over who would break the story. We wanted to do it in the 
Plain Dealer. Tom Boardman of the Press finally agreed and then 
it broke the story anyway. 
Our goal was to raise $11.5 million from the business 
community and the general public. This was to generate $165.75 
million in state, federal and foundation funds for projects ranging 
from new housing to job training to recreation centers. The 
program was to last eighteen months, but that was to be merely the 
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beginning of a $1.5 billion effort over a period of ten to twelve 
years to rebuild our city. 
The response was fantastic. Money came in from elementary 
school children in nickels and dimes and from a man named 
Leland Schubert who gave $1 million. Everyone, it seemed, 
wanted to be part of this effort to begin the rebuilding of the city. 
We actually raised and spent over $5.5 million and generated 
several millions in federal and other assistance. 
Cleveland: NOW! was instrumental in building housing, 
creating jobs, building day-care and recreational activities, new 
drug-treatment centers, and a number of other positive things. But 
the really important achievement was in solving a problem no 
other city had been able to solve, that of getting people totally 
involved in an effort to do something for their city. There was a lot 
about the program that was pure public relations. Everything 
positive that happened over that eighteen-month period was 
announced as a Cleveland:NOW! achievement. Obviously that was 
not always true. But people had to have a feeling that the building 
they saw, the progress in evidence around them, was the result of 
their effort and determination to see their city move. The program 
did not do all we hoped, and by now the spirit that moved it is 
dead; but for a moment, Cleveland -- a city that is the butt of so 
many jokes, and sometimes deservedly -- felt involvement, 
achievement, and pride. 
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9 
TWO BULLS 
 
Cleveland's City Council is an anachronism in the second half of 
the twentieth century. No other major city in the country has such 
an unwieldy legislative body. Unwieldy isn't the word, it is 
corruptive, it is crippling. For quite honorable and well-
intentioned, even liberal reasons, the city fathers in the first part of 
the century redesigned Cleveland's Council to give clear 
representation to the multitude of ethnic communities. One of the 
first of the major industrial cities in the Midwest, Cleveland grew 
most during the time when the Eastern European countries were 
the source of most of America's immigrants. As a result, the city 
became a quilt of extremely distinct neighborhoods, almost 
enclaves, each with its own ethnic character. 
The Council was set up to have thirty-three representatives for 
the city's 800,000 persons, each councilman elected from a ward. 
Needless to say, the ward lines, drawn by the councilmen 
themselves, neatly marked off like-voting neighborhoods. This 
reached a point of absurdity in the decade before the U.S. Supreme 
Court's one-man, one-vote rulings went into real effect in 1970. 
Cleveland's thirty-three wards were so gerrymandered that some 
wards were more than twice the size of others. Now if this large 
body of councilmen served to mediate the city's ethnic pluralism in 
the first half of the century, that function was certainly wrenched 
out of shape by the advent of a significantly large minority of 
blacks. When more than half of the councilmen are elected by 
small ethnic strongholds, each with its own neighborhood 
isolationism, and when they choose a strong leader as their 
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president, it is easy to see what they can do to what the textbooks 
would call a strong-mayor form of government. 
So what I faced was a government of negative capability, which 
may be fine for a poet but is hell for an activist politician. Had I 
been satisfied to be a mere administrator or caretaker, as for 
twenty-five years the mayors who preceded me were, there would 
have been no trouble. But I wasn't satisfied with that and that was 
the trouble. The suburbanites would read the headlines about our 
feuds at City Hall and moan that if only Carl Stokes or Jim Stanton 
could get along, this city could really move ahead, that Stokes was 
blowing a great opportunity. How hopelessly naïve! For a mayor to 
govern, actually govern, he has to have political power over the 
councilmen. He has to be able to have some effect on whether they 
can get elected or re-elected, to grant or to withhold substantive 
favors, such things as new playgrounds and street paving. I was 
caught in a double bind. I had to use the limited patronage of City 
Hall to keep the black councilmen loyal to me and independent of 
the Council's own favor system. But, since most of the councilmen 
were elected from a small, ethnic, not to say racist base that I 
couldn't undermine, there was simply nothing I could hold over 
their heads. The Democratic Party apparatus certainly wasn't about 
to help. 
I had never fully realized how much power those men had. I 
had never wanted to be a councilman and I never understood why 
anyone else would. In all my campaigning -- and I believe I had 
more than the usual candidate's understanding of the issues -- I 
never pointed my finger at the Council. I accused the mayors. I 
was following in the tradition of others who also had failed to 
explain the role of the Council in the decline of Cleveland. I don't 
recall any mayor ever admitting the extraordinary power of the 
Council. With a strong leader who can further his own interests by 
providing a measure of profit or political security, the Council 
becomes formidable. James V. Stanton was such a man. 
In 1963, when Stanton was elected to his second term as 
councilman, the leadership of the Council, President Jack P. 
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Russell and Council Clerk Thad Fusco, were under attack by Press 
Editor Louis Seltzer. It was clear that Russell's machine was falling 
apart. Until Stanton came along, the white West Side councilmen 
were not organized. Stanton stepped into the power vacuum and 
put them together. Then he began a campaign of constant 
harassment at Russell from the floor of the Council. He forced a 
vote on every issues that could embarrass Russell. He was very 
effective, and he stood out in a body where the level or 
performance is routinely dismal. 
Stanton was greatly helped by a young Italian, Paul J. 
DeGrandis, a former councilman with keen organizational mind 
and sure knowledge of the tough byways of politics. But De 
Grandis had cast a vote against the Fair Housing Ordinance in 
1961, and the black vote in his ward, though small, had been 
enough to defeat him and elect Michael Fatica. I had advised him 
against voting that way. I had known both men well. DeGrandis 
and I roomed together at a National Young Democrat convention. 
Fatica was an assistant prosecutor the same time I was. DeGrandis 
had first won for Council in 1957 when Lowell Henry won. We 
shared campaign tips during that time and expanded our friendship. 
Henry had confided to me that he and some others had received 
five hundred dollars for their vote for president of City Council in 
1958. That was not new. A favorite City Hall story was about the 
councilman who had been so tricky he had taken five hundred 
dollars from both sides; since it was a secret ballot, he figured 
neither side would know just how he voted. But neither side trusted 
him, and the agreed that each would have someone sit beside the 
councilman and make him expose his vote. It worked. One side got 
its money back, but didn't get his vote. Nothing's worse, the story 
goes, than a councilman who won't stay bought. 
In November 1963 Michael Fatica made the public charge that 
Stanton had offered him a thousand dollars for his vote for the 
presidency in Stanton's struggle with Russell. The charges and 
Stanton's denial were front-page news. In December, Stanton's 
long time friend and fellow West Side Irishman, John T. Corrigan, 
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the county prosecutor, subpoenaed Stanton to appear before the 
grand jury. On Christmas Eve the grand jury cleared Stanton of the 
bribery charge. He defeated Jack Russell and in January of 1964 
was sworn in as president of the City Council. 
In February 1964 Michael Fatica was charged with soliciting 
and accepting a bribe in a liquor license transaction. Corrigan sent 
Fatica's case to the grand jury, and he was indicted. In December 
of that year he was found guilty of the charge. Later, I'll discuss 
Prosecutor Corrigan in greater detail. 
For a long time I was unable to understand how a West Side 
Irish kid could be as street-wise as Jim Stanton at such a young 
age-he was only thirty when he became council president. He had a 
sure political sense. He was shrewd and hard and he knew how to 
count votes; I mean he knew when not to call for a vote that would 
show any lack of support. Later, as mayor dealing with the Safety 
Department, I came to see the light. Jim Stanton was the son of a 
firemen. Police and firemen are good politicians who know how to 
take care of themselves. They learn how to deal for their own 
interests in the same way a professional politician does, and they 
have a similar view of the world. Stanton had also learned from 
James M. Carney, the developer, who had earlier served in the 
state legislature. Carney never lost his interest in politics. Stanton 
had been greatly helped by Carney in his bid for a Council seat and 
later for Council President. 
Stanton grew quickly into an effective and strong leader. He 
had the toughness that you need when you are trying to hold 
together a number of men, each with his own little fiefdom, and he 
quickly found the glue needed to hold the pieces together. He 
developed good relations with the media, both the editorial offices 
and the working press. He had a kind of bullying good humor and 
ebullience that appealed to reporters, and he had a black toady, 
Jack Oliver, who took the reporters out and fed them and bought 
them drinks. Stanton worked politics, he spread his base. He gave 
some black councilmen the same deals that Russell had given, and 
then he went one step further. He made Leo Jackson, for instance, 
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chairman of the Urban Renewal Committee, giving him more 
power to negotiate with white business interests. Doing things like 
that brought Stanton enormous benefits; some people even thought 
of him as a liberal. It was a marvelous trade-off, because it was 
widely felt that Leo Jackson desperately wanted white approval. 
Meanwhile, Stanton's approach to legislation proved to be as 
anti-civil rights and conservative as that of previous Council 
presidents. Before the 1960s, such things weren't tested. But with 
the advent of the civil-rights movement, open-housing laws, gun-
control laws, and equal-employment opportunity laws, the old 
white politics was shown up for what it was. In 1961, Stanton vote 
against a Cleveland Fair-housing ordinance. When fair-housing 
laws were being considered at the state level, and when the 1964 
Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Acts were pending in 
Congress, Stanton refused to allow the Council to pass resolutions 
memorializing Congress or the state legislature to pass them. The 
Council was forever passing resolutions on Birdfeed Day, Like 
Your Dog Day and all sorts of nonsense, but as soon as a civil-
rights issue came up he would have it referred to committee to die 
and never be heard of again. In this respect Stanton was worse than 
any other white Council president had been -- because he was 
brighter and knew how to do it better. 
As we began to prepare for the 1965 campaign, it was clear that 
for the first time Stanton's interests and mine were on a collision 
course. Stanton wanted to run for mayor. But he couldn't convince 
his backers to support such a move. Carney and the other men 
behind the Democratic Party in Cleveland liked having him in the 
Council and running the deal. In his two years as president he had 
solidified his leadership, and he was useful as a whip over Locher. 
The big guys wanted to keep him where he was. Later, after he 
found he could not put it together and I was in the race, he 
withdrew and supported Locher. This was a facility Stanton had 
that I always marveled at. He would frequently, out of either 
design or impetuosity, throw out the bitter and personal criticisms 
of others in public life, get all the benefit from it, and then reverse 
136 
his field and support the same men without even generating a 
public discussion of his perfidy. He was very effective on Locher's 
behalf with councilmen and in speaking to groups on the West 
Side. He even put together a group of most of the black 
councilmen against me. 
By the end of the campaign, Stanton and I emerged as the two 
young politicians obviously on their way somewhere. We had the 
opposite philosophies of government: he represented the traditional 
politics, and I represented those fighting for change. Later he was 
to become the symbol and voice of the white community in its 
reaction to my stewardship of the city's affairs. It is in that light 
that our one-on-one conflicts must be understood. Our personal 
conflict was incidental to the greater function he served. 
In January of 1967, Stanton made the unequivocal declaration 
that he could not support Ralph Locher for mayor. He began 
cutting Locher right and left for the failures of the administration, 
many of which were as much due to the City Council's stalling on 
legislation as they were to Locher's slack administration. I was 
watching him -- he and I understand each other perffectly. I had a 
two-way shot. I was still guiding my lawsuit through appeal, 
hoping to have the congressional district redrawn so that I could 
run for Congress, but I was also keeping my options open to run 
for mayor. Stanton was busy generating stores in the newspaper 
about his interest in running for mayor, stories in which he was 
glowingly referred to as an example of the fresh, young Kennedy-
style politician. He had copied the Kennedy speech mannerisms 
and the finger-pointing style. 
But finally it had to be a question of who had the guts, and that 
was Stanton's continuing failure in dealing with me. He would get 
himself into a position that had to lead to a confrontation, yet at the 
final moment he was unable to take the final step. He filed to run 
for mayor. The day he filed I made the remark that there were only 
two major candidates, Ralph Locher and me. Stanton told a 
reporter, "Stokes is right. There are only two candidates." Two 
days later he withdrew. That meant two things to me. It meant he 
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was going to throw his weight behind Locher, and it meant that he 
didn't have the guts to go out there and try to win the white base, 
take it away from Locher and beat me. Under the veneer and the 
gloss, he was thinking timidly like the rest of them. He wouldn't 
gamble the loss of his Council presidency for the big job. 
So he missed his chance. And it was a great chance. Most of the 
white votes I got would certainly have gone to Stanton. They came 
to me because Locher was so patently unacceptable. I didn't need 
that margin running against Locker and the inept Frank Celeste, 
but against a really tough candidate like Stanton it would have 
been a different ball game. He would have gotten the newspaper 
endorsements, the Democratic Party and would have been more 
vigorous, the political workers within organized labor would have 
been much more zealous. I won because Locher was such a 
hopeless cause that nobody could whip up a strong anti-Stokes 
movement. Stanton was a tough guy, but he didn't have that final 
measure of guts. 
After the election, he came to my office. "Mayor," he began (he 
always called me "Mayor"), "I want to cooperate. I don't want to 
be mayor, I like being president of City Council." 
I came back to him with the same bullshit. I told him that, 
working together, we could turn the town around. And, frankly, we 
could have. I had a considerable degree of latitude at that time, and 
no Council president in recent memory had the extraordinary 
control of his membership that Jim Stanton had. For the first six or 
seven months, everything was fine. It was the honeymoon period 
when everybody was excited about what they were doing. Nobody 
was sniping, the media were giving us great support for everything, 
there was a fine spirit of cooperation all across the city. 
I had just put together a group of businessmen to take a look at 
the city's finances, and appointed James Carney as it chairman. In 
1966 the Council had enacted a one-half percent income tax that 
enabled me, the next year, to run on a campaign pledge of no new 
taxes. When I got to the Hall and found out how ignorant I had 
been about the city's true fiscal condition, I did what I had to do. I 
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didn't mind shifting my position on the tax issue. I had known the 
city was in trouble, but had thought we would be able to make it 
for a while before I would have to go for an increase in the tax. I 
found, however, that things were worse than I had feared. We 
needed the money right away. 
Jim Carney, once he discovered the true needs of the city, went 
to Stanton for me and asked him to support me and get the Council 
to pass a half percent increase. By state law, the Council had the 
authority to take it up to a full one percent. And Stanton was very 
helpful. When he anted something to get through the Council, it 
got through. When he didn't, it didn't. 
A few days after Carney talked to him, Stanton cornered me in 
an alcove just off my office. He said, "Listen, I've got this 
ordinance I'd like to take through Monday night under suspension, 
providing for an increase in the taxicab fares." 
I said, "Well, gee, Jim, I don't know, you better let me take a 
look at it." 
"Well, what you're going to find," he said, "is that Cleveland's 
fare are lower than other cities," and he went on to name a few 
cities, "and unless we do this, they're going to have to cut out some 
of the areas we serve." 
Now, as I'm listening to him, what I'm trying to figure out is 
Stanton's relationship to McBride, the man who owns the cab 
company. And I have to think about my own need to get the 
income tax increase passed. Finally, I had a repugnance to any fare 
increase, because one of the things I had planned to attack was the 
cab company's monopoly. As Stanton is talking to me, giving his 
version of the cab company's needs, these things are going through 
my head. The upshot was that I said, "Okay Jim, go ahead."  
It always happened like that. I would sit down with Jim and talk 
about the things we needed for the city's welfare, the substantive 
things, and Jim would sit there agreeing. Any time I came up with 
important legislation, important enough for me to talk to him about 
it, he would come back within a day or two with some small, 
specific piece of legislation that would help some special interest 
139 
of his. Well, that's politics, and we moved along. People said, "why 
don't Carl Stokes and Jim Stanton get along?" We did get along. 
Stanton's law practice grew and the city got needed legislation. 
At this point I should note the occurrence of a calamitous event, 
the details of which I will discuss more fully at a later time. On 
Tuesday, July 23,1968, in the northeast area of Cleveland called 
Glenville, a band of young, black self-styled revolutionaries under 
the leadership of Fred Ahmed Evans, engaged in a shoot-out with 
members of the Cleveland Police Department. During the course of 
that evening, three white policemen and six black civilians were 
killed by gunfire --three of the blacks were termed suspects in the 
shoot-out by the police. Twelve policemen, most of them white, 
were hospitalized with gunshot wounds. The aftermath of that 
night was to haunt and color every aspect of my administration the 
next three years. 
Glenville killed much of my public support and gave the non-
supporters a chance to emerge from the woodwork. This was 
especially true in the City Council. The criticism of the 
administration escalated immediately after the shot-out. Jim 
Stanton came down on us for not consulting him when we made 
out decision to keep the white policemen out of the area. The fact 
was, Stanton was around all day as we were trying to decide 
whether to pull out the white policemen. He was in our offices 
twice. He would go over to one of my aides and say, "Well, I guess 
everything is under control. Anything I can do, let me know," and 
then he would walk out. He never asked to see me. Now, I 
understand what he was doing. He'd come over and do that and 
then walk back over to the City Council side of the building and 
raise hell about how we were ruining the town. His face livid with 
rage, he's curse and cast about in a manner to suggest he was 
almost out of control of his senses, Of course had seen him several 
times like that, when he came over to the outer office of the 
administration. Somehow, that side of Jim Stanton never was 
presented to the public by the media. 
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It was after Glenville that Jim Stanton turned the councilmen 
loose. We had to face them every Monday night, when the Council 
meets. The meetings are televised live on educational television, 
and the mayor and the entire cabinet attend. The administrative 
branch has the right to attend, not the responsibility, but there has 
grown a tradition that the mayor and the cabinet members would 
respond to questions from the councilmen. After Stanton turned 
them loose, those councilmen began to use that public meeting to 
indulge in vitriolic and malicious attacks. These attacks became so 
bitter and demeaning that I ultimately broke with tradition, rules 
and the media's delight with the weekly spectacle, and ordered my 
cabinet members not to attend council meetings. 
Through the fall and into 1969, Stanton and I battled each other 
over every major issue that came up. One columnist described us 
as two young bulls with the city as the herd. I was trying to put 
together seventeen councilmen for a majority and couldn't do it. He 
was trying to put together twenty-two councilmen for a two-thirds 
majority vote that could override my veto, and he couldn't do it. I 
had an unshakable block of eight Democratic votes, plus four 
Republicans, plus an occasional extra vote when either conviction 
or a favor brought someone into the fold. The effect was a 
legislative situation that blocked all progress. If I didn't approve of 
a Stanton bill, I could veto it, know he could not muster the 
twenty-two votes to override me. But I couldn't work up a 
seventeen-vote majority to pass the bill he didn't like. We both had 
purely negative capabilities. In this manner was the city governed. 
The single most important legislative accomplishment of my 
four years as mayor was enactment of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Ordinance. That law required any firm doing business 
with the city to prove to our satisfaction that it had an active and 
specific program for recruiting, hiring, and upgrading persons from 
minority groups. Of course that meant mainly Negroes and Puerto 
Ricans. The new law meant over $3 million for minorities in jobs 
previously denied them. Getting such a law passed by our racist 
City Council was, on the surface, a noble undertaking. In fact, 
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though, it depended on the curious coming together of one man's 
naïve idealism, another's hustle, and my eye for the latter's greed. 
It was just before Christmas 1969. I had just been reelected, and 
all the fine rhetoric of the campaign had gone to the media's 
collective head; just about everybody thought Stanton and I were 
getting along. We were facing the last Council meeting before the 
winter recess. This is a kind of wastebasket session, in which a 
multitude of pending bills are rushed through, more less without 
examination. A perfect time to get through a bill that you don't care 
to have your opponents scrutinize too closely. And Stanton had his 
own little pet, which we knew perfectly well. 
For some months, he had been trying to engineer a zoning 
change in an area that had once been the city's prize park. Called 
Euclid Beach Park and fronting on Lake Erie at the city's far 
eastern tip, the property had held a well-built amusement complex 
of rides, gazebos, kiosks and concessions, as well as a tree-filled 
picnic area and promenade along the beach. The park complex had 
deteriorated over the years and was clearly ready for a new 
purpose. Stanton had one. He had been trying to get the land 
rezoned to permit high-rise apartments to be built. We didn't know, 
in the administration, specifically how Stanton was connected to 
this potential development, but it hardly made sense for him as a 
West Side councilman to take such concern in rezoning land in an 
eastern ward represented by another councilman. I had the Zoning 
Board disapprove it. This stopped the project cold. To reverse the 
decision of the Zoning Board, he'd have to get twenty-two votes in 
the Council. He couldn't get them. I had the lever I needed against 
him. 
About a week before the pre-Christmas Council meeting, I told 
all my cabinet members to pick out pending bills whose passage 
they felt was vital to city needs, We ended up with a list of twelve 
priority bills that had been hidden in various Council committees. 
The list of twelve bills included one truly controversial issue, gun 
control, but most of the others had not provoked much public 
discussion. 
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I looked the list over and it seemed all right. "is that it?" I 
asked. 
"What about EEO, Mr. Mayor?" 
It was a question from my law director, Clarence "Buddy" 
James. Buddy was no politician. It never occurred to him that an 
equal-employment-opportunity law was a hopeless cause in our 
situation. I knew, and just about everybody around me knew, that 
we had no way of getting such a bill passed. But Buddy didn't 
know it and he had had it drawn up and submitted to the Council, 
where it had stuck. I looked at Buddy then and I thought of all that 
and I thought of what I knew Stanton wanted. 
"Damn right," I said. 
Clearly it was trading time. I called Stanton, and we agreed to 
have dinner at Marie Schreiber's Tavern. I told him I could get my 
councilmen to vote for his Euclid Beach Park rezoning if he could 
get his majority to pass my thirteen bills. He looked the list over. 
Gun control stopped him. His leadership was strong over the 
Council majority, possibly the strongest in the town's history, but it 
wasn't that strong. He said he would need time to present a gun-
control issue. I agreed to that. He committed himself to passage of 
the remaining bills. 
I then explained to my councilmen, before the meeting, that 
they were to vote for the Euclid Beach legislation even though I 
had had the Zoning Board disapprove it. I told them what we were 
getting in the bargain. At the Council meeting that night, our EEO 
bill and the other legislation passed into law unanimously. I would 
be willing to bet that not one of those white councilmen voting for 
it had even read it. 
It is said that ours is a government of laws, not of men. I'll buy 
that.  
In the spring, Jack Russell told me that as long as the 
councilmen who supported me kept attending the Democratic 
caucus meetings, Stanton had a club over them. The unit rule 
bound them to vote with the majority. There were twenty-seven 
Democrats, and the eight who comprised my bloc were always 
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going to be outvoted by the Stanton people. Russell said that there 
only way I was going to be able to keep my base was to pull my 
councilmen out of the Stanton machine, where they were getting 
chewed up, and sustain them with the administration's sources -- 
patronage jobs they could spread around, street paving, extra care 
for their playgrounds, etc. This sort of thing had to be done once 
they pulled out of the Democratic caucus they would no longer be 
able to pull off the normal Council-dominated ventures, such as 
spot zoning changes. 
Russell know how this worked because Stanton had done it to 
him in 1963 when the young councilman formed his own rebel 
caucus as a prelude to taking the leadership away from Russell. 
But in that case, Stanton's caucus and the majority caucus were 
both white, and Stanton faced no danger in having the 
administration go after services in his ward because Mayor Locher 
too was white. The differences these men were having were 
"merely" political; it was in-group fighting that had no meaning to 
the community at large. But when I pulled my rebel caucus out, it 
was seen as a purely racial move, and Stanton was able to 
convincingly say I was polarizing the city. The city was polarized 
already, and there aren't degrees of polarization any more than 
there are degrees of pregnancy. In either case you either are or you 
are not, and it doesn't help the situation to try to blame men who 
show up long after the deed is done. My pulling out the rebel 
caucus only made visible the war that had been going on in the 
closed caucus meetings. Stanton would visit the newspaper 
editorial offices and deplore the terrible situation I was causing by 
this open opposition. It was impossible to fight against this sort of 
thing; there was never an issue to get your hands on, never a 
specific and public action on his part. He was engaging in a kind of 
political sniper fire. You keep getting wounded, but nobody can 
see where the shots are coming from. In any case, the eight 
members of the Stokes bloc pulled out and were immediately 
labeled by the media as the "rebel caucus," and by one City Hall 
lawyer as the "Chicago Eight." 
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At this point I began to maneuver legislation whenever I could, 
to require a two-thirds vote. I wanted to put off voting on 
legislation which would put me in a highly publicized position, 
until it meant a major test of Stanton's strength. So, when I could 
have the Planning Commission or some such administrative 
agency disapprove a bill on technical grounds, I would do it, 
because then the bill required two-thirds vote, which I knew 
Stanton could not put together. Most of these votes never came to 
the floor, but the people who were concerned knew they were 
there. As the months went by, Stanton's leadership was generally 
being chipped away. It was not that he did not have solid control of 
the majority; he certainly did. But when you have a certain power 
you reach a point where what you don't have becomes more 
important than what you do have. Stanton had his power, but we 
began to force people to focus on the power he didn't have-twenty-
two votes. And the confidence in him began to wane. 
Finally, in October, less than a month before Stanton's certain 
election to Congress, I pulled it off. I had been waiting for, amount 
other things, the perfect legislation. I called a press conference and 
announced that for the first time since my election I was going to 
use my powers of veto. I knocked down three pieces of legislation 
and refused to sign two others. Of the three I vetoed, two were 
Council attempts to rezone areas to block public housing scheduled 
for Stanton's own ward and another West Side ward. His interests 
were clearly at stake. The third bill was an attempt by the Council 
to insert itself into the Board of Control, which made up of the 
mayor and his cabinet and which awards contracts once approval 
for the expenditures is given by the Council. Stanton had the worst 
tactical position possible. He was faced with issues that generated 
intense feelings, especially among his own constituents. He had to 
try to override my veto. Everybody knew what the issues between 
us were, and here we had obviously the test of his leadership. And 
he knew perfectly well there was no way he could get twenty-two 
votes. He did what he had to do. He brought the issues up on the 
floor of Council. We did what we had been waiting to do. We 
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voted them down. He lost. He couldn't get the votes. After that, a 
whole handful of men who had hoped to succeed him as Council 
president started sniping at him in the caucus meetings, and his 
internal control disintegrated rapidly. 
A point needs to be made about the war between us, The 
community at large, spurred on by the newspapers, adopted 
simple-minded interpretation that if only we would put our 
personalities and our vanities in the background and get along, the 
city could move ahead. The newspapers -- and I think particularly 
of the Plain Dealer's simplistically-minded Tom Vail, who in his 
"Publishers Column" harped on this theme and encouraged his 
readers to focus on the city's problems as the product of the 
personal feud between Stanton and me. This is typical of the 
establishment's refusal to accept responsibility for its own social 
barbarism. It doesn't take much intelligence to examine the issues 
over which Stanton and I fought and discover that each involved 
substantive, basic attempts on my part to bring reforms to provide 
services to the people who needed them most, the poor and the 
elderly. Stanton's position on these issues was inevitably to present 
the most reactionary opposition. I wanted public housing for the 
elderly and for poor people, black and white. Stanton fought me. I 
wanted a gun-control law to help us stop the weekly carnage that 
goes on in Cleveland. Stanton fought me. I wanted to use the actual 
and potential resources of the city of Cleveland to provide jobs for 
people who didn't have them. Stanton fought me. Even had we 
liked each other, as long as he chose to represent the interests of 
the haves while I was fighting for the need of the have-nots, we 
were doomed to collide. 
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10 
THE MEDIA 
 
We have allowed two traditional institutions, both intended as our 
protectors, to develop forms of social and thought control that 
would have terrified the men who wrote the Constitution. My 
greatest frustration as mayor of Cleveland came through my futile 
attempts to reform the Police Department; but that failure cannot 
be fully understood apart from an understanding of the press. As 
these two institutions hardened into permanent adversaries, I was 
forced into a defensive position and was not able to fully exercise 
the authority I had been elected to wield. When I left office after 
four years, The Cleveland Police Department was as politically 
corrupt, as Byzantine in its organization, as brutal in its 
understanding of the sources of crime, as it was before I came. 
And, in my opinion, the newspapers were still as reckless, as 
arrogant and as profane. I mean that literally. To present daily to 
the public a simplistic, often racist and socially thoughtless 
interpretation of human events is profanity. 
Newspapers enjoy an exclusivity of protection and privilege 
comparable only to that enjoyed by the police. Policemen are taken 
from our society of men and given the extraordinary privilege of 
being able to take the freedom and liberty of their fellow men. Like 
their fellow men, policemen can be wrong. But there is little 
recourse for the victims when this happens. 
And we give them guns. The police are allowed to carry and 
use weapons that are not available to other citizens. They are given 
the right by law to take life when in their judgement it is necessary. 
And we provide them with so little social education that we have 
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no reason to suppose that their judgement will be sound. We have 
in the police an exclusive class, protected by law in their 
exclusivity and their privilege, and a class created out of the last 
promising segment of the lower middle class of white America. 
The news media are antagonists of another sort. They are more 
than a random collection of individuals. They are a business 
institution operated to make money from people who have money. 
They are a white institution which reflects white racism in its 
employment and operational functions. Equally important, their 
responses, their social values, their world outlook coincides with 
their class position in the economic structure of this society. Their 
influence is pervasive and they are aware of it. They are often 
giddy and reckless in wielding their power because they are free 
from counter institutional assault. It is not so much that they rally 
to opposition, but that they confuse and neutralize potential allies. 
To that extent the news media are a constant abrasive. It was only 
natural that they would attack a black mayor attempting reform. 
The point of saying that the pen is mightier than the sword is 
not that the sword is a less efficient solution to human conflicts but 
that the pen is in fact a sword. It cuts and it can kill. Several of the 
writers who covered my administration indulged themselves in a 
form of steady, slow assassination. The newspapers are protected 
by our most cherished social contract, the Constitution. They have 
virtually no limitations. The men who wrote the Constitution never 
intended that the newspapers would develop into such ultra-
powerful institutions. And as more and more cities find themselves 
with only one newspaper, or perhaps two newspapers owned by 
the same man, who also sometimes owns a radio and/or television 
station, they find themselves in fact under a form of shadow 
government, an unelected, unaccountable rule. 
The federal government at least recognized that there is 
something wrong when the firm that owns the newspaper also 
owns the television station. The law recognizes that the airways are 
public and must be protected from abuse by the special interests. 
Why should newspapers be exempt? Many newspapers have what 
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amounts to a monopoly as shapers of opinions. Wouldn't it be 
reasonable to demand of those opinion-makers that the public 
know what special interest they have a stake in? In 1970 I 
introduced legislation that would have forced public disclosure of 
financial interests not only of elected officials such as myself and 
councilmen, but also of newspaper reporters, executives, and 
editors. You can guess the response of the newspapers. The level 
of scorn and abuse in the editorial columns reached new highs. 
They reduced the proposal to an absurdity. But what is absurd 
about it? Doesn't the public have the right to know, for instance, 
when it is reading an article in the Plain Dealer about some action 
of the Cleveland Trust Company that the Plain Dealer is up to its 
neck in financial ties to that bank? Newspapers hold a public trust 
because they influence the course of government. Public trusts 
should be accountable to the public. 
Cleveland is, or was, the most dramatic example of government 
by newspaper. Louis Seltzer, the editor of the Cleveland Press, 
determined every mayor from 1941 through 1965. The result was 
that Cleveland limped into the second half of the century with no 
one to attribute failures to those actually making the decisions. The 
watchdog wasn't just asleep, he was working the other side. 
When I came into office I didn't underestimate the value of 
newspaper support, but I also understood that the papers had been 
as much a part of the failures of Cleveland as had the politicians. 
Seltzer had grown up with the Press, and had turned it into his 
personal voice. Cleveland had large groups of Eastern European 
immigrants. He focused his paper on their point of view. As they 
grew, the Press grew, consolidating Seltzer's power no only over 
the Press as an institution, but over the political structure of the 
city, undermining the normal, and legally constituted, power of the 
parties. He ran the Press personally. 
When Seltzer went on a campaign, he determined exactly how 
everything was going to be played and he gave great editorial 
support, even putting his editorials on the first page. He had 
personal contact not just with the men directly under him, but with 
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the reporters. Those men did what was expected of them. The 
condition of Cleveland in 1967 reflects Seltzer's lack of 
understanding of what a city needs to stay alive. But that it was his 
understanding that in large part got it that way is indisputable. The 
politicians were all forced to court him. Nobody made a move 
without consulting Seltzer. If Seltzer didn't approve it, most of the 
politicians didn't do it. The two best things that happened to 
Cleveland in 1967 were my election as mayor and Louis Seltzer's 
retirement from the Press. 
However, Seltzer's influence did not die with his retirement. 
The power of the press is shared by its representatives, and in the 
case of the Press, this mean that the top reporters under Seltzer had 
learned over the years that politicians were as afraid of them as 
they were of Seltzer. The reporters came to regard public officials 
as submissive and even subservient to their power. Of course the 
power of the newspapers is always awesome to public officials, but 
the power of the Cleveland Press went beyond the normal state of 
affairs. Cleveland's mayors learned a tradition of deference to the 
Press because they were creatures of the Press. Clevelanders don't 
even smile when they describe how former mayors trekked to 
Seltzer's office before making any major decision. It's not funny. 
This was one of the traditions I was determined to change. 
It was a difficult time for some of the Press reporters to adjust 
to. Paul Lilley was the top investigative reporter at the Press and 
he was always close to City Hall; he knew most of the dirt. He had 
always been able to walk into the mayor's office when he felt like 
it and get inside information in those "off the record," 
conversations that so often compromise the integrity of both the 
politician and the reporter. He would tell those mayors things they 
didn't know, and the mayors would reciprocate. 
He had visited me early. He started to tell me how he expected 
to be treated, and I told him I wasn't going to say anything to him 
off the record.I told him he wasn't going to hear anything from me 
in that office that I wouldn't say in a press conference. 
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He looked at me and said, "Well Carl, it just looks bad in the 
newspaper when the story says, 'When confronted with the 
accusation that a certain thing happened, the mayor had no 
response.' I don't want you to be in that position." 
"You do what you want to do, Paul," I said, "but when they 
have read sufficiently that I don't have any comment, they'll know 
from all that I am doing otherwise that I must have sufficient 
reason that I'm not going to comment. But if I have to choose 
between this subtle blackmail of yours --" 
"I'm not trying to blackmail you," he interjected. 
"All right, I'll take that back. Let's just say the subtle suggestion 
that you are making that I should confide in you at the risk of some 
negative comments in your paper is a risk I'll take. I'm not going to 
talk to you off the record, and when I tell you I don't have anything 
more to say, then your asking the question a different way isn't 
going to get a different response." 
Lilley wasn't the only one. But I am proud to say I never 
pandered to the news media. I never curried their favor by slipping 
a reporter and exclusive to win favor with him or his paper or his 
broadcasting station. I respected the hard-working reporter who 
dug out the facts on my administration -- no matter how negative 
these might be. I despised the lazy and personally hostile reporter 
who took gossip and/or half truths and made feature stories of 
them. 
This is not to complain about the initial coverage my 
administration received. One habit the media people have, and it is 
a good one, is to give any new administration -- and this is true at 
all levels of government -- time to get its house in order. The 
reporters know where the weak spots are, where the trouble lies, 
but they don't parade them to the public. At first. This is called the 
honeymoon. The ending of this honeymoon is gradual, just as it is 
with most marriages. But with us it was different. Glenville came 
like the cutting of a leash. In the next three and a half years there 
was almost no time that one or both newspapers did not have some 
kind of investigation going that concerned me or my 
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administration. They never touched me, but it wasn't because they 
didn't try. 
Their desperate desire to get something on Stokes reached 
ridiculous levels. All through the fall of 1970, Toni Tucci of the 
Press was turning up penny-ante scandals. One time he found that 
one of the receptionists in my office was on the wrong payroll. We 
had brought her over from the Utilities Department and never 
changed her classification. But the Press played it on page one 
with banner headlines as though we were cheating the taxpayers. 
More troubling than these sensationalized miniscandals was the 
tone of the reporting after Glenville. No matter what the story, if I 
could be at all connected to it in any way, and if it was at all 
controversial or had any negative implications, there were some 
reporters who would manage to connect it with me. There was no 
way to fight against this sort of thing, and it is almost impossible to 
fully document. When I complained, the reporters involved quickly 
responded that I was shining over personal criticism. They couldn't 
understand that I didn't mind personal criticism in a story that was 
about me as a person, for something I had done, but that a story 
about a tax issue that attacked the validity of a tax by associating it 
with me was harmful journalism. 
In 1970, when I saw that the city was headed for financial 
disaster, I set up one of those "blue-ribbon" committees you need 
when you have to have the substantiation of impartial and expert 
testimony supporting what you already know has to be done. I had 
businessmen and bankers study the city's financial position and 
they came up with certain recommendations. They called for an 
increase of eighth tenths of one percent in the income tax. I tried 
my best to get the newspapers and television stations to report on 
the subsequent campaign for that tax fairly, without associating it 
with me. Sure enough, by the time the issue was through the 
Council, the papers had made it "Stokes's tax." They made it so 
that the vote on the tax was a referendum on me. The merits of the 
tax and the city's need for it were buried under the paper's 
personalizing its passage. 
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Through all of this I found that I couldn't have found a better 
man for my press secretary than Richard Murway. He had been a 
prize-winning housing and urban-affairs writer of the Press, and 
then for more than ten years a public-relations counsel for the 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, which is headquartered in 
Cleveland. His cool collected, informal way of handling reporters 
was precisely what I needed, given my own flamboyance and 
occasionally impetuous angers. 
Those first months were amazing. I had set a policy right away 
that we wouldn't have daily formal news conferences as mayors 
before me had. I could see how the TV reporters had badgered 
Locher, making him look foolish day after day. I had no intention 
of allowing them to jam a microphone into my face every day and 
ask me what I was going to do about this terrible urban-renewal 
mess today that had been there for fifteen years. But, as it 
happened, there was so much going on for those first eight months, 
so many appointments, new programs and the like, that I ended up 
having what amounted to daily formal news conferences. We 
almost always had something to announce. We were working from 
eight in the morning until midnight or later, seven days a week. As 
my own pace slowed into a regular schedule I began to see how 
valuable Murway was, and he turned out to be one of those few 
people with whom I became truly close. He had the kind of loyalty 
that can't be bought, an essentially nonpolitical human 
commitment to me and what I was fighting for. Before he joined 
my administration, Murway would never have been picked out as a 
white liberal -- no marches, no sit-ins, no picketing. He was never 
part of any Movement. And when you compare that with his real 
and deep commitment, you realize that to use the label "white-
liberal" on Murway would be to underestimate him. He just 
happens to be a fully human being. 
When I had a complicated story, I took it to the Plain Dealer. I 
don't mean there is any difference in intellect between the people 
who work for the two papers, but the Plain Dealer, as the morning 
paper, is geared to more in-depth reporting. They have more time. 
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The afternoon paper is always short of time and is geared to getting 
the news out quickly. When we came out with Cleveland: NOW, 
although we told the Press it was coming, we insisted that the story 
go to the Plain Dealer. Budget and tax stories were better handled 
in the Plain Dealer. But if we had something we wanted to make 
sure hit hardest with the actual Cleveland resident, we took it to the 
Press, because it has more actual home readership within 
Cleveland proper. 
City Hall is always the source of sensational stories, but it was 
also true that I came along in a difficult time for the Press, a time 
that resulted in, I think, less accurate stories than had been the rule 
in the past. The city was losing population, and the Press was 
trying to compete with the Plain Dealer for the suburban 
circulation, which meant getting editions out sooner in the 
afternoon for home delivery in outlying districts. That meant 
earlier deadlines for the reporters, and consequently less time for 
checking facts. 
One thing I leaned through my dealings with the newspapers, 
and with the television stations, is that they squabble among 
themselves as much as those who are in government. Their internal 
politics are worse than professional politics because they are not 
practiced in public. They are shielded by the corporate veil. Their 
petty rivalries are always causing friction between officials and 
editors. The latter keep count on how many stories their opposition 
gets from an administration, and if the balance shifts slightly they 
come whining. Over the four years I was in office, the relative 
positions of the two papers changed. The Press lost circulation, 
advertising and its political dominance. The Plain Dealer became 
the largest paper in the state. 
Although the Plain Dealer is the largest paper, it has never 
been able to insert itself into a truly powerful position in the city. 
The man who is at the top of the Plain Dealer, Tom Vail, is a 
patrician who doesn't really care about running the newspaper in a 
personal way -- at least not beyond having his own picture in it. He 
has little contact with the people under him and no contact with the 
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average citizenry. While the Plain Dealer, like any large 
newspaper, has the power to arouse people, mostly in a negative 
way, and while it can further the careers of certain persons through 
favorable and certainly less than objective news coverage, the 
paper still lacks the punch needed to impress or bully politicians 
and institutions in the way the Press once did.  
I had to deal with editors Thomas Boardman at the Press and 
Vail at the Plain Dealer -- the men at the top. Just as they had to 
come to me, not to my commissioners, I had to go to them. At 
times, negative times, this was efficient enough. The man at the top 
can get his operatives to stop doing what they are doing much 
easier than he can get them to do something new or against their 
grain. The actual control of the coverage of events was in the 
hands of middle-management people, men like city editor Ted 
Princiotto at the Plain Dealer and Dick Campbell at the Press. 
They operated almost without interference. The men at the top can 
set policy and determine overall operation, but the men who sits at 
the city desk and selects the news, the reporter who comes in with 
what he thinks is news, the way he writes the news, how it is 
rewritten, what headlines goes on the story, what stories are 
assigned and to whom, the reasons they are or are not assigned -- 
this is how the day-to-day management of the news occurs. 
Newspapers tent to think of themselves as special. They think 
they are different from and better than other institutions. They're 
not. They can be as internally corrupt as any police force. As in 
any other institution, the operation can fall into the hands of 
persons who know how to grab and hold. If those persons lack a 
certain understanding of life outside the newsroom, if they are 
bigoted or just dumb, then it will be reflected in the newspaper, 
just as control of a police department by brutal, insensitive and 
bigoted minds results in a certain kind of police department. The 
individual reporter can be just as undisciplined and corrupt as the 
individual cop on the beat. Each has been known to take a bribe 
and give a knee in the groin. Although I, as an elected official, was 
often unable to make a specific police chief or a particular 
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policeman perform properly, Tom Vail, and Tom Boardman could 
make individual reporters or managing editors perform according 
to their policy. The men at the top can fire reporters, provided they 
can outmaneuver the Newspaper Guild. Unless the reporter is 
willing to cooperate they cannot tell him what to write and how to 
write it. But they can certainly determine whether what the reporter 
writes will be printed or not.  
To understand my feeling about some of the media you have to 
understand the case of Doris O'Donnell, who in 1967 was a 
reporter for the Plain Dealer. If she had been merely an 
exceptionally biased reporter, understood by the editors over her, 
she would have been no problem. Any editor in his right mind 
would have kept her from stores that involved the police and/or the 
black community, let alone the more sophisticated problems. But 
her sympathy for the police view of the world was rewarded at the 
Plain Dealer. Miss O'Donnell regards herself as a friend of the 
Negro, and to defend her case she will point to stories she has 
written. I would point to the same stories in attacking her racism. 
She was generally regarded as the Plain Dealer's chief 
investigative reporter, mainly because she was given the juiciest 
assignments by the managing editor, Ted Princiotto, who, I have to 
believe, shared her views. 
In 1967 I learned that she had compiled a dossier on me and, 
after being unable to convince the Plain Dealer to run it as a news 
story, had taken it to my opponent, Seth Taft. Taft refused to use 
her material. Two nights later the issue came to a head. Each night 
the Plain Dealer assigned a reporter to each candidate. On this 
night, Doris O'Donnell was assigned to Seth Taft. We were to 
appear together at one point in the evening at a neighborhood 
center. Taft made his remarks and left. However, Miss O'Donnell 
did not leave with Taft, as she was assigned to do. She waited until 
the end of my remarks. After the question-and-answer period, as I 
came off the stage and walked down the aisle, shaking hands and 
singing autographs, a group formed. Miss O'Donnell moved to the 
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front of the group and said, "Mr. Stokes. I am Doris O'Donnell 
from the Plain Dealer." 
"Yes, Miss O'Donnell?" 
"You know me -- you can call me Doris." 
"No, Miss O'Donnell, I do not know you. I am quite familiar 
with your articles, but to my knowledge this is the first time I've 
seen you. I'll call you Miss O'Donnell." 
Then she said, as best I can recall, "Well, that doesn't make any 
difference, but I do want to ask you a question. Isn't it true that you 
have been married three times?" 
As she asked the question, her voice rose. Most of the crowd 
around us heard her clearly. One man said, "What the hell do we 
care if he has been married three times. Why don't you leave the 
man alone?" 
"Yes, Miss O'Donnell, I have been married three times," I said, 
"but twice to the same girl." You may recall that the first Shirley 
and I were married first secretly, then later in a big ceremony. 
At that, we moved on out of the building. But as we reached the 
sidewalk, she came up again and in a loud voice said, "Mr. Stokes, 
isn't it true that the man buried in Highland View Cemetery under 
the name Charles Stokes is not really your father? That, in fact, 
Charles Stokes was married to your mother but she had you by 
another man?" 
"Well, Miss O'Donnell, you have now gone far enough to 
demonstrate to me that you have a purpose in these questions and 
remarks other than news reporting. When you have proceeded to 
literally calling me a bastard child and defamed my mother's name, 
it is time for me to take that kind of behavior up with your editor, 
and I will do that the first thing in the morning." 
"That is your privilege," she said, and walked off. 
I didn't see her again that night. The next morning I called Tom 
Vail and asked to see him that afternoon. When we met, he had 
with him Tom Guthrie, his assistant, and William Ware, the 
executive editor. They told me Miss O'Donnell had reported 
essentially the conversation we had had the night before. They said 
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she was unable to give them any explanation of why she had asked 
me those questions, nor was she able to account for staying to 
question me rather than leaving with Seth Taft, as she had been 
assigned to do. They assured me she would be taken off the 
campaign and given other assignments. And she was. 
"But why did she do it?" I asked Vail. "Why does she have it in 
for me?" 
Vail said he didn't know, but "perhaps she is going through the 
change." 
I then turned to Ware and asked approximately the same thing, 
wanting to know why, even if she was going through 'the change,' 
as they called it, I was the target. 
"When a woman is going through the change," he said, "anyone 
is subject to her wrath." 
He said it in a light tone -- clearly he did not want to deal with 
the real issues of his own responsibilities. The important things to 
note is that none of them even tried to deny that she was out to get 
me. When the issues was raised again later with these men, as 
unfortunately it had to be, they gave similar answers, never once 
denying the fact that it was a personal vendetta. 
By March of 1968, Vail and I had established a relationship 
that included regular almost weekly meetings. Sometimes the 
meetings would be just the two of us, sometimes the meetings 
would include my directors or some of the Plain Dealer's editors. 
This gradually became more elaborate, and my summer it had 
developed to the point of having regular lunches in a dining room 
off Vail's office. The point was to keep the top brass at the Plain 
Dealer apprised of our programs and problems to see how the 
paper could help. Police Chief Michael J. Blackwell and Safety 
Director Joseph McManamon were beginning to have conflicts. 
McManamon was trying to get started on a reorganization of his 
department along the lines of the Little Hoover Commission 
recommendations of 1966 (some of which had been suppressed by 
the news media when pressure was brought by former Police Chief 
Richard B. Wagner; more on this later). Then, after Glenville, the 
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problems became more acute and unavoidable. Vail at one point 
asked if there was anything his paper could do to help with the 
police problems. I told him yes -- if he could get someone to really 
write about the malingering, the continued protection of numbers 
and policy operators, the nearly complete work stoppage the police 
were engaged in after the Glenville shoot-out. 
I confessed to them that this was the toughest part of city 
government to handle and that I wanted to try some reforms but 
couldn't do anything without public support. They all expressed 
understanding and agreement. Vail suggested that they run a series 
of articles in which reporters would go out and really talk with 
people in the community about the problems they had with police 
and also talk with people in the administration. I said fine, I'd have 
Frank Moss, a black assistant to the safety director and a veteran 
policeman, available, because the reporters ought to talk with him 
and to the people at the Afro Set, a nationalist group. And they 
ought to talk to the street club leaders in Mount Pleasant and 
Glenville and to Louise Craig and Appalachian white leaders over 
on the West Side and some other Spanish-speaking persons in the 
projects on the near West Side. They agreed to these suggestions 
and said they'd put a number of reporters on the story. "We'll get 
this police thing out on the table," Vail said. 
The articles were done by a group of reporters, but the group 
was headed by Doris O'Donnell. It proved to me damaging and 
vicious. And this came from the top. You had to believe the man at 
the top okayed this series before it ran. Now, I have no problem 
taking personal criticism. But when they consciously went to the 
men whom I knew to be the most blatantly anti-Stokes police in 
the department, permitted them to spew out their hostilities toward 
me on the front page, they did a great injustice to the city. It was 
the most damnable single act I've known the Plain Dealer to 
participate in. Tom Vail knew Doris O'Donnell's personal hostility. 
The articles had one purpose -- to show the hatred and animosity 
the Police Department had for Carl Stokes and for what he was 
trying to do. 
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I called Vail when the first article appeared, and I asked him 
why he was permitting this kind of article to be written. He said, 
 "Carl, this is the series we talked about." 
"No," I said, "it's not the series we talked about. We talked 
about your reporters going to sources in the community and getting 
from them information about the police, what they are and are not 
doing. There's not one word in the stories from the people in the 
community. All this is is a sheer late piece, a forum for the police. 
This doesn't have any similarity to what we talked about. And as I 
look at the list of reporters who are supposed to be working on it, I 
know it is not true. I don't see anything in the article that reflects 
what Bob McGruder knows, for instance." 
"Well, that's going to be in the articles yet to come." 
"Tom, let me tell you this. This is not what we agreed upon. 
You are doing a terrible disservice to the city. When you put Doris 
O'Donnell in charge, you knew her own hostility to me, you knew 
her close working relationship with the police. I have to believe the 
person giving direction to this mess is Doris O'Donnell." 
"I think it is a good series," he said. 
The community, white and black, did not think it was good. 
The Plain Dealer was picketed and angry delegations of 
neighborhood people descended on Vail's office. Western Reserve 
University Civil Violence Center described the articles as 
"effectively keeping the vendetta going between the races." 
That was the end of my talks with Vail. I began to realize 
something. When you have sat with people for some hours, as I 
had done, and then they come out with this, and you think back to 
other incidents, you realize you aren't going to prevail over their 
own personal attitudes and the institutional failures of the 
newspaper. You stand in the position of compromising yourself if 
you continue trying to work with them. At that point I began to 
withdraw. My relations with the media became only what were 
formally necessary. 
This is, unfortunately, not yet the end of the Doris O'Donnell 
story. Even though she had been taken off covering me personally, 
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she resurrected her campaign in the city room when she learned I 
was going to run for reelection in 1969. I don't know  whose idea it 
was, whether hers or theirs, but she left the Plain Dealer in 
September 1969 and went on the staff of the small Willoughby 
News-Herald, in a suburb in an adjoining county. Within three 
months, she and he husband, Howard Beaufait, who was then a 
News-Herald copy editor, were in the Bahamas, trying to trace me 
to some shady land deal or tie me in with some rackets figures. 
Now, the paper she worked for has no more interest in Cleveland 
coverage than it does in Pittsburgh -- certainly not enough to 
dispatch two staff members on an expensive fishing expedition 
fifteen hundred miles away. If either of the Cleveland dailies 
wanted to spend that kind of money on that kind of snooping, it 
would be at least plausible, and in face one of them did, and at the 
same time. 
The Plain Dealer sent its City Hall reporter, Bob McGruder, 
and its then chief investigative reporter, Donald Bartlett, to the 
Bahamas at the same time that Mr. and Mrs. Beaufait were there. 
When the Plain Dealer reporters returned, they wrote a long memo 
explaining that they hadn't been able to tie me to anything, and 
there was not basis for a story. That was true, and subsequent 
events proved that their investigation had been more intensive than 
Miss O'Donnell's. On one occasion the two teams crossed paths, 
although Miss O'Donnell later denied knowing that the Plain 
Dealer was there.  
The absence of any evidence tying me to anything in the 
Bahamas did not stop Miss O'Donnell. The News-Herald published 
a four part series, bannered across the top of page one. The story 
exploited as it legitimate basis a rewriting of what had already 
appeared in several national publications, that rackets money was 
involved in expanding the casino and hotel industry on the resort 
islands. But then the articles were given a veneer of references to 
me, insinuating without ever saying so that I had ties to these 
people and, therefore, shady investments. It was the yellowest 
piece of nonreporting I ever saw. The articles would repeat rumors 
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about me and then go on to say that the rumors, although they 
couldn't be proved, certainly could be true because there was an 
"avalanche of well concealed real estate transactions" on Grand 
Bahama. The articles were full of unattributed remarks and 
'whispers' none of which went so far as to tie me specifically to 
anyone or any deal. The sole basis of my association with the 
Bahamas that they could point to were my two trips there, each for 
no more than three days, and one trip to Miami in the three years I 
had been in office. Miss O'Donnell confused my Miami trip with 
the others and without investigation further assumed it had been to 
the Bahamas. Without revealing in the articles exactly how many 
times I had been there, she referred to the resort areas as my "home 
away from home." I promptly filed a libel suit for two million 
dollars. 
Here are some of the sadder passages from Miss O'Donnell's 
deposition. She is being questioned by my lawyer, Kenneth 
Weinberg. 
Q. Did you find any evidence that you included in your story 
that Stokes owns and interest in any business in Grand Bahama 
Island? 
A. Not that I could determine... 
Q. Did you find any evidence that you included in your story 
that Carl Stokes was connected with the Mafia threat that you said 
runs through the island? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Well, then, why was Carl Stokes included in this story at all? 
I don't understand. If you found no evidence connecting him with 
the subject matter of the story, why was he put in the story at all? 
A. My assignment was to go down and look around, to see 
where the public officials spend some of their time. He was one of 
the public officials from this area who spent time down there. 
Q. He was the only one? 
A. No. There are other people. I could name hundreds of people 
who were there. 
Q. He is the only one you mention in your story. 
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A. He is a public figure. The other people would not be 
significant. 
Q. As a matter of fact, that was really your assignment, wasn't 
it, to go down and write a story about Carl Stokes? 
A. No. It was to go down and look around the island. 
Q. And see how you could involve Carl Stokes in the Grand 
Bahama? 
A. No, that is not true. 
Q. That was mentioned, wasn't it? 
A. Among other things. 
Q. Yes. 
A. Because he is a public official. 
Q. Right. As a matter of fact, what you set out to do in this 
story was to get something on Carl Stokes, is that right? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you like Carl Stokes? 
A. I have nofeeling about the man. He is just another politician. 
Q. Have you ever written any derogatory stories about Carl 
Stokes? 
A. I have written news stories about the Mayor as a public 
official, about his public acts. 
Q. If they came out derogatorily, that is not your fault, is that 
right? 
A. The matters and the news incidents fall where they are. 
Q. The truth speaks for itself, right? 
A. The reporting speaks for itself. 
  
At another point in her deposition she had this to say: 
Q. Was there any particular reason for having Carl Stokes's 
name prominently featured in the first article and virtually ignored 
in the balance? 
A. Well, I think the first paragraph explains it, that this 
information had been given from many Negroes about his 
investment in a condominium. 
Q. Well, it doesn't say that. It says there were whispers. 
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A. Well, I am telling you, if you want to call them whispers, 
you can call them whispers. If you think telephone voices and so 
forth sound like whispers, I will grant you that these people 
whispered to me. 
Q. Were these anonymous calls? 
A. No, sir. I know who the people are. 
Q. They are all black? 
A. Ninety percent of them. 
Q. Were they friends of Carl Strokes? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Were they enemies of Carl Stokes? 
A. I would think they know the mayor very well. 
Q. Were they people who called you and told you they would 
help you get Carl Stokes? 
A. No sir. They are not that melodramatic. 
Q. Would you characterize your articles as melodramatic? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Would you characterize them as truthful? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would you characterize them as innuendo? 
A. I characterize them as writing. 
Q. Fiction or nonfiction? 
A. Writing. Reporting. Writing. 
Q. But you don't care to characterize it as fiction or nonfiction? 
A. No, sir. 
  
In March 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court broadened the rule 
protecting a newspaper from damages for the libeling of a public 
official. It made our case very difficult to sustain. But the News-
Herald publisher, Harry Horvitz, did not want to gamble what the 
court might do. He offered to publish and apology if I would 
withdraw the suit. On May 25, 1971, the News-Herald published 
an apology that said: "The articles did not state, nor were they 
intended to convey the impression, that Mayor Stokes had any 
interest in any real estate or business in the Bahamas 
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nor that he had any connection with any illegal activities. The 
News-Herald regrets if there were any interpretations to the 
contrary." They also had to pay the court costs, and the suit was 
dismissed. Within a few months thereafter, Ms. O'Donnell and her 
husband left the employ of the News-Herald and entered the 
private practice of selling real estate. 
In 1967, after I had been elected mayor, my press secretary 
Richard Murway said to me, "Newspaper men are cynical, 
skeptical, but they are less prejudiced than the average white 
Clevelander. They are going to show their lack of prejudice by 
covering you and your administration the same way they covered 
your predecessors." I remember telling him, "They shouldn't do 
that." The newspapers and their reporters were part of the problem. 
They had no understanding of how I, as a black man, had gotten 
elected. They had no understanding of the things I must do as a 
black man in power. Most of them lived in the suburbs and 
internally were no more free of racial prejudice and hostility 
toward the central city than any other white suburbanite. Neither 
paper had had black reporters covering their beats other than police 
court. Blacks in the television and radio stations were almost 
nonexistent prior to my election. No black person was anywhere in 
the policy-making, supervisory or editorial level of either paper. 
They had no capacity or experience with which to deal on a peer 
level with a black mayor. Most newspapermen are incapable of 
believing that they are something less than perfectly fair. They are 
so thin-skinned that they will not allow criticism from anyone 
outside their own ranks. At the slightest suggestion that they are 
biased, they start shouting that you are challenging their cherished 
right of freedom of the press. 
The power of a newspaper is not only awesome, it pulls itself 
beyond criticism. Every day in Cleveland, the daily newspapers go 
into the hands of three quarters of a million people at the very 
least. The reporters who covered, say, City Hall, sold their point of 
view, their stance toward Carl Stokes, to hundreds of thousands of 
people. But when I stood up to criticize something said about me 
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in the newspaper, or criticized the reporter publicly for making 
wrongheaded criticism of me, I faced an immediate and unbridled 
rebuttal, written by that same reporter, maybe on the editorial page. 
He had access to the weapons. I had only my own news 
conference, still at the mercy of how it would be reported. You 
can't fight a power like that. That is, you can, but one hand is tied 
behind your back. 
Reporters know the awesome power that is in their hands. And 
they know, too, that they are practically immune from effective 
response on the part of persons they aggrieve. I think this is a 
dangerous condition for a society to be in. Of course, it would be 
more dangerous not to have newspapers, and there is the dilemma. 
I don't have a ready solution to the problems; I only know it is 
always wrong in a free society for any one institution to be totally 
free of control. 
I recall one day when I was at the Plain Dealer to see someone 
about something and ran into Ray Dorsey, then the paper's chief 
editorial writer. This was in 1970, when I had begun to fight back 
against the daily attack by the papers. He wanted to know why I 
was criticizing the Plain Dealer. 
I said, "I'm not here to talk about that." 
"You know," he said, "we've been with you, and we don't 
understand why you're criticizing us." 
"Listen," I said, "who are you that you can't be criticized, Ray? 
Now, don't give me a hard time. I think you were wrong in what 
you did on that last story. When I'm wrong you criticize me, why 
can't I criticize you when you're wrong?" 
"We're trying to do a job," he said. 
"I don't want to talk about it," I said. "If we start talking about 
it, I'm going to tell you what I think about your active soliciting of 
votes for Tony Calabrese to become minority leader of the Senate." 
Boy, did he get red. I had, as we used to say in the streets, 
pulled the covers off him. 
It took me a long time to decide to take the news media on, but 
once I decided, I never wavered from it and it worked. It worked 
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for me personally, but I knew it wasn't good for the community.  
There are natural forces already there, structural inequities that 
militate against any substantive change under the best of 
circumstances. Once you take on the media too, it's all over. But 
when I took the media on, it was a great educational process for 
people. Once I was able to get my own weekly televised news 
conference, I was able to run those reporters out there for the 
public to see. They saw firsthand how most reporters ignored the 
substantive news and cast about for the trivia, the sensational, and 
that comment from which they could create a conflict with me and 
someone else. The black audience could also see that, other than 
Bob McGruder of the Plain Dealer, all the regular City Hall 
reporters for the papers, television and radio were white. 
In getting those televised weekly news conferences I took a 
page from the book of Mayor Henry Maier of Milwaukee, who got 
the educational television station to broadcast his weekly news 
conference. He had despaired of dealing with the press. I went 
Maier one better. I persuaded the news director of the Cleveland 
NBC affiliate, WKYC, to give me a half hour. As Murway and I 
kept watching the news coverage, we could see that we were 
constantly being covered as personalities, and that the substantive 
activities of the administration were being ignored. We knew we 
had to get direct access to the people. 
Our half hour followed Meet the Press on Sunday and was 
taped every Friday morning. The impact was great. The ministers 
in the black community would say from the pulpit that they were 
finishing early so that everyone could get home and watch the 
Stokes news conference. It gave us a chance to publicly question 
reporters like Tony Tucci from the Press, and it underlined the 
personal hostility in many of their stories. Bill Barrett, the 
television writer for the Press, was always depreciating my listen 
audience, saying the polka program in the same time slot was 
outdrawing me. Hell, I wasn't having the program for the polka 
dancers. 
167 
I went to the television press conference not just to wage war 
with the press. In a half hour on television, I could get out what I 
wanted in my own words. Tell them about the substantive things 
we were doing. And if there was enough time, the media people 
could get their shots. 
Another aspect of my counterattack on the media was to have 
the Community Relations Board investigate both dailies to see 
what their hiring practices were. I showed the community what I 
charged to be the racist hiring practices of both papers. American 
newspapers are white owned, white run, and operated for white 
advertisers and white consumption. They talk to, not with, the 
black community. When my Community Relations Board 
investigated the Cleveland dailies, it found that both had less than 
five percent total black employment, and less than one percent at 
any capacity above the level of unskilled labor or clerk. If they are 
not doing anything about providing more jobs for qualified blacks 
with in their own structure, how can they be expected to be doing 
anything about employment practices in the community at large? 
How sincere can their crusades be? 
The most dramatic example of their attitudes came in their 
coverage of the riots in the late 1960s. The Kerner Commission 
report established that the media often contributed to the turmoil, 
tension and conflict of the riots themselves. Television crews even 
set up shots of kids throwing bricks. They overplayed, enlarged 
and often inflamed those tense situations. There was a great 
ignorance, especially among the broadcast media, about how to 
handle the reporting of a riot. 
Interestingly, the reporters who came into a city during a riot 
after having seen other riots were much more objective, less 
inflammatory, than the home-town reporters. I think this goes 
beyond the fact that the reporters from outside were probably the 
star reporters from their own newspapers and magazines and that 
the local reporters were merely whoever happened to be on duty. I 
believe it is the product of the complicated conspiracy within the 
local reporter's own mind-his own natural prejudices and his 
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sympathy for the local police. I believe that one of the least 
understood sources of racism in the daily coverage of newspapers 
lies in the way newspapermen are trained to believe in and rely on 
the police. A reporter's first job at the newspaper is almost always 
on the police beat. On that job he learns to accept the police 
version of any incident. More often than not he relies on the 
policeman's written report. He will occasionally make phone calls 
to the person who was directly involved, but then only if the crime 
was sensational, and only if he is not close to deadline. More than 
that, he develops a camaraderie with some of the police, who are 
very good at using off-the-record conversations to compromise 
reporters into not using information that might cast a fishy light on 
their own activities. If the reporter goes on to cover the courts, he 
is again usually taking the police and the prosecution view of the 
world, a view that happens to leave out a huge and rather important 
chunk of reality. 
Keeping that chunk of reality in mind, let us look at how the 
politics of the police conspire with the politics of the media to keep 
the people from learning what crime really is and how law 
enforcement really isn't. 
As I mentioned earlier, Cleveland's civic leaders in 1966 
established a Little Hoover Commission to investigate every phase 
of city government. The reports issued by that committee gave a 
relentlessly dismal picture of waste and inefficiency. With one 
exception, the failures of the city were laid out in the newspapers, 
with extended summary accounts of the findings and 
recommendations. There were twenty-nine reports of all phases of 
the government. 
But one, Report No. 6, on the Police Department, appeared 
publicly in a curious form. The first chapter laid the ground rules 
and the terms of the study. The rest of the chapters dealt with 
recommendations for a reorganization of the department. Strangely 
missing was the chapter that detailed the current status of the 
department. Even more strange, one might think, was the fact that 
no one found this strange. 
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The report was done by Public Administrative Service, a 
private consulting, research, and publishing firm in Chicago. The 
Cleveland study was headed by Dr. George D. Eastman, a senior 
staff member of the firm and a former police chief of Seattle. As  
originally done, the report included as its second chapter a fifteen-
page indictment of the department as it was being run. It is worth 
mentioning here that the chapter said Cleveland's crime-reporting 
procedures were so sloppy and inadequate that it would be 
impossible to know how bad the city's crime problem was. "The 
result is that literally thousands of complaints are not formally 
recorded and many received are not properly classified," according 
to the report. Even so, while the city lost 5.8 percent of its 
population in five years, the rate of major crimes rose more than 
eighty percent. "This is, of course, an almost unbelievable change," 
the report said. Worse, the rate of clearing up cases through arrests 
were "so far below national averages that they are cause for serious 
concern." Vice repression activities, it said, "are not aggressive, 
consistent, nor effective." Of traffic control, the report said that the 
city in 1965 "had the worst traffic accident record of many years 
and apparently, enforcement-wise, did the least about it." 
It is said the management of the department was a shambles. 
 
The division's formal organization violates sound organizational concepts in many 
respects. It is further confused by informal arrangements, power centers, and unusual 
lines of communications which make the apparent structure of organization 
meaningless.... Perhaps the division can best be described as a loose federation. Such 
an organization precludes effective leadership, and encourages tendencies to build 
small empires, and to create sinecure positions. It promotes reluctance to require 
competent performance from subordinate officers and wasteful use of sworn 
personnel for office and clerical assignments.  
 
It added that some of the commanding officers "could not fully 
define their own responsibilities, let alone those of subordinates." 
The problems of community relations, the report said, 
 
are so critical in Cleveland that they warrant immediate and serious attention leading 
to the adoption of new concepts, policies, programs and procedures. Yet, the division 
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stands aloof from very serious community problems, it is hostile and suspicious of 
those it is there to serve, and it has no real program directed toward the analysis of 
these problems, nor for their solution. 
  
The report found that beat patterns had not changed over the years 
"in spite of drastically changed conditions." It said the patrols 
provided no real support to the city traffic enforcement needs. 
Patrol officers on the average took only one enforcement action 
every two months. "Bureau offices this consistently ignore 
violations committed in their presence; the natural result is non-
compliance and disrespect by the motoring public." 
The report stated that "lack of morale and discipline are 
evidenced by the wearing of untidy, unkempt, and non-standard 
apparel, officers sleeping on duty in two-man cars and in building 
offices, particularly in the jail, and drinking in public places while 
on duty; and improper 'punishment assignments' to certain 
activities aggravate the situation." It went on to score the 
promotion procedures, which were based mainly on seniority and 
marksmanship. I remember that Chief Wagner's reputation at the 
time as a great administrator came from the fact that he was known 
as the best shot in the department. The report also showed that the 
intelligence range of recruits just barely hit the national average, 
and each recruit class for the preceding two years had included 
appointees with intelligence quotients at ninety or below. 
It is policy, unfortunate enough in this case, to circulate 
advance copies of such reports to the top people -- the commission, 
the mayor and his cabinet. Chief Richard Wagner violently 
objected to the findings of chapter two and reportedly demanded 
that Mayor Locher and the Little Hoover Commission persuade the 
editors of the daily newspapers not to print that chapter. I don't 
know who did what. All I know is that chapter two was not 
published by either paper. 
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11 
THE POLICE 
 
Ask yourself why the cries for law and order come from 
conservative whites, most of who live safely in the suburbs. The 
very people who are least affected by crime are the most vocal 
about it. It is my people who are most affected by crime. 
"Affected" means brutalized. Crime's victims are the murdered, the 
raped, the beaten, the robbed. The black community pleads for 
police protection, and what it gets is indifference, or patrols by 
men looking for an excuse to get violent themselves. For black 
people, the local police are not to be supported, they are to be 
controlled. I took my election as a mandate to reform the Police 
Department. I saw as one of my most important tasks the reform of 
the police, the return to having our police as our protectors, men 
who would enforce the law, do their job, be responsive to the needs 
of the people. This great hope became my greatest frustration, my 
greatest failure. 
If Cleveland's Police Department is only an exaggerated 
version of what is wrong with most big-city police departments, 
that is because even the minimal controls brought to other cities in 
the 1960's were unavailable in Cleveland. Cleveland was in the 
hands of ethnics, the immigrants from Middle and East European 
countries. Every people has its own view of the world, a  view 
wrought out of the conditions of life. Just as black Americans have 
a view of the world based on their being colonialized within their 
own country, so the ethnics brought to America a world view 
based on centuries of the alternating sovereignty of empire and 
province. 
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These two world views came to clash in Cleveland -- quite 
naturally, it seems to me. I don't mean to disparage the point of 
view of the Middle Europeans; I am not accusing them of being 
congenitally stupid or lazy or not having rhythm or of eating 
kielbasi all the time. But I think it is unassailably true that their 
idea of good government for Cleveland was grossly inappropriate 
to an American city in the second half of the twentieth century. 
They had learned to respect and fear the army, and they found it all 
too easy to transfer that respect and fear to the police in this 
country. In Europe, they had learned that the symbol of authority 
was the man in uniform. He was the instrument of whoever 
happened to be in charge at the time, and he was to be feared and 
respected. The man in uniform was also traditionally presented as 
the protector, the bastion against the forces from beyond the 
border. That kind of respect transferred to city police becomes an 
aberration. Unfortunately, it happened. 
In 1967, when I ran for mayor, I knew about the Little Hoover 
Commission report, and knew from my own experience about how 
ingrown, defensive and isolated the department had become. And I 
knew that it had to become a public issue. I knew that the police, 
under attack, would resort to seeking public support, and I naively 
thought that I could, by the force of the rightness of my views, 
bring the public to support me. Police were no strangers to me. I 
had worked with them as a probation officer, during the time when 
I was in private practice as a lawyer, and when I was a prosecutor. 
I knew the department, knew the men who were corrupt and those 
who were clean and honest. I knew the gambling joints, horserace 
bookies, after-hours joints and policy and numbers operators who 
flourished by paying off the police. I knew the police who 
cooperated in fixing court cases, those who made a good living 
referring cases to lawyers, and those who had close friendships 
with known underworld figures. But there were men in the 
department for whom I had tremendous respect, and that shouldn't 
be forgotten. Also, to the best of my knowledge, there hasn't been 
such depth of corruption in the Cleveland department that its 
173 
members are tied to organized crime, the selling of drugs 
themselves, etc., as has been proven in the police departments of 
New York and Chicago. 
I chose for my security men policemen whom I knew were 
among the best in the department, real professionals, the kind of 
men that others in the department would call "all cop." And I never 
felt more sick at heart than when I visited the wounded policemen 
after Glenville. Most were men for whom I had great respect; they 
were extraordinarily find police officers, and at least three of them 
I counted as my friends. They looked up at me from those hospital 
beds with what appeared to me to be withering hatred and 
resentment. They made me feel miserable. There was nothing I 
could say to them that would help. 
The fact is, though, that our police department happened to be a 
federation of fellows, some good, some bad, most conservative, 
some reactionary, but all almost totally lacking in the training in 
human relations that some departments have at least made a 
beginning to provide. The most obvious, and to me the most 
important, failure of the police was in their dealings with the black 
community. Black people were systematically kept out of the 
department, since the ruling clique was able to pass on who was 
accepted or rejected for appointment. The blacks who were on the 
force were segregated into all-black patrols and were always 
assigned to the ghetto. And all the police knew that few policemen 
faced charges or an appearance before the grand jury for shooting a 
black man while on duty. 
After four years in office, I could tell myself that the 
department was better equipped, had better cars and a better 
communications system, and that the men had more opportunities 
for training and education. But that's about all. The indictment of 
the department contained in the suppressed chapter of the 1966 
Little Hoover study is about as accurate today as it was then. The 
determination of those men to live by the old ways won out, we 
were never able to penetrate their inward ways, their cohesive 
hostility to any change. 
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Part of the problem was a legacy of legal mechanics that grew 
out of former Mayor Tom Burke's fight with the department. When 
Burke went after the corruption, the police maneuvered the 
operational control of the department out of the mayor's hands. 
Under the guise of keeping the Police Department safe from 
political appointments, the police forced a public vote on a 
redefinition of the chief's and the safety director's responsibilities 
that stripped the director from direct control. As the charter read 
when I took office, the safety director merely presided over matters 
of policy. He could make a policy change and order the chief to 
implement it, but then the chief was free to do as he saw fit. The 
Little Hoover Commission had recommended that the job be 
abolished. I fully agreed with that, but, again, I knew that would 
take change in the city's charter, which would require a vote of the 
people. By the time such a move might have been available to me, 
Glenville had already happened, and there was no way I could take 
those issues into the public arena and win. 
Police have an amazing political power, a power that has 
mushroomed in the last few years with the advent of the big-city 
crime scare. The mental attitude on the part of the people that gives 
the police that power is reminiscent of the Cold War attitudes of 
the American public in the early 1950's, when a politician could be 
ruined if he got stuck with the label "soft on Communism." I think 
today's fear of crime, which is also a thinly disguised fear of black 
people, is very like that older fear of the menace of internal 
Communism. The police today are able to exploit that fear of crime 
into public support of themselves as an institution, even when, as 
in Cleveland, the very things they are trying to perpetuate are the 
things that keep them from being able to effectively attack crime. 
Fear is not subject to rational discourse, so legitimate issues of 
reform can be quickly confused and discredited with an 
emotionally charged rhetoric of danger. 
All I ever asked of the police was that they enforce the law. I 
wanted it enforced evenly, fairly, vigorously, and with some 
understanding of the society we have come to live in. I wanted the 
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hand to come down on all who were doing wrong, even were it 
someone close to me. To every one of my appointees I gave the 
same story: "You are going to have the opportunity to do wrong, to 
make money under the table. If you take it, keep that first dollar 
and frame it, because when you get caught you're going to taste the 
full measure of the law." I told the black radical militants: "I want 
you to work with me, cooperate with me, The extent to which you 
will, I am going to help you all I can. But when you go past me, 
you better understand that I am going to step back and you are 
going to have to face that white cop." And to my police chiefs I 
gave one basic instruction: "Make your men enforce the law. You 
do that and you will never get any interference from me." 
I was so concerned with the fairness and even-handedness from 
the police because I knew that law and order was the most 
sensitive issue for the first big-city black mayor. Even though the 
overwhelming majority of crimes were committed against black 
people, and were allowed to go almost uninvestigated because the 
white police had long ago decided to vigorously enforce the law 
only when the victims of crime were white, the white majority was 
afraid I was going to let all those blacks take up guns and run 
around killing white people. So my first move, on the very night of 
my election, was to appoint my safety director. Joseph 
McManamon and I shared a commitment to reforming the 
department, and I knew his closeness to me. And he was an 
Irishman. The two of us sat down to pick out a police chief. 
Michael J. Blackwell had picked up the nickname "Iron Mike" 
during probation days, when he led a bunch of theatricalized raids 
on bootleg joints. He made a great picture, swinging axes against 
garage doors and barrels of booze. He was the picture of the Irish 
cop, tall and straight, with a big square bright-red face. When I 
came into office he had long since made full inspector, but he had 
repeatedly passed over when other mayors were looking for police 
chiefs. That, by itself, made me think there was probably 
something good to be said for him. 
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But that wasn't enough. There was a lesson to be learned 
through my experience with Iron Mike. You don't take a man who 
has spent his life with uniforms, rules and regimentation and ask 
him to go out and wrench the very system that has given him his 
living. Mike Blackwell was a good man, but we got him too late. 
He was sixty-six and set in his ways. 
Our first attempt to change things was to reassign the men so 
that we would have more patrolmen on the streets. The Little 
Hoover Commission report -- in the suppressed chapter -- bore me 
out. And later it said, "Almost six percent of the sworn personnel 
are classified as light-duty personnel. Those on light duty during 
the study had been so classified an average of more than four 
years; one has been on light duty for 40 years. Many able 
personnel are assigned to unimportant duties." 
I made my move, and we began to learn the truth of the first 
two sentences of the last paragraph of the report: "Cleveland must 
look forward to a difficult period. The exponents of the status quo 
will be articulate, a period of confusion is inevitable, and some 
mistakes will be made." Using the commission's recommendations 
as guidelines, McManamon ordered the transfer of more then 280 
men. He created twenty-five new basic patrol zones, taking men 
out of the Traffic Bureau, the Ports and Harbors Unit, the Task 
Force (which had developed techniques that honed harassment and 
brutality to a fine edge), the administrative and technical services, 
and the Detective Bureau. He also ordered the transfer of some 
black police to the all-white West Side, and put some police who 
had been working in civilian dress back into uniform. All this was 
to be accomplished by December 1, 1967, about two weeks after I 
took office. 
Blackwell was supposed to supervise the transfers, but in fact 
all he did was sign the transfer papers prepared by the ruling  
clique, and they made the transfers as awkward, embarrassing and 
infuriating to the police as possible. They would take a busy 
intersection where the same policeman had been stationed for 
years and had become not only efficient but popular, and move the 
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man out, leaving a wake of angry motorists and pedestrians. They 
took long-time veterans from the far West Side and transferred 
them to the far northeast side -- just as white, but ten miles farther 
from their homes. Men were taken from enforcing traffic laws on 
the West Side to enforcing rape, murder, and robbery laws in the 
heart of the ghetto. The department's ability to comply with an 
order and thwart its purpose at the same time was uncanny. The 
police began feeding reporters stories about low morale, and 
insinuations of police problems began regularly appearing on the 
evening television news and in the newspapers. The public began 
to be concerned for their safety. That damn black mayor was going 
after their protection. 
Poor Mike Blackwell. I believe his sympathies were with me, 
but he was simply not in control. A clique of senior police officers 
actually ran the Cleveland Police Department -- no matter who was 
chief. (it is a measure of my failure that three years later, when I 
realized I could do no more, I achieved a measure of peace with 
the department only by appointing one of the clique, Lewis Coffey, 
chief.) I had done more for Blackwell than any mayor in his forty-
three years on the force. But the clique held more power over him 
than I. We began to have Blackwell-McManamon feuds, all 
dutifully reported in the media. The editorial writers were 
demanding that the mayor step in and put things in order. 
When Glenville hit, I saw how hopeless things were. Blackwell 
had absolutely no control over his men, and in a crisis he had no 
idea what to do. His loyalty to me during the week of Glenville 
was great, but it was simple loyalty -- no imagination, no drive. It 
was a great opportunity to single out the most vicious men on the 
force and transfer them to posts where they couldn't exercise their 
hatreds, but he let it pass. Glenville had released all the hatreds, 
and the men felt no compunction about voicing them publicly. 
McManamon saw it and made one public announcement in which 
he said he was going to find the "snakes under the rocks" and get 
them off the streets. 
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The day after McManamon said that, Lieutenant Harry Leisman 
was sitting in a bar about a block from the police station talking to 
a lawyer and a couple of reporters. It was shortly after Glenville, 
and Leisman had been quoted in the newspapers as saying that on 
the night of July 23 he had "shot at shadows." 
"You know when McManamom said that about snakes under 
rocks?" he said that night. "He meant me." And he laughed. 
Harry Leisman was no laughing matter. Known as "Harry the 
Cop." Leisman was the epitome of everything you don't want in a 
cop. Leisman attributed society's ills to "Jews, niggers and 
Commies," and could quote at length from the 1928 manifesto of 
the American Communist Party to prove his points. He pointed 
with pride to his car trunk containing a variety of weapons. On or 
off duty, he always carried a private gun in his hip pocket. Harry 
was perfectly right: McManamon did mean him. Joe transferred 
him downtown, out of the ghetto where he had been stationed. But 
it takes more drastic action to rid a department of the Harry 
Leismans. 
McManamon tried his best. I saw the mess we were in and saw 
no way we could beat the police at their political game. We 
couldn't break up the clique. McManamon wanted to throw the 
rules away, beat them and bring them under control. But I had to 
ask him, "How can we win?" The charter put the operative power 
into the hands of the chief, not the safety director and not the 
mayor. We had only one move: fire the chief. I gave McManamon 
authority to begin looking for a candidate to replace him, but I 
advised him to move cautiously; we knew about the repercussions 
that would follow if the men found out about it before it was a fact. 
I was reluctant to get into public fights with the department, 
because I knew we didn't have the ear of the media. They have 
police reporters who work with them every day. They plant stories 
to their hearts' content. If they found out we wanted to replace 
Blackwell, I would have taken another beating in the newspapers. 
My hands would have been tied. Joe and I agreed that we should 
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try to get a man from within the department -- one that Joe felt was 
honest and could be trusted. 
My next chief of police was widely known as the straightest 
cop in the city. Patrick L Gerity and Joe McManamon had gone to 
the Police Academy together and had served together. Joe was 
very high on him. Gerity had never been part of the clique, and for 
his rectitude he had been given a captain's rank and a desk in the 
Detective Bureau and everything was routed around him. No one 
could say he had ever been on the take. And he was a loner. 
Gerity went to work. He transferred Inspector Lawrence 
Choura and Lieutenant Henry Doberstyn, who, Gerity told me, had 
given him hell in the past. Within the next week he made several 
more transfers; within the week after that he somehow got turned 
around by the department; and withint two weeks after that he was 
holding news conferences giving me hell for trying to interfere 
with the way the Police Department was being run. I don't know 
which turned him on more, working with the police against me or 
seeing himself on television, but whichever it was, it 
transmogrified the straightest cop in the city into just another 
politician for the police. For the next eight months we fought 
almost constantly and in public. It was fast ruining everything I 
hoped to do in the department. I remember that after one fight 
there was a meeting of the Fraternal Order of Police, and when 
Gerity entered the room all the men stood up and cheered him. It 
was clearly an ovation for his opposing me. A day or two after that 
he was talking to me and he said, "Mayor, I want you to know 
every man in that room stood up and cheered when I walked in." 
"Gee," I said, "don't policemen always stand up when the chief 
comes in?" 
"They didn't for Blackwell," he said 
We had lost him forever -- the loner had found friends. 
Meanwhile, all this was taking its toll on Joe McManamon. He 
had chosen two men, both good men, and they had both turned on 
him. It was beginning to affect his health. But he never turned 
away. Right to the last he kept asking me to turn him loose, let him 
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take on the department. The fact that such a man could not 
function in the job points up the need to look seriously at the job of 
safety director or police commissioner. It has no power, only 
frustration. There is apparently room for only one person between 
the mayor and the Police Department. He can either be the chief or 
the safety director. Since we couldn't do that, we tried to do the 
next best thing -- hire a safety director who would pick his own 
chief, let them both be from outside the city, let them take over at 
the same time, and see if we could clean house.  
Just at the time that we were beginning to look for a 
replacement for Joe, Richard Peters, one of my executive 
assistants, and former editor of the New York World-Telegram, 
read that one of the military's remarkable men, Air Force 
Lieutenant General Benjamin O. Davis Jr., was retiring. The 
general had spent part of his youth in Cleveland. Peters wondered 
aloud whether such a man, a military man, a leader of men, and, 
beyond that, a black man, might not be just what Cleveland 
needed. 
The possibilities struck me. A military man! A general! Black 
or no, the police would have to respect him. And, being black, he 
would have to be the kind of man who would agree with what I 
wanted to do. In retrospect, I can only say that it was my desperate 
need that drove me to such foolishness. 
I had in my own mind only one memory that concerned him, 
and that was a memory of not him but his father. I remembered 
how, when I was young, his father had sent a tremor of revulsion 
through America's black community by standing up as the nation's 
first black general and addressing his all-black troops with these 
inspiring words: "I may be your color, but I am not your kind." 
I ignored the memory and allowed myself to be carried into the 
greatest personal debacle of my career. 
I called a local black physician, Dr. Middleton Lambright, who 
I had heard was a friend of the general. He said their families had 
grown up together. We said nothing more on the phone, but I 
added that we would talk more later. I had learned that it was 
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unwise to conduct business on the phone; I assumed that the phone 
and my office were bugged by the police. I had been told that 
Captain George Sperber, head of the Intelligence unit, had my 
office bugged. I have no way of knowing whether that was true of 
not, and I never let John Little call in an expert to examine the 
office. My thinking was that if they were determined to listen, they 
would find a way, and calling in experts every couple of weeks to 
debug the office wouldn't solve anything. I simply resolved to 
conduct my business elsewhere, and in unpredictable patterns. 
In this case, I sent Dick Peters out to ask Dr. Lambright to call 
the general and ask him if he would be willing to talk to us about 
the possibility of taking the job of safety director. The general said 
he would talk. Peters went to Florida to talk to him and came back 
impressed. Next, Joe and Ann McManamon went to interview him 
and came back impressed. He said absolutely the right things, 
exuded confidence, saw the Cleveland situation as a challenge, was 
a great admirer of mine, etc. 
Then I did something I had not done before, I left the city 
without my security men. It was imperative that nobody learn that 
we were considering a replacement for Joe until we actually had 
somebody; the police would have become impossible to deal with 
under such circumstances. John Little drove me to the airport. I 
carried no bags and paid cash for my ticket to Tampa. After I was 
on the plan, John Little called the people in Florida and told them 
when and where I would arrive so that they could pick me up. 
When I arrived at the general's office, he said, "I want you to 
meet my boss." It had never occurred to me he had a boss, but of 
course it had to be true. There are generals and then there are 
generals. Davis had three stars, and his boss had four. I was struck 
by his subservient manner to the white general with four stars, but 
then I thought, what the hell, I don't understand the military, never 
have and never will, maybe that's the way things have to be done. 
Then we went to the general's home, a very nice ranch-style 
house. He had an aide (which rhymes with maid), a sergeant, 
working there, and now I was struck at how authoritative, clipped 
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and overbearing he was with the black sergeant. I couldn't 
understand how anybody could take such a tone with someone 
working in his own home, but again I thought, it's the military, 
we'll let this one pass. 
I patiently explained to him the problems I had been having 
with the police department, the quandary we were in, told him 
what I thought the department needed, explained that we wanted to 
bring him and a new police chief in at the same time, that he would 
have approval of the new chief. 
He replied: "Had a situation like that in the Army, knew how to 
handle it. Don't worry. Glad to come. We'll take care of it, Mr. 
Mayor. Great admirer of yours. Delighted to handle this for you. I 
understand it. Something has to be done, we'll do it." He promised 
to be in Cleveland by January 31, 1970, the date his retirement 
became effective. 
Talk about crisp. The guy talked like a telegram. Sitting there 
so straight he looked like he was still standing up, Davis exuded a 
confidence that quite simply overwhelmed me. Now I knew what a 
"commanding presence" was. And he was physically perfect for 
the part. More than six feet tall, slim, fine featured and light-
skinned, wavy gray hair, just the sort of appearance to offset the 
fears of the white police. When I left Tampa I was on cloud nine. I 
had them now. That damn Police Department wouldn't have a 
chance. 
Now that we had our safety director, we needed advice about a 
new chief of police. How do you get a police chief without the 
police knowing about it? Police have what amounts to a national 
grapevine. We knew that as soon as we started making inquiries 
about any individual the word would get back to Cleveland. We 
called in Patrick V. Murphy, later the police commissioner of New 
York. We sneaked him into town, rushed him to my brother's law 
office, and later sneaked him back out. He approved of what we 
were doing and made a pitch for us to get James Ahern, then police 
chief in New Haven and one of the most outstanding law-
enforcement men in the country. Ahern has since left police work, 
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but he was an exemplar of what a police officer must be in these 
times. 
We contacted Ahern. He agreed to come to Cleveland and 
discuss the matter. He warned against any publicity that would 
compromise his situation in New Haven. The night he arrived, 
John Little and Joe McManamon went over and talked to him in 
his room. I was to meet him the next morning for breakfast. When 
I arrived that morning, he told me that he had gone down to one of 
the hotel restaurants for dinner that night before and that a man had 
walked over to him there and asked whether he was James Ahern. 
He had tried to disavow who he was, he said, but the stranger 
clearly knew him. By the time we finished our breakfast, the first 
edition of the Press was out and there it was, a front-page article 
about how Ahern of New Haven was in town to talk to Stokes 
about becoming police chief. That made it impossible for us to talk 
further. A lousy newspaper article and we lost the chance of 
getting the best police chief in the country. 
In December, I went to the annual meeting of the National 
League of Cities in San Diego and poured out my troubles to 
Jerome Cavanagh, who was finishing his last year as mayor of 
Detroit. Cavanagh was the dean of our breed, the first of the 
liberal, activist big-city mayors -- a man who had been able to take 
the reins at the height of the movement in the 1960s and had drawn 
bright young people to his government. He was in a position to 
teach the basics to the rest of us. In 1969, though, he was on the 
way down. His personal life had fallen apart, his city had suffered 
the worst riot in the country in the terrible summer of 1967, he had 
been tied to scandal, and he didn't stand for reelection. The mayor-
elect, Roman Gribbs, was also at the San Diego meeting. I didn't 
have to spell it all out to Cavanagh, because Cleveland's Police 
Department troubles were already known amoung the mayors. 
Cavanagh knew how backward the department was and how 
difficult it was for me to attack. He knew, too, that I needed a new 
chief who would be clean and tough, a man who could resist the 
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pressures of the clique. He gave me two names and said both men 
had excellent records. 
I gave the names to Dick Peters and told him to check them out. 
The first man turned out to be too old, no longer interested in 
taking a challenge as tough as Cleveland's. The other man was 
William O. Ellenburg, a police chief and safety director of Grosse 
Point, Detroit's most exclusive suburb. Until four years earlier, 
Ellenburg had been an officer in the Detroit Police Department. 
Peters went to the library files of the Detroit newspapers and found 
nothing but good stories about Ellenburg, cases he had broken, 
numerous awards and citations he received, and a story on his 
retirement dinner, attended by two thousand and presided over by 
Roman Gribbs, who at that time had been Wayne County sheriff. 
At this point in our search, my paranoia left us vulnerable. I 
was mortally afraid of having the Cleveland police find out we 
were looking for a replacement for Gerity -- I didn't want any more 
damn newspaper stories. We had had enough. And I knew that if 
we started asking around the law-enforcement agencies about 
Ellenburg the word would get back to our own department with 
dispatch. The grapevine would kill us. It seemed to me the 
newspaper clippings, coupled with Cavanagh's strong 
recommendation, were good enough evidence that we had a good 
man. Peters talked with Ellenburg and reported that he was eager 
to take on the Cleveland department, that he understood the needs 
and agreed that we had to bring in more black police and to work 
with instead of at the community. Ellenburg flew to Tampa and 
had a day-long meeting with General Davis. The General phones 
me afterwards to say Ellenburg seemed to be a good man. That 
sealed it. I told Ellenburg he was hired. 
My package was complete. The public knew General Davis 
was coming but didn't know specifically when, nor whether he'd be 
police chief or safety director. On Monday, January 26, 1970, at 
about 11 A.M. I let the other shoe drop. I announced that William 
Ellenburg was our new police chief and that he would begin his 
duties immediately. Earlier that day, prior to the announcement, 
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Ellenburg and I had met with all the top police command officers 
and I introduced them to their new chief. They were shocked and 
startled but understood it was now a fait accompli. Chief Gerity's 
usually florid face turned ashen. 
But when Ellenburg turned in his resignation to the Grosse 
Point mayor, the word began to move around Detroit, and as the 
reporters at the Detroit Free Press got wind of it, and old story 
about Ellenburg, one that had been lying around just under the 
surface for seven years, reared its head. Had Ellenberg stayed in 
Grosse Point, had he not been appointed by this black mayor in 
Cleveland, I have no doubt the story would have never become 
public. 
The source of the Ellenburg story was a notoriously discredited 
Detroit figure. He claimed that in 1963, seven years ago, Ellenburg 
and two other Detroit cops had been paid off to allow an abortion 
operation to flourish in the city. The authorities had previously 
checked rumors of this story out and, apparently, found nothing, 
because Ellenburg continued to work for the department for three 
more years, and retired with honor and a testimonial dinner. 
When the story of his appointment in Cleveland started going 
around, the source surfaced again, telling his story to the Free 
Press and to Lou Gordon, a talk-show host on a UHF television 
station in Detroit. The Free Press people put in a call to the Plain 
Dealer in Cleveland about the middle of the week, and they 
immediately dispatched Donald Bartlett, then their chief 
investigative reporter, to Detroit. The Sunday before Ellenburg was 
to be sworn in as chief in Cleveland, both the Free Press and the 
Plain Dealer ran their articles on the charges although they did 
disclose the doubtful reliability of their source. And that night the 
taped interview with Lou Gordon was played on the television 
station. 
The most significant thing about all these stories was that there 
was absolutely no evidence brought forth beyond the bare 
allegations. The seven-year-old allegations of a desperate and 
disreputable man suddenly became page-one banner headlines on 
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Sunday, February 1, just six days after my appointment of 
Ellenburg. It was one of the greatest journalistic disservices done 
during my four years as mayor. The Plain Dealer broke the story 
obviously knowing it dubious reliability, since admittedly it rest 
solely on the word of an alcoholic Mafia informer under 
indictment. It was pure sensationalism. They could only reply to 
me that they had a duty to report the news. The other policemen 
that the source said were linked to Ellenberg and the abortion 
operation continued to serve with the Detroit Police Department. 
They served under Patrick Murphy, one of the finest, toughest, and 
fairest police chiefs in the country, a man who went on to try to 
weed out the bad cops in the police Department of New York City. 
It seems obvious that there was no basis in fact for the charges. 
That Sunday night I went on television, denounced the Plain 
Dealer roundly and said that until something solidly factual was 
turned up about Ellenburg, he was gong to be my police chief. I 
told them that following Monday night's City Council meeting I'd 
go to Detroit and investigate this matter myself. 
I was understandably distressed over the entire matter, but even 
more so because on Monday, February 2, we were having this 
massive civic luncheon to welcome the General back to his home 
town and present him to the public as our new safety director. The 
luncheon went off well nonetheless. Ellenburg accompanied me, 
the General, and Mrs. Davis to the luncheon. The papers said the 
Statler Hotel Grand ballroom had never had so many people in it 
before. The General was absolutely unperturbed over the Ellenburg 
affair. I swore him in and he delivered a ringing and applause-
evoking acceptance speech. 
Earlier that morning, Ellenburg had had a press conference to 
respond to the Plain Dealer story. That afternoon, I watched a 
replay of the conference. The reporters descended on him like 
hungry mice on a piece of cheese. I knew my trip to Detroit was 
imperative. I left that night accompanied by Detective Tony 
Midolo, who had for long been a top investigator in the Homicide 
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Unit. Immediately upon my arrival in Detroit I called Jerry 
Cavanagh. 
"Jerry I have to talk to you about this," I told him. 
"Let's have breakfast downtown tomorrow," he said. "If I have 
you come out to the house they may be watching." 
"I don't care if they are watching you, Jerry. If this guy is all 
right, what difference does it make if I'm seen coming to your 
house?" 
"I just think it will be best all around if we meet in public," he 
said. 
I hung up. He certainly wasn't talking the way he had in San 
Diego. I didn't know what problems he had, but he was obviously 
not being forthright about the situation. 
The next morning we met in a Detroit hotel restaurant for 
breakfast. The newsmen were all around, and while we ate they 
took their pictures and asked their questions, to which we gave 
noncommittal answers. Finally they left and I said to Cavanagh, 
"What is this stuff about Ellenburg?" 
"Hell, that story's been around for years, there's nothing to it." 
He said. 
There was nothing more to say. He had known and hadn't told 
me about it. The breakfast was over. So was my last chance to get 
an outside police chief to clean up our department. 
I then made the rounds of all the law-enforcement agencies. I 
talked to Pat Murphy and to Mayor Gribbs, who had presided at 
Ellenburg's dinner while sheriff, and although I turned up nothing 
to substantiate the charges, I knew that the ugly aspects of the story 
would stick to me. I flew back to Cleveland with my mind full of 
questions, trying to reason out whether I could afford to take both 
the department and the newspapers over this issue. Fortunately, I 
didn't have to make the decision. I returned home to a meeting of 
my closet advisers. We held the meeting at my house. There were 
about eight of us, including the general and Ellenburg. We 
discussed the matter for a while and then Ellenburg said he wanted 
to talk to me privately. We went into another room. 
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"I could have gone anywhere in the United States." He said, 
"and this story never would have broken. But you happen to be a 
black mayor and you appointed me. I have known about this story 
for the longest time. It never meant a damn thing to anybody, but I 
don't think you can survive with me here." 
A great weight had been lifted. I thanked him for offering his 
resignation and apologized for having to accept it. We went back 
into the room with the others and I told them what Ellenburg had 
said. Everybody agreed it was the right move. 
Wednesday, February 4, ten days after his appointment, 
Ellenburg announced his resignation. I called the general in to talk 
about a new police chief." 
"Don't worry, Mr. Mayor," he said. "Just give me a man. I don't 
care who he is. We'll get the job done." 
The next day we called in Inspector Lewis Coffey and offered 
him the job, and he accepted. It was the one right move I made. I 
came to love the guy. With the kinds of problems I had with the 
department, Coffey was the perfect man to settle things down. He 
just kept on doing things the way they had always been done, but 
he wasn't to be drawn into those debilitating fights with the 
administration. He was a cop, not a politician. And he was a 
gentleman. He became the fourth and last Police Chief I was to 
appoint. The political costs of changing chiefs had run their gamut. 
I told Coffey to go out and enforce the law and I would not 
interfere. I resolved to turn my mind to other things. I had the 
general out there; if any reform was to come, it would be through 
his doing. I just had to let him carry the ball. But what happened 
was that after two years of constant fights between my safety 
director and the Police Department, I found that I had made one of 
them one of us. 
The signs had been there. First of all, there was my own 
memory of the general's father. Then when the appointment was 
announced, a newspaper in Tampa reported that in his two years 
there the general had never attended an affair given by the black 
community. Something I didn't know about until later was that 
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when rumors of his appointment got around, the Police Department 
people did their own check of his background and told Tom 
Boardman at the Press, "This is the kind of man we can live with." 
Later, after Davis had left, I received a number of calls and letters 
from black servicemen who had served with him, and they al said 
essentially the same thing: We never understood why you hired 
him in the first place. He never was any damn good. 
I should say here that I bear the general no personal animosity. 
The difficulties we had have to be recounted because they point up 
precisely the problems with the Police Department. That the 
general was hopelessly the wrong man for the job I had in mind 
should have been apparent to me before I ever appointed him. But 
it wasn't. I kept fixing on the point of his being both a general and 
a black. It has not occurred to me that success in the military is 
almost totally unrelated to success in the rest of the world. I came 
to understand that only as I watched the general in action and 
realized he hadn't the slightest conception of what civilian life was 
like -- that authority and power cannot be unquestioned in the 
civilian world. The military had left him with a catechism 
understanding of human life. He had to read it from the book. The 
book gave status, authority, and it bestowed all rights. 
The general had quickly demonstrated an extraordinary ability 
for public relations. He called in Chief Coffey and informed him 
that not only was the mayor determined to keep out of the chief's 
handling of the operational functions but the, the safety director, 
was equally determined to keep out of it. He told the chief he just 
wanted to be kept informed. Within a matter of weeks, he had 
arranged his schedule so that he arrived at seven-thirty in the 
morning, took care of his mail, dictated replies, made his phone 
calls and was gone by early afternoon. When the weather turned, 
he was gone by noon to play golf at least two days a week. The 
police fell madly in love with him. 
At first, he had kept an open door. When he discovered that the 
citizenry included bushy-haired, ill-spoken, angry young men 
wearing dashikis and carrying absolutely no respect for him, his 
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position or status, he changed his policy. He was appalled at the 
very idea of having to listen to people that he would never deign to 
recognize socially. Jim Stanton loved him, the newspapers loved 
him, the white community loved him. When it all came down 
around my ears six months later, Tom Vail's bat boy, Tom Guthrie 
(who later became executive editor of the Plain Dealer), wrote a 
column about playing golf with the general. Allowing that he didn't 
want to judge the situation between the general and the mayor, he 
said that the general was certainly a straight shooter on the course, 
and such a man is usually a straight shooter in life. 
One evening I was listening to the six-o'clock news. Paul 
Briggs, superintendent of public schools, announced there had 
been an escalation of violence by adult whites against young black 
children being bused to school in Collinwood, a predominantly 
Italian and Slovenian neighborhood. Briggs said the school would 
not open the next day because the police said they couldn't 
guarantee the safety of the black youngsters. I immediately phoned 
Briggs and asked him to meet me at City Hall at 8 P.M., then 
called General Davis and requested that he and Chief Coffey come 
to the Hall and also send out police cars to bring all members of 
the school board to my office. At the Hall, I told all of them I'd be 
damned if I was going to let the school be closed in my city 
because the police wouldn't safeguard little black boys and girls 
from white hoodlums. In their presence, I called Governor Rhodes, 
related the facts and requested that the National Guard be sent in. 
Rhodes called me back in fifteen minutes and said there'd be six 
hundred guardsmen in the area by 6 A.M. Paul Briggs and I went 
to the television station and announced that the troops would be in 
Collinwood the next day, the school would be open and the 
children being bused in would be protected. I then ordered the 
general and Chief Coffey to personally be on the scene and see to 
it that the police did their job. 
The general said, "I will send an observer, Mr. Mayor." 
"No, General, I want you out there," I told him. 
"If the observer sees a need for me, sir, I will go," he said. 
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"General," I said, "there is nothing that it going to substitute for 
the chief of police, the head of the National Guard and your 
presence out there." 
"Well, if you are insisting that I go." 
"General, I am ordering you to go." 
" Yes, sir. I will be there, sir." 
And he became a hero. There is nothing quite so impressive as 
that tall, ramrod figure of the general, and there he was, out in the 
thick of things. The media picked it up, of course, but they could 
never have know that the general had to be ordered to go out there. 
Shortly after that, Kimber Wald, my purchasing commissioner, 
came into my office and said, "Mayor, did you know the Safety 
Department was ordering dumdum bullets?" I certainly didn't, but I 
said I would get to the bottom of it. I called the general in and 
asked him about it. 
"No, sir. Certainly not. Under no circumstance would we use 
dumdum bullets. No use for them." 
I called Kim Wald back and assured him the matter was taken 
care of and not to worry about it. Three weeks later, Wald came 
into my office with a requisition form and said, "Mayor, I thought 
you said that the police weren't going to order the dumdum 
bullets." He handed me the form and there it was, right in the 
middle of the department's shopping list, and order for dumdum 
bullets. I immediately sat down and had -- wrote a note and told a 
secretary to carry it to the general. It said, in effect: "General 
Davis, approximately three weeks ago I brought to your attention 
the fact that it was understood that dumdum bullets were being 
purchased by the Police Department for general use. I had told you 
then that the policy of this administration was that the police would 
not have and would not use dumdum bullets in this city. You are 
ordered to take whatever steps are necessary to revoke the request 
of your department for these bullets. 
About fifteen minutes later, I was sitting in Dick Murway's 
office when the general strode in and said, "Mr. Mayor, I have 
gotten your memorandum and I want you to know I was telling 
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you the truth when I told you the department was not ordering 
dumdum bullets. The department was ordering bullets for general 
use on the target ranges." 
"General," I said, "what would they be having target practice 
with dumdum bullets for?" 
"There is less danger of ricocheting when you shoot dumdum 
bullets." 
I said, "General, do you understand that we are not to use 
dumdum bullets for any reason in this city while I am mayor and 
you are safety director?" 
He went into his West Point act, an amazing sight. His waist 
drew in, his chest expanded, his chin tucked in, his face went red 
and he grew about three inches and said, "Yes. Sir." He wheeled 
and strode out into the corridor. After that, my relations with the 
general deteriorated. 
I was tired of fights with the police, but at this time there just 
didn't seem to be any way of avoiding them. One of the most 
important fights -- and one that was still going on last year in 
Cleveland -- was over the country's new Criminal Justice Center, a 
forward-looking concept that grew out of President Lyndon 
Johnson's Law Enforcement Assistance Agency proposals. After 
Johnson announced the LEAA, New York's John V. Lindsay 
immediately moved to set up a Criminal Justice Coordinating 
Council in his city, made up of representatives of every part of the 
justice system. For a time, Lindsay's council was the only one in 
the country. My law director, Clarence James, came across the 
concept at a criminal law seminar and returned to Cleveland very 
excited about it. We sent him to New York to study its systems and 
then proceed to establish our own with LEAA funds. One of the 
first study committees we appointed produced the concept of a 
criminal-justice center in which all the different components of the 
justice system would be housed and, presumably, coordinated -- 
the courts, the probation and parole departments, the sheriff, the 
police and the jail. We went on to lay out plans for the center, 
came up with a $60-million bond issue to build it, submitted it to 
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the voters and, happily, got it approved. But the police did their 
best to avoid being coordinated. They wanted to keep their own 
little fiefdom away from everybody else. The City Council had 
already approved $10 million in bonds for a new central police 
station, and we had to decide whether the police would be included 
in the justice center to know whether those $10 million would go 
toward making up the cost of the center. 
The issue had to be settled. The general and the police had been 
meeting, and the rest of us had been meeting. Finally, we had a 
joint meeting -- the general, Chief Coffey and several police 
officers, County Commissioner Hugh Corrigan, H. Chapman Rose 
of the Greater Cleveland Growth Association (our form of 
Chamber of Commerce), and myself. One of the police pulled out 
a tape recorder and put it on the table. 
"What is the purpose of that?" I asked. 
Coffey said, "Well, Mayor, we just wanted to know where 
everybody stands, and we thought we would have it on record." 
"I think that is not necessary in a meeting like this, and I would 
rather that you not use it, if you don't mind." 
Clearly, we were off to a fine start. The police presented their 
response to a traffic study we had to do on the area of the proposed 
center. They had earlier advanced the idea that they couldn't be in 
the center because the traffic was too heavy in the immediate 
downtown area. We had had a study done which showed that their 
objections were not without basis. They presented more objections. 
There was no question in my mind that the police headquarters 
belonged in the justice center, and there was no doubt in my mind 
about why the police didn't want to be there. The wanted to be off 
by themselves. I think of a description of their attitude later given 
me by George O'Connor, my last safety director: "These fellows 
are still thinking about the old police days when huge doors would 
roll up and Black Marias would come screaming out with their 
lights flashing, zooming off somewhere into the night. They may 
not have known where they were going, but it was at least out of 
there." We sat tossing around the police objections, and finally I 
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told them we would meet again and at that time I would give a 
definitive answer on the issue of whether to include the Police 
Department in the justice center. 
The next day, June 30, I wrote General Davis a memo: 
Our Monday June 29 meeting left me with a difficult decision 
as to the relative merits overall of the proposed city-county justice 
center at Huntington Park and the city center only at Payne 
Avenue. Ignoring for the moment the technical objections as to 
parking and traffic egress, please give me your personal evaluation 
and recommendation as to the better of the two sites as it related to 
the desirability of a combination of functions, facilities, 
maximizing of man-power and resources, and the more economical 
approach to the total justice process. 
The following day I received this reply from the general: 
I regret to say that I am unable to grasp all of the aspects of the 
proposed city-county justice center at Huntington Park and the city 
center only at Payne Avenue sufficiently well to give you an 
opinion as to the relative merits overall. The problem very simply 
has too many facets that are beyond my ken. My limited view of 
the problem, which I realize you did not request, but which I offer 
gratuitously, is that the city-county justice center at Huntington 
Park should not be crammed down the throat of the police... 
This from the man who had been heading the project for us for 
the last six months. He refused to oppose the Police Department. 
This avoidance of responsibility was typical of the military 
establishment in which he had been such a success. His apparent 
strength had come from the institution, not himself. This big, 
strong, crisp man, placed in a position of having to depend on 
conviction and personal strength, had wilted. He was the safety 
director; if the problem was beyond his ken, who was supposed to 
understand it? 
I immediately called for another meeting of the Coordinating 
Council that Friday. When we met, I told them that I had reviewed 
the situation and that my decision was that the best interests of the 
total justice process required the presence of the police in the 
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justice-center complex; therefore, the city would build their 
headquarters within the justice center. 
"Mr. Mayor," the general said as he rose from his seat, "do I 
understand that your decision is to ignore the written objections of 
the police to this center?" 
This was the first of two times that the man totally confounded 
me. He had an ability to wait for a situation when we were on 
public view and then take a position so blatantly odd that I didn't 
know how to deal with it. 
"Yes Mr. Davis," I answered, "and it will be your responsibility 
to see that the Safety Department gives the proper cooperation to 
the planners of this project. Do you understand that?" 
"Yes, sir. I just wanted to know, Mr. Mayor, that you made the 
decision against police objections." 
The general's identification with the department had become 
thorough. When a friend of mine in the Service Department told 
me he had heard that the General had authorized the police to carry 
personally owned weapons, I called him in, I sent and order. Our 
relations had descended to the level of my dealing with him as a 
commanding officer. I sent him a memo: 
It has come to my attention that you have authorized the 
Cleveland police to have in their possession weapons not issued by 
the department, and [which] in fact are the private weapons of the 
police. I regard this as a danger to precedent and practice and 
hereby instruct you to take whatever steps are necessary to see to it 
that the Cleveland police do not carry non-departmentally issued 
weapons. 
This was a subject we had specifically discussed in Florida 
when I first interviewed him. You can't have police out there with 
guns that can't be identified later. When a man is shot, it is of the 
utmost importance that the police officer at he situation not be 
using a weapon that is not immediately identifiable. If he does 
carry such a weapon, he is in fact violating the concealed weapons 
laws, because although he is authorized to carry a gun, that 
authorization carries with it the responsibility of the government 
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agency he works for to make certain that the gun is used only in 
the line of its own responsibilities. The authorization must be 
accountable. The abuses that carrying private weapons can give 
rise to are obvious. 
The general immediately hand-carried my memo back to me 
and said, "Mr. Mayor, I have to confess my being unable to carry 
through an instruction of yours. I received this memo. There are 
some very practical things in life sometimes that one has to face. 
Whatever I tell those police, whether I tell them to carry these 
weapons or not to carry them, they are going to carry them 
anyway. So since they are carrying them anyway, why don't we 
show our cooperation with them? After all, Mr. Mayor, you did 
have Glenville, you know." 
I told him that perhaps at the risk of alienating the department, 
the lives and welfare of the people had a greater value, that even 
though it was true that they would carry the guns anyway, if the 
policy was secure and a man was traced to the use of an 
unauthorized weapon, we at least had a way of bring hum up for 
disciplinary action. 
"Mr. Mayor, I do not agree with you, sir, but your instructions 
will be conveyed to the police." 
The stage was now set for the final act. The general was loved 
by all the white media, but the Call & Post had begun to report 
some of the experiences people in the black community. 
The general came into my office in early July and said that the 
Call & Post was becoming an increasingly difficult factor for him 
to work with as he was trying to do this job for me. Usually I 
respond when people say things to me, but I couldn't think of 
anything to say to that, so I just sat there. He went on to say the 
paper was creating tensions and made a few more remarks in that 
vein. Again I sat there. 
"Well, Mr. Mayor?" 
"Well, what, General?" 
"What are you going to do?" 
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"What am I going to do about a newspaper? Are you kidding? 
Tell me this: Have they written a story that did not reflect the 
facts?" 
"I think so." 
"Show me that story you're talking about." 
"Mr. Mayor, if I have to show you the story, then I doubt very 
much that there is very much you would do." 
"General, I think you're right." 
"Thank you, Mr. Mayor." He got up and left. 
I didn't realize it, but he was building a case. He came back 
later and said, "Mr. Mayor, I want to talk with you about a few 
other people who are making it very difficult for me." 
He proceeded to name the Cleveland Council of Churches, the 
Friendly Inn Settlement House (one of a number of neighborhood 
centers funded by a welfare group), the Reverend Baxter Hill, a 
vocal militant, and the Reverend Arthur Le Mon, my own 
community-relations director. 
"Baxter Hill," he said, "must go. He makes my job impossible. 
He is a menace to the community." 
"What about Harllel?" I said. 
It is important to understand the difference between the two 
men we were discussing. Baxter Hill was head of a youth group 
called Pride, Inc. In the middle 1960s he had been president of the 
local chapter of CORE. He was sometimes loud, and fond of the 
"shit that's going down" rhetoric. But Pride, Inc. was basically an 
organization for finding summer jobs for inner-city kids, and Hill 
had no more real power than the director of the YMCA. Later, in 
1972, he was convicted of stealing federal funds that had gone into 
his jobs program. He was a petty thief. I mention that just to point 
up the difference. Harllel X (formerly Jones) is a currently serving 
a life sentence for conspiracy to commit murder. He was a 
powerful force in the ghetto. Unquestioned leader of the Afro Set, 
a group so strong locally that they were able to keep the Black 
Panthers from even establishing a local chapter, Harllel didn't fool 
around. 
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"Harllel I can live with," the general said, demonstrating a gross 
naivete about his subject, "but Baxter Hill must go." 
"How do you suggest I make him go?" 
"Well, doesn't he have this organization, Pride?" 
"Yes." 
"Are they not funded by Cleveland: NOW?" 
"Either that or the Mayor's Council on Youth Opportunity." 
"Then it's very simple, Mr. Mayor -- just cut off his money." 
"General, everything I know about Baxter Hill can be summed 
up in his being vexatious and contentious. But he has been one of 
those who has been helpful in the resolution of community 
tensions." 
"But he's causing me tensions, Mr. Mayor, and if I'm going to 
do my job, he will have to go." 
"General. What about these others you mentioned. Are they in 
the same position?" 
"Yes, sir." 
"What about the Council of Churches?" What do you suggest I 
do with them?" 
"This metropolitan council of theirs, aren't they funded by the 
United Appeal?" 
"Yes, I think so." 
"Mr. Mayor, you have some very close ties with heavy 
financial contributors to the United Appeal, and if you would talk 
with them, telling them that maybe this is an organization that 
maybe they shouldn't be contributing to, I am sure they would be 
responsive to you." 
"General, do you realize what you are asking?" 
"Yes, sir." 
"Now, just a minute. The United Appeal is made up of some of 
the most respected organizations in the city, and when they fund an 
agency it is only after a very careful review by several agencies 
within their framework." 
"I understand that." 
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"This metropolitan council is an integral part of a federation of 
churches that consists of more than seven hundred of Greater 
Cleveland's most respected, stable Protestant churches." 
"That has nothing to do with it, Mr. Mayor. If you make the 
request, I am sure they would honor your request." 
"I'm just not going to do that. That isn't even in the periphery of 
the kinds of things I am willing to do." 
"Fine. Is your answer the same about Reverend Le Mon?" 
"Will you please tell me what Reverend Le Mon has done 
wrong?" 
"He's one of the organizers." 
"Organizers of what?" 
"Of those people out there. And he is directly under your 
control, Mr. Mayor. You don't have to ask anybody about firing 
him." 
"Well, General, I am not going to fire him." 
"Fine. Thank you sir." And he got up and walked out. 
It was clear to me that I had a problem. But I still didn't realize 
what the man could do. One week later I found out. On Sunday I 
got a phone call from a friend who had been at a party the night 
before given by Art Modell, the owner of the Cleveland Browns. 
The general had been at the party and had spoken to several people 
about resigning as safety director. I couldn't believe it. In the first 
place, we had an agreement that he would stay one year. I learned 
sometime in the spring that he had already committed himself to 
take a job the Pepperdine College in California later that same 
year, but I still expected him to serve out most of his agreement 
with me. More than that, I had to assume that if he was seriously 
thinking about quitting, he would give me an indication. However, 
I realized I had better talk to him about what he was saying at that 
party. The next morning I talked to John Little about it and then 
sent him over to see the general. He returned to tell me that the 
general had left work, was going to see his dentist, and would be 
back at 11 A.M. Then I saw the Plain Dealer. One of their 
executives had apparently been at the party, too. The paper banner-
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headlined a speculative article, without comment from Davis, that 
he was going to resign that day. I went in to the cabinet meeting. 
The general's executive assistant, William Hendrickson, a retired 
Air Force lieutenant colonel, came in and handed me an envelope. 
I opened the cabinet meeting, and as things began to proceed I 
opened the envelope. In it was a handwritten letter, very short, very 
devastating: 
 
I find it necessary and desirable to resign as director of public safety, City of 
Cleveland. The reasons are simple: I am not receiving from you and your 
administration the support my programs require. And the enemies of law 
enforcement continue to receive support and comfort from you and your 
administration. I request your acceptance of my resignation at your earliest 
convenience. 
 
I called Dick Murway over, handed him the letter and told him 
to alert the press that I would have a news conference after I talked 
with the general. We finished the cabinet meeting and then I called 
in Bill Silverman, Sid Spector, John Little and Murway, and 
kicked the problem around with them for about an hour. We came 
to no conclusions. At that time we didn't know how bad it was. 
Then the first edition of the Press came out carrying the full story, 
with the general's letter quoted in full. Now we knew how bad it 
was. This damn hero was accusing me of harboring criminals; 
suddenly all the racist rumors about me were confirmed. 
At 11 A.M., Colonel Hendrickson was called over again. 
Where was the general? Well the general had finished with the 
dentist and was now out taking his wife to lunch. I wrote out a 
short message that said, "Dear General, I have read the 
newspapers. You are requested to be in my office at 3 P.M."then I 
told Hendrickson, "You find him and deliver this to him." 
About ten minutes to three, the general appeared in my office, 
looking pleased, as if he were coming over to wish me happy 
birthday. 
"Mr. Mayor?" 
"General, we have been looking for you." 
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"Well, Mr. Mayor, I had thought that my letter was sufficient 
and there really wasn't much need of our talking." 
"I just thought that it would be a kind of courtesy that would 
have been afforded anyone." 
"No slight intended. What can I do for you?" 
I wish the language had some equivalent for those exclamation 
points and question marks they used to signal strange moves in the 
reporting of chess matches. Words aren't good enough at a time 
like this. 
I looked at him a moment and said, "You use some very strong 
language in your letter." 
"Yes, sir." 
"I am sure you appreciated the impact it would have in this city 
on my relationships with the people." 
"Yes, sir." 
"Will you tell me why you wrote the letter this way?" 
"Mr. Mayor, I have told you many times why I wrote that letter 
that way. 
"We haven't had that many conversations since you have been 
here. Are you referring to the talk we had about the Call & Post?" 
"Yes, sir." 
"Baxter Hill?" 
"Yes, sir." 
"The Council of Churches?" 
"Yes, sir." 
"The Friendly Inn?" 
"Yes, sir, Mr. Mayor, that is just what I'm talking about." 
"You are saying that the enemies of law enforcement are these 
people?" 
"Mr. Mayor, they are enemies of mine. Therefore they are 
enemies of law enforcement." 
We went out into the Tapestry Room to face the reporters and I 
simply turned it over to the general. Bill Silverman had strongly 
advised me against a public fight with the general. The general 
handled the questions with the usual stiff aplomb, refusing to 
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elaborate on the language of the letter. Never in my life was I at a 
lower point than during that news conference. The general had 
neatly ruined me. I went out to lunch with my advisers after the 
news conference. We talked some more about what could be done, 
but, for the first time, none of the possibilities seemed to make any 
sense. We were supposed to be brainstorming, but it was all storm 
and no brain. I told them I wasn't going back to City Hall and went 
home. 
Fortunately, Shirley and the children were in El Paso 
vacationing. I went home and let solitude do its work. I put on 
some records and built a fire. It was the twenty-seventh of July, 
middle of the afternoon, but I build a fire. I respond to a fire in the 
hearth; there is something soothing and contemplative about a fire 
that released me from my ties to my troubles. I listed to some 
gospel music, then to a record of Martin Luther Ling's speeches. 
For four hours until after 8 P.M., I sat there listening to records, 
drinking brandy, watching my fire and turning things over in my 
mined. Then I just went to bed. I woke up about 1:30 A.M. 
Something had come to me. I wasn't certain what it was yet, but I 
sat down with a legal pad and began writing; when I finished I had 
sixteen pages of legal pad filled (this may sound like more than it 
was -- I write in a huge script). I went back to sleep until seven the 
next morning, when I called Dick Murway and told him to get 
Little and Silverman to meet me with him at City Hall at 8:30 
A.M. I had them read my notes and the two-phase plan I'd come up 
with and asked them if they could agree to that approach. They 
said they could, so I had Murway cut it down, make it a simple 
statement, and told him to call a news conference for that 
afternoon. Then I went for a ride and went to see a movie. 
And I had him. Once I understood what my problem was, I 
knew which way to go. I knew that Ben Davis thought the incident 
was over, and he was the one who wouldn't be looking for any 
public fight. But I couldn't let the thing drop with those innuendoes 
up in the air, feeding rumors. The general knew what he was 
doing, and he knew he had hit me where I suffered most. The soft 
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underbelly of any politician's career is the set of rumors or 
accusations of illegal activity that stick to him. It was particularly 
bad for me, being black and going further to work with black 
militant groups than anyone else had. The general's letter, with that 
key phrase that all the bigots and Stokes haters could react to, had 
confirmed the rumors and suspicions. Within three days after the 
general's resignation, I had turned it around. You can go anywhere 
today, to any black community in the country, and ask for opinions 
about the general and I think I know what you will hear: the 
general may be just right for the Nixon Administration, but he isn't 
right for black folks. And I did it simply enough. The first day after 
his resignation, I publicly called on the general to name the 
enemies of law enforcement. He refused, as I knew he would. 
Whetting everyone's interest in why he wouldn't name names. The 
next day, I did so myself. 
At a widely attended press conference, I spelled out his so 
called "enemies of law enforcement" as being the Greater 
Cleveland Council of Churches, the Call & Post, Reverend Arthur 
Le Mon, Baxter Hill and the Friendly Inn Settlement House. The 
news reporters could hardly believe it. They dashed to find the 
general. But he had no other names to give them. 
The white clergy rose up en masse because they knew the 
Council of Churches was, if anything, more conservative than 
liberal and not at all militant. The Baptist clergy knew there was no 
more gentle and law-abiding member among them than Le Mon. 
The black community wasn't about to accept this undeserving 
attack on their only newspaper which had fought their battles for 
over forty years. Too many black people and United Appeal 
members knew the Friendly Inn to accept such a charge. And those 
who knew him only smiled at the thought of elevating Baxter Hill 
to the level of a danger to law enforcement. Even Tom Vail felt 
compelled to editorially lament the general's failure to substantiate 
his charges. 
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This public mixture of rage, disbelief and scorn was best illustrated 
when General Davis literally ran down Euclid Avenue to escape an 
interracial group of women demanding that he retract his 
defamatory and dishonest statement. Shortly afterwards, the 
General made a quiet and ignominious retreat from Cleveland. 
That same week I appointed a five-man committee to search for 
another safety director. It was clear to me that the decision on a 
new man had to be out of my hands. I had brought in the general 
and Ellenburg, and both had turned out to be disastrous. This time, 
we couldn't afford the slightest shadow over the appointment. I 
appointed Judge Perry B. Jackson, and a councilman and three 
businessmen to search for a man. Three months later they came up 
with George W. O'Connor. O'Connor was then serving as chief of 
the police administrator and as an academic. He had a master's 
degree in criminology from the University of California. With his 
easy manner and impeccable credentials, O'Connor was the perfect 
guy to settle things down. It was a shame that we couldn't put his 
expertise to better use. Although he was committed to the same 
kind of reforms I had been looking for all along, the politics of the 
situation had so far deteriorated that he had no room in which to 
move. Besides, his arrival coincided with the defeat of our 
desperately needed income tax increase, and his budget was so 
severely cut that he had to spend most of his time trying to 
preserve the semblance of a police force. It was not a time for 
reform.  
Perhaps it's not true that I accomplished nothing with the 
police. I got some black policemen on the West Side where they 
had never been before, got the Civil Service Commission to revise 
the hiring practices to bring in better men and to make it more 
open to black and Spanish-speaking people. And I appointed a 
black chief police prosecutor, who was able to put a stop to a 
number of practices that had brutalized the black community. It 
was no longer easy to get warrants for harassment purposes, nor 
could police protect themselves quite so easily with counter 
prosecution when they found themselves in trouble. And every 
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time a cop shot somebody, his case went to the grand jury, no 
matter what the circumstances. When the police realize such 
policies are unbending, they act with a little more restraint. 
But it is true that I accomplished none of the substantive, 
structural reforms of the department that I had hoped for. The 
department was still, as most police departments, virtually 
autonomous, without effective civilian control, and building exotic 
arsenals of vicious weapons. In 1972, as part of its $360,000 
request for ordnance, the department was requesting a supply of 
the new nine-millimeter machine guns being made by Smith & 
Wesson. The order also included grenade launchers and dozens of 
high-powered rifles for shooting long distances. Meanwhile, 
though I had left them with a brand-new $6.5- million 
communications system they had failed to significantly reduce 
response time. Emergency calls were still not getting through. But 
no one was attacking the police for it. The mayor, Ralph Perk, was 
a return to European ethnic ways, sympathetic to the police 
Department. In fact, seeing how Perk worked with the department, 
I realized that my own desire to bring it under closer control by the 
mayor is not in itself altogether desirable. The point has to be, 
finally, that we need some sort of civilian control that is not subject 
to the routine pressures of politics. Just how that is to be set up will 
have to be worked out on a local basis. But the need is desperate. 
This country cannot afford the growth of an indigenous 
paramilitary privileged class getting ready for war. 
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12 
GLENVILLE 
 
In the summer of 1971, I asked Sergeant Bosie Mack, a black 
policeman, to give me an account of events as he saw them leading 
up to and including the night Ahmed Evans and his band made 
their attack on the Cleveland policemen and set in motion the 
destruction of much of what we wanted to do in Cleveland. Mack 
is a good, experienced policeman. He is not a young rebel in the 
department. He is a veteran of the force and one of the few black 
men ever to move up to the rank of sergeant. He can speak about 
that terrible night with more knowledge than anyone else. This is 
his account. 
 
STATEMENT BY SERGEANT BOSIE MACK, July 28, 1971 
 
"For a complete story of my involvement in the events of July 
23, 1968, I must speak of the days prior to that date. My 
involvement began about July 8, although I had received 
information of concern during the preceding week. 
"Beginning Monday, July 8, Detective William Taylor and I 
began an almost constant check and surveillance of the entire 
Auburndale area. We had received information of an arms build-up 
in the area, along with information of pending trouble. During our 
investigation we learned that this suspected illegal activity was 
under the direction of Fred Ahmed Evans. 
"We checked with the apartment owner and learned that Evans 
and his followers had taken over three of the four suites of the 
building and were not paying any rent. The property owner wanted 
them out because of non-payment of rent, taking over of two other 
suites without proper authority and just plain fear of the persons 
involved. 
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"Detective Taylor and I made efforts to gain entry into any of 
the suspect suites, with negative results. Not knowing what was 
really taking place within the apartment suite, we did not think it 
wise to force entry until we had reasonable cause. In an effort to 
obtain the information we considered necessary to force entry, we 
arranged through Director McManamon for a building and housing 
inspection (July 17). 
"After briefing, the building and housing inspectors made an 
effort to inspect the building. Detective Taylor, James Draper, 
Charles Rhodes and I were in the area and kept watch on the 
inspectors as much as we could. The inspectors were unable to get 
into the apartments. When we met with them, they expressed fear 
of returning to the building, although they could not explain their 
fears. They talked with a male who let them know that they were 
not coming in. These inspectors were really shook up. 
"We thanked the inspectors and instructed them not to talk 
about what had transpired. Detective Taylor, the other officers and 
I returned to Police Headquarters. I reported to Captain George 
Sperber, chief of intelligence. After bringing him up to date on all 
the information we had obtained and what I thought would happen 
if this situation were permitted to go unchecked, I requested the 
helicopter known as Car 1300 to photograph the area during its 
traffic surveillance flights. 
"Captain Sperber said, 'When this administration took over they 
abolished the helicopter unit. Therefore, we have no way of 
obtaining photos from the air.' 
"I said, 'Captain, Sergeant Lemieux is a member of the Traffic 
Unit; he flies twice daily; he knows how to use a camera; he can 
take the pictures during one of his routine flights.' 
"Captain Sperber said the helicopter belonged to a radio station 
and he could not tell them what to do. I got an impression that 
Sperber did not care what happened. He then told me to talk with 
neighbors in the area and set up an observation post. I told him that 
was out of the question. Evan's followers were all over the area and 
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we did not know who was who yet. Sperber said, 'You and Taylor 
will have to do the best you can.' 
"I then asked for three additional men to be assigned to this 
investigation. Sperber stated the administration had transferred all 
the men out and he could not get additional men transferred back 
in and I would have to do with what I had. 
"Taylor and I then went on what amounted to twelve- to sixteen 
hour shifts watching the Auburndale area and taking care of our 
regular assignments. We worked seven days a week. On Sunday, 
July 21, we started hearing the expression 'The pot is going to boil.' 
We found out that the pot boiling meant trouble, a confrontation of 
some type with the police. We spent the rest of that day trying to 
find out about this confrontation." 
"On Monday, July 22, we heard about a tri-city riot that was to 
start on July 24. We learned that the cities were Akron, Canton and 
Cleveland. I t was late Monday night or Tuesday morning when we 
learned this. 
"On Tuesday, July 23, I informed Sperber that the word was 
that trouble would occur in this city Wednesday morning, July 24. 
The target area was Five Points. There would be firebombing and a 
shoot-out. It was not known what was to be torched or who would 
be in the shoot-out. Evans was supposed to go out of town to pick 
up machine gun and ammunition. He was to leave about nine 
o'clock Tuesday night, in his station wagon. 
"After I told Sperber what I had heard, Seargent Ungvary and 
Patrolman Smith met with him. They apparently had the same or 
similar information. Taylor and I, having cone on the street, 
received orders to return immediately to the intelligence office. 
Upon returning, I met with Captain Sperber, Sergeant Ungvary and 
Patrolman Smith and discussed the situation. Then we all went to 
Chief Blackwell about ten thirty or eleven. 
"Smith and I gave the information to the Chief, Inspector Garey 
and Inspector Coffey. Blackwell told us to take the information to 
City Hall -- it was a hot potato -- and see what City Hall wanted us 
to do about it. I asked Sperber why we should take this to City 
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Hall. Sperber said because the Chief said so. I argued that this was 
a police problem and that he, as the intelligence boss, and the Chief 
should work out a plan to eliminate the problem. Sperber said, 
'That's up to the Chief.' 
"Then I said to Chief Blackwell, ' I agree that City Hall should 
be informed as to the situation, but it seems to me that this is a 
police matter and you as chief of police should handle it.' 
"Chief Blackwell said, 'This is big.' That's why he wanted City 
Hall to know about it and he would follow City Hall's orders in this 
matter. We left the Chief's office about 12:20 P.M. 
"In the Mayor's office about 1:45 P.M., Smith and I again 
disclosed the information we had gathered. Present were Director 
Clarence James, the acting Mayor; Director McManamon; 
Councilman George Forbes; Inspector Coffey; Captain Sperber; 
Sergeant Ungvary; Detective Taylor; Patrolman Smith; Walter 
Beach and myself. Part of the information given by Patrolman 
Smith was that there was a list of persons marked for death when 
the riot started -- Mayor Stokes, W.O. Walker, Baxter Hill, 
Patrolman Payne and Earle Brown. 
"Director James and the others listened to what was said. Then 
there was a discussion on ways to avert the tragedy. Since the 
information was that the action would be Wednesday morning 
after Evans returned, it was decided to have two roving Task Force 
cars keep the area under surveillance. These cars were not 
supposed to stop moving. They were to appear as normal patrol 
and look for Evans to leave the area in his car and follow same. 
They were to follow Evans to the highway, then the Highway 
Patrol was to be notified of the route and directions taken by 
Evans. The Highway Patrol was to continue the surveillance, 
follow Evans to this destination or the state line. It was believed 
that Evans would go to either Akron or Detroit, Michigan. The 
Ohio patrol and Michigan patrol were alerted to stand by to 
participate in this plan. Evans, as per plan, was to be stopped in the 
highway as he returned to Cleveland. 
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"Inspector Coffey, being the highest-ranking officer present, 
was told to issue the proper instructions to the Task Force and 
other Cleveland police he deemed necessary. Captain Sperber was 
to make the necessary arrangements with the Ohio State Police, 
Michigan State Police, Akron Police Department and Detroit 
Police Department and also gather what intelligence those 
departments might have re this crisis. 
"While at City Hall, Inspector Coffey called the Task Force and 
instructed them to establish a detail on the building located at 
12312 Auburndale and keep same under surveillance because there 
[might] be trouble. Upon hearing this, I repeated to Inspector 
Coffey the part of the agreed-upon plan for a 'roving patron.' 
Inspector Coffey told me he was talking to Lieutenant Schemp. 'He 
is a good man, he will know what to do.' 
"I told the inspector that I knew Schemp and that he was a good 
man and that he would 'do exactly what you [Coffey] tell him to 
do.' I further stated, 'You told him to put a detail on that address 
and watch it and that is what he will do.' I further stated to the 
inspector that if the police parked in the area someone would mess 
with them 'and when the police take action against this person you 
will have the start of an incident.' I suggested the inspector have 
the supervisor of the Task Force come to City Hall or his office 
and I would lay the whole thing out to them so they would know 
what they were up against. 
"Inspector Coffey again told me that Schemp would know what 
to do. I then went to Captain Sperber, who was still in the Mayor's 
office, and told him of the instructions given to the Task Force and 
asked him to make sure the Task Force knew they were to keep 
moving. 
"Captain Sperber said to me, 'Coffey is an inspector. He knows 
what he is doing. Who am I to tell him what to do?' I then said to 
Captain Sperber: 'The Task Force has only a few colored 
patrolmen and if a car of white policemen park out there, there will 
be trouble and someone will get killed. I hope to God it won't be a 
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policeman.' Captain Sperber merely stated, 'Inspector Coffey will 
take care of notifying the Task Force.' 
"I was instructed to make sure the detail at the Mayor's home 
had two shotguns in the car. I did this and dispatched Detective 
Taylor to meet the Mayor's plane. I further instructed Taylor to 
stick with the Mayor. I returned to Police Headquarters with 
Captain Sperber, all the while trying to get him to do something 
about the orders given the Task Force. I even volunteered to go to 
the area myself and make the surveillance. All my efforts met with 
negative results. 
"After this meeting ended, Councilman Forbes and W. Beach 
told Director James that they would go to Auburndale and try to 
cool things. They would attempt to reason with Evans. Director 
James instructed me to take what men I had under my control and 
secure the Mayor. 
"Upon arrival back in town, the Mayor went to his home. The 
detail of detectives were there on duty. Taylor and I got together 
and discussed the situation and we both were on stand by. 
"I then proceeded home. At about East 147th and Bartlett, a 
broadcast came over the high band. The officer stated in very 
excited tones, 'they are coming out. They have automatic rifles. 
There are about thirty of them.' I asked over the high band in the 
vehicle I was driving if the officers were sure the weapons were 
automatic. The answer came back: 'they are automatic. I am an 
eyeball witness.' 
"I then broadcast an order for the police in the area to pull out, 
to move to a point on the perimeter and get in touch with the Task 
Force base. This was bout 8 P.M. I then heard the sounds of 
gunfire over the high band and low band. A tow truck was crying 
for assistance on Beulah Avenue. The tow truck was under fire. 
Two police cars stated they were on their way to assist. 
"I proceeded home, immediately called Director McManamon 
and informed him that the 'ship had hit the sand,' that a gun battle 
was in progress on Auburndale, between the Nationalists and 
police. I suggested he inform the Mayor and I told him that Taylor 
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and I would be at the Mayor's home in five minutes. I then called 
Captain Sperber and left word with his wife that two policemen 
had been shot and the battle was still raging. I contacted Taylor 
and told him that all hell had bust loose and I would pick him up in 
two minutes. 
"After picking up Taylor, we drive to the Mayor's home. The 
vehicle was in such bad shape that it broke down in the Mayor's 
driveway. It refused to start; it simply sat there and boiled. I then 
ordered the men on detail to give me their vehicle and shotgun. 
"I informed the Mayor as to what had happened and where it 
was happening. The Mayor stated he wanted to go to the Sixth 
District headquarters. We left his home for the Sixth District. I 
then suggested that he go to City Hall, and I showed him the list of 
names of persons to be killed during this shoot-out. I further 
suggested that at the Hall he would be in position to call his 
advisers and he would be in position to know what was going on 
city-wide. The Mayor agreed and we went to City Hall. 
"Upon arrival at the Hall, to my surprise, many members of the 
Mayor's Cabinet and many office girls were there, both black and 
white, and wanting to help in any way they could to bring the 
matter under control. 
"Mayor Stokes told me to get Chief Blackwell there as soon as 
possible. A call to his home produced no results. I called the police 
radio and requested broadcasts for the Chief every two minutes if 
necessary until he responded. The Chief arrived at the Hall, and I 
ushered him to the Mayor's office. I heard the Mayor say to Chief 
Blackwell, 'Chief, I have to ask you as chief and call on all your 
years as a policeman -- tell me, what do I do?' The Chief answered: 
'Back when I took over the Workhouse, I clamped down and 
changed things around there.' 
"The Mayor said: 'Chief, what do we do now?' 
"The Chief simply said: 'To tell the truth, I don't know.' 
"The Mayor said: 'Chief, we've got to stop this thing. Police and 
citizens are being shot out there.' 
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"The Chief responded with some worn out cliches. I walked 
away feeling sick way down deep. I thought of how from the 
beginning the top officers did not seem to want to do anything that 
would prevent this from happening. I thought of how they said, 
'Friends of the Mayor are involved,' or 'The Mayor can take of it, 
they are friends of his.' It seemed as though the top officers of the 
department wanted some kind of incident to discredit the Mayor. 
"On July 25, during what could be called a lull at City Hall, 
where the Mayor, his assistants and I had been cooped up ever 
since this thing started, I went to the intelligence office to consult 
with Captain Sperber. He stated to me that he was writing his 
resignation. He said it was for two reasons. One was that the 
Mayor had ordered him to turn over all reports, tapes and 
statements he had concerning the riot. He said, 'That stuff is all 
evidence,' and he refused to turn it over to anyone other than the 
county prosecutor. Then he asked me a question. He asked me if I 
had done everything I could to prevent the riot. He must have read 
something in the look I gave him. He went on to say before I could 
answer, 'we have three policemen dead and several wounded. I feel 
bad about this. I feel as though there should have been something I 
could have done about his. How do you feel about it -- the dead 
men and their families? It's on my conscience.' 
"I said, 'Skipper [the nickname I started calling him after he 
made captain], I am grieved by the death of the officers and I feel 
sorry for their families. I feel for the wounded, but my conscience 
is clear. Yes, I feel as though I did everything I could to keep those 
men alive and uninjured. Taylor and I spent many days and nights 
out there observing things and we reported directly to you, telling 
you what the situation was out there. It seems now like no one 
believed us, as if they were not listening when I spoke. I did not 
have enough help and couldn't get any from this office. As for the 
Mayor ordering the reports and other evidence brought to City 
Hall, I don't believe that. The Mayor is an attorney and he wouldn't 
do that. Captain Sperber said that he had just received a call from 
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the Chief's Office ordering him to turn over everything we have to 
the Mayor's Office. 
"I said: 'I don't know anything about that order. Somebody got 
the order fouled up, but I will check with the Mayor and get it 
straight.' 
"Then Captain Sperber said: 'If you were in my place, wouldn't 
you resign?' 
"I said: 'Skipper, I've told you my conscience is clear and I am 
not about to quit and I ain't thinking about it.' 
"I then returned to City Hall and asked the Mayor about the 
order Captain Sperber had to turn over the reports, tapes and 
statements. 
"The Mayor said, 'they got it all wrong. Those things are 
evidence. How in the hell can I order him to turn it over? No one 
should have access to those things but the police and prosecution. 
If anyone else gets those things, it will ruin the case when it comes 
to court.' 
"The Mayor then said, 'the office staff is compiling a 
chronological log of the events relating to the riot. They want to be 
sure they have a record of what happened and the time and place it 
happened. For that they don't need the reports or anything that 
might be evidence. All they want is a list of events, time and 
places. They don't even need the final disposition.'  
"I went back to the intelligence unit and told Captain Sperber 
what was wanted at City Hall. He said, 'If that's all they want, they 
can have that.' 
"The night the Mayor made a tour of the riot area we came 
upon some incidents between the police and the residents of the 
area. The Mayor's arrival on the various scenes cooled things. The 
residents acted with respect toward the Mayor. This seemed to 
anger some of the police. They took the attitude that the Mayor 
was interfering and wouldn't let them do their job. The National 
Guard didn't want any part of the police action and seemed to try to 
stay clear of it. 
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"Many residents expressed fear of the police. They said the 
white police were angry, out for revenge, and [they] were afraid 
that the white police would take revenge on any black person they 
found on the street at night and besides, they said, 'most of the 
white police are drunk.' That was heard from residents throughout 
the riot area and the unaffected black community. The entire black 
community seemed relieved when the order went out to remove all 
the white police from the affected area and to replace them with 
black policemen. This order seemed to anger the white police even 
more. They regarded this as more interference by the Mayor and 
showed their displeasure by many obscene and disrespectful 
remarks made over the police radio. The Mayor and the black 
police were the target of these remarks. 
"The black police, though small in number, rose to the 
occasion. They really extended themselves in their efforts to bring 
things under control after the first night there were no more deaths, 
black or white. The second night was relatively quiet. The city was 
returning to an almost normal state." 
 [END OF STATEMENT] 
 In the aftermath of the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., 
on April 4 1968, almost every large city in the country with a 
sizeable black community had violence and looting of some sort. 
We were able to keep that from happening in Cleveland. In a way 
it was unfortunate that we succeeded as well as we did, because it 
only confirmed the establishments wager that in backing me they 
were buying insurance. Not that I didn't make a good deal of it 
myself at the time, taking reporters along with me as I walked the 
streets, calming people, talking them into cooler emotions. I tried, 
though to get across the point that the community had calmed 
itself. If wasn't just me out there; we had clergymen, athletes, street 
clubs, militants out patrolling, working to keep the lid on. 
Obviously, they were out there because I got them together to do it, 
but they were the ones who really handled it. The reporters focused 
on Carl Stokes, and it set me up for a much longer fall three 
months later when Glenville broke out. We had out first Town Hall 
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meeting during April, after the loss of Martin, and I remember two 
little old white ladies running up to me and kissing me and 
thanking me for saving the city. 
In Glenville I took a step that other mayors around the country 
would later take when things got out of hand: I pulled out the white 
police and sent black leaders in to keep the peace. It wasn't a 
totally unprecendented move in Cleveland, Ralph Locher had 
pulled out the black police from Mayfield Road when Little Italy 
faced its school segreation crisis. He didn't want any black 
policemen up there whipping white heads. But more then pulling 
the white policemen out of Glenville, I sent in the leaders of the 
black community to police itself as I had in April. I think that was 
the most important thing I did, and it worked, at least in the sense 
of stopping the shooting. There were no more deaths. But it did 
unleash what had been latent race hatreds that had been smoldering 
since the election. It meant the end of Carl Stokes as hero. As long 
as I had been the hero, no one would vent his racism publicly. We 
had had the city so caught up in working toward solving 
Cleveland's problems that those who were not a part of the 
enthusiam were at least neutralized. All of that ended. 
The thing that brought it out was not so much the Glenville 
shootings as that a black mayor had pulled out the white police. 
This had clearly been a fear all along, that a black mayor would 
interfere with the police function of protecting the white 
community against the black peril. 
The decision to make that move was not easily arrived at. On 
the morning of July 24 I had well over a hundred black leaders 
assembled at City Hall. We had been up all night at the Hall, 
calling people for the 8 A.M. meeting. We tried to get a true cross 
section on the issue of pulling the police out or leaving them in, 
and we reached no decision then. Most of the older, middle-class 
Negroes were against pulling them out. The younger, more militant 
blacks wanted to pull them out. My own immediate reaction early 
in the meeting was against pulling them out. As it progressed and 
arguments were made, I modified that position. I knew that I was 
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the only one who would have to live with the decision and that no 
matter which was I went I couldn't win. I had to stop this small war 
going on within my city. I didn't even have confidence that 
whatever decision I did make would be obeyed by the police. 
Finally, I just had the feeling that black people were not going to 
kill black people. And I knew that in that room that morning there 
were at least two people who knew whether there would be further 
shooting, because of their own personal knowledge and 
involvement. That afternoon I called a press conference to 
announce that I was going to pull the white policemen out and 
allow black leaders to patrol the area. 
Wednesday night they kept their watch in the area. There was 
some looting, but no more shots were fired, no more lives were 
lost. The next day I met with the community leaders again, this 
time in the Glenville area. They told me they had stopped the 
shooting, they were convinced there would be no return to the 
warfare of Tuesday night. But they just couldn't handle the 
problem of looting. Some reported the presence of professional 
looters and cars from Michigan. The decided they wanted the 
police and the National Guard back in the area. 
On that Thursday night, there were absolutely no incidents 
whatsoever. The people welcomed the police back. There were 
reports of incidents that indicated that the police themselves 
wanted something to happen. There would be people in the streets 
and the police would pull up and jump out of their cats with their 
guns out and tell the to get the hell off the street. The people 
cooperated and moved away despite the provocative behavior of 
the police. 
A number of the people I had talked with on Wednesday before 
pulling the police out were members of the Police Department, 
men who were aware of the bitterness among the police over the 
police over the men who were shot down, as well as the residual 
hatreds of black residents of the neighborhood. Over and over 
again, the trusted people in the department I talked with said either 
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flatly that the police should be kept out or at least that I ought to be 
very careful because the men would be looking for revenge. 
The police attitudes throughout the entire incident and its 
aftermath were self-protective, corrupt and destructive. A 
dispatcher would call a patrol car on the police radio to go help 
someone in the Negro area, and the cop would reply, "Send the 
nigger mayor to take care of it." All this was reported to me, but it 
wasn't until two days after the incident that we found time to go 
after the radio tapes. When we inquired about them we were 
informed by Captain Sperber that the tapes had been turned over to 
the county prosecutor for evidence. He brought me a letter written 
by John T. Corrigan on July 25, addressed to Sperber -- not to the 
chief of police, but to this captain saying that prosecution of 
somebody for the homicides of July 23 was anticipated and "it is 
most important that the chronology of the action of the police 
department be preserved." It went on to request all police records 
and radio tapes, to be kept as evidence. 
That night and the next, racial slurs and insults were still being 
made occasionally by the police over the air. John T. wrote another 
letter to Sperber, ordering the tapes from July 24 and 25 to be 
delivered to him. Now, John T. had no use for those tapes for his 
prosecution. During the subsequent trials of Ahmed and his 
followers, the tapes were never mentioned. It they had been 
effectively kept out of my hands. 
In fact, the police were willing to conspire with anyone to 
protect themselves. Late Saturday night, July 27, an NBC 
television cameraman was beaten up. He charged the police with 
attacking him. The police charged that he was attacking them. On 
Sunday I held a meeting with the top men in the Police 
Department. They said they didn't know anything about it. Later 
that afternoon, at the request of WKYC officials, I went over to the 
NBC-owned station and listened to the video tapes of the interview 
with the cameraman, Julius Boros, who contended the police had 
smashed his camera and beaten him with night sticks. The 
television-station officials and reporters were furious. They 
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demanded I do something about this vicious attack up a member of 
the press. I made a public announcement that there would be a 
thorough investigation and that the appropriate action would be 
taken. But the next morning I for a call from James Carnes, then 
chief police prosecutor, who said the WKYC-TV people wanted to 
talk to me. I told him to bring them over. 
Carnes led the delegation into my office of the top television 
station officials and their counsel from an established Cleveland 
law firm. But interestingly, also with them was Milton Firestone, a 
veteran Police Court lawyer, best known for working out deals 
with the police and persecutors such as to reduce driving while 
intoxicated charges to the lesser offense of reckless driving. One of 
them proceeded to tell me that they had discussed the whole matter 
and that probably the best course of action would be to have both 
sides drop the charges. They said they would have Boros sign a 
waver of release and the whole matter would be considered closed. 
Now, Carnes had earlier told me the police had the facts and were 
going to prosecute Boros. I asked the WKYC people if this deal 
had been cleared all the way up in their organization. They said 
that it had. 
I hit the ceiling. I was as mad as I ever got, hitting my desk to 
punctuate my points. "I will be damned if I permit this kind of 
thing going on in my office," I said. "I don't know whether the 
police assaulted this man or not, but I know the police claim they 
have the evidence to convict the man. He, Boros, claims the police 
brutalized him. You are not going to some behind the doors of this 
office and think you can arrive at the kind of shoddy settlement 
that has traditionally been accepted by this city. The police have 
charged the man, NBC has vehemently denied any aggressive 
action on the part of their man and in fact said he has been 
victimized, and, goddammit, nobody is going to come into this 
office and make any deals. Now, all of you get out go here." 
Jim Carnes never said a friendly word to or about me after that. 
He later told me I had made him look silly. Subsequently, we both 
agreed on this resignation as Chief Police Prosecutor. 
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Few people knew that I went into the Glenville area myself 
Thursday night. In the early evening, Jim Barrett, Bosie Mack and 
William Taylor, all policemen, were following my car in a tail car, 
riding some distance behind to prevent someone coming up behind 
me. Although I had never reacted to threats that came in, they did 
come in, various forms, every day. When Glenville occurred, the 
threats escalated to an intensity of violence and obscenity that 
would be worthless to reproduce here. I was never so glad that my 
family was out of town, away from the violence that surrounded 
us. 
That Thursday night we first drove to my house. I told Barrett 
that what I really wanted to do was go out to Glenville. I didn't' 
want anyone to know I was doing it, because I wanted to observe 
what was happening without the glare of television lights and the 
presence of reporters. The back-up detail was dismissed for the 
evening. The security detail at the house were told we were going 
into Glenville but I wanted no escort. Barrett and I left alone. 
As we arrived at the cordoned-off area, we were challenged by 
the guardsmen. It was a sight that made you sick at heart. As I got 
to 105th Street and Wade Park Avenue, I saw a half-track with 
cannons and a couple jeeps with two guardsmen carrying machine 
guns, and as we pulled up they signaled the car while asking us 
where we were going. I identified myself, and Barrett took out his 
badge and pinned it on his lapel so they would see immediately he 
was a police officer. The guardsmen told me they couldn't permit 
me to ride into the area, because they felt that some of the men, 
seeing two black men in a black Lincoln Continental, might let go. 
A captain with them insisted that the only way he could approve 
our going in was under his escort. So I had to go in with the 
captain and two other men, all in a jeep with a machine gun 
mounted on it. 
We got to Superior Avenue and were greeted by a tank. Not a 
half-tank. A tank. In the center of my city, an army of occupation 
had taken over. My reaction was a bottomless revulsion, an 
uncontrollable visceral churning; I was cast down. The streets were 
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deserted, there was nothing out there but soldiers with guns. It 
reminded me of Germany. The fear and resentment of the soldiers 
was almost palpable in its volatility. Even at the checkpoints, with 
the captain present, they would point those machine guns at the 
car. I couldn't help thinking, One of these nuts could pull the 
trigger just because he is afraid in a hostile area -- he really thinks 
of himself as being in a foreign enemy country. I understand what 
it must have been like at Kent State on May 4, 1970, when an army 
of poorly trained, fearful, apprehensive, exhausted young men with 
inadequate controls met a situation for which no one had been able 
to prepare them. I understood that night in Glenville that all it 
would take would be for us to suddenly accelerate the car or make 
any sudden move and we would be fired upon. 
We arrived at 114th and Superior, near a gift shop kept by one 
of the nationalist groups. I got out and went into the shop. Barrett 
went with me. They had the news on the television set, reviewing 
the events of Tuesday night. I sat there with them and explained 
what that kind of activity was doing in our city. We got pledges 
from them to help us bring peace back to the community, and then 
we proceeded down Superior. We came upon a white magazine 
writer named Jack Skow who was walking down the street. 
Apparently a white man could walk the street unmolested. He 
came over and told me he would like to ride with us. He got in and 
we rode around. We heard a call over police radio that they were 
holding up a number of nationalists at Eighty-fourth and Superior. 
That we knew was the Afro Set. I told Jim, "Let's get down there." 
When we for there they had Harllel Jones and one of his aides 
named Shababa and four boys that had to be under fourteen years 
old. They were all lined up against the outside of the building with 
their hands against the wall. There must have been twenty police, 
with all kinds of guns pointed to these six people. I heard what was 
obviously an agitated conversation coming from the police, 
something like, "You sons of bitches, one of you move and we'll 
blow your goddam head off." How the hell were they going to 
move in that situation? The police had guns pointed not only at 
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them but at a crowd that was beginning to gather around them. 
Clearly we had the makings of a blood letting. 
I got out and walked through the crowd. The highest-ranking 
officer was a lieutenant. There were no guardsmen around. I said, 
"What's the problem?" He said Harllel and the others were 
violating the curfew. I asked Harllel about it, and he said the boys 
were in the Afro Set attending a meeting. They had come out in 
time to get home before the curfew went into effect, but the 
policemen had stopped them just as they were leaving the building 
and had been holding them; as soon as the curfew hour passed they 
had told them they were in violation and they were going to jail. I 
told the lieutenant that they were only dealing with young kids and 
a matter of a few minutes' violation. 
Just then one of police came up and said they had found a set of 
brass knuckles in Harllel's car. The lieutenant said this had to be 
classified as a dangerous weapon. 
I said, "Lieutenant, do you mean to tell me that with all the 
trouble we have in this city you want to arrest him because of a set 
of brass knuckles?" 
He said, "Mayor, this man is violating the law. Are you asking 
me to not enforce the law?" 
I said, "Okay, Lieutenant, have it your way." I told Harllel to go 
with him. I told him I would see to it that he had a lawyer right 
away. I told him not to give the police any trouble and he said, 
"Okay, Mayor," and got into the police cruiser. I then drove the 
other boys home. At City Hall I personally called attorney Stanley 
Tolliver and got him to go to the precinct and represent Harllel. 
We found out later on that after we left the Afro Set office the 
police went in there with shotguns and machine guns and just shot 
up the whole place. 
The man who brought us to that place, who initiated the 
shooting, was Fred Evans a hustler who took the Ahmed and was 
projected by the news media into a prominence that he has never 
anticipated but quickly exploited. He talked all kinds of 
revolutionary nonsense purely for the purposes of extorting money. 
223 
He was a petty hustler. But the young black kids who were out 
there believed him. The media gave him nationwide exposure 
when he predicted the end of the world. He never believed the stuff 
he fed the kids. And when it got hot in that house on Auburndale, 
Ahmed surrendered in such as way as to make sure he did not get 
shot. Once in the custody of the police, with the eyes of the media 
and the public focused on him, he went right back to his rhetoric. 
When Ahmed started buying guns, those kids believed he was 
preparing for the revolution. But what kind of revolution is it when 
you get into a house in a crowded neighborhood and carry a 
hopeless battle with the police? They were fighting from a house 
from which there was no escape, fighting a superior force, with 
nowhere to go. I would doubt that Ahmed fired a shot. I don't mean 
that he was innocent. A jury found him guilty of murdering the 
policemen and he is now serving a life sentence in the Ohio 
Penitentiary. I mean he was not a revolutionary He was a punk. He 
did not intend that there would be shooting. He just wanted to keep 
his hustle going. But once you begin a certain kind of activity it 
can build on its own, gathering momentum. Before Ahmed knew 
it, his rhetoric had carried him into a full-scale war on the street. At 
that point the only thing this punk had in mind was how not to get 
killed. He crawled out of that house after sending out every 
possible message that he wanted to surrender and wanted to 
surrender safely. Instead of being considered the hero some try to 
make of him, he ought to be considered lower than Benedict 
Arnold. 
Now all of the veteran reactionary writers of letters to the 
editors began to surface. (Perhaps they had been writing all along, 
but the newspapers, until Glenville, had not been printing them.) 
Glenville gave them something to hang their anger on. It was 
clearly a public issue and clearly an issue of black and white. 
Black revolutionaries, led by an eccentric astrologer name Ahmed 
Evans, had actually opened fire on the police. It was the first time 
in this country something like that had happened. This was no riot. 
It was no festival of looting and burning. It was warfare. 
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In the aftermath of Glenville, we spent a good deal of time 
trying to figure out how to recoup the public confidence. We had a 
poll taken after Glenville, Bill Silverman hired a firm to do a poll 
of the entire community, and it showed that forty-seven percent of 
the white people approved of our decision and almost eighty-one 
percent of the black community agreed with the move. When you 
couple that with the fact that all of the claims of the businessmen 
who had stores vandalized totaled less that a million dollars, it 
seems to me that you can't attack our decision. Look at the extreme 
damage in other cities -- Los Angeles, Newark, Detroit -- let alone 
the loss of life, and you realize we really did hold the lid on the 
situation. And afterward we moved quickly to get federal 
assistance for the businessmen, we moved to clean up the area, to 
remove the physical evidence of the violence, and started 
immediately helping people to relocate. 
Nevertheless, not only the Council but all the groups that are 
normally platforms for racism now went to work on us. The police. 
The people calling radio talk show. And the business community. 
The businessmen, against my constant reminder that I was no 
insurance against violence, had continued to believe it anyway. 
Glenville was their rude awakening, and when they found out that 
they had risked an independent mayor as an insurance policy to no 
avail, they turned away. Tom Patton, the president of Republic 
Steel, pulled a group of businessmen together, and they called for 
an audit of Cleveland: NOW! To find out how much Cleveland: 
NOW! money had gotten into the hands of Ahmed. They found 
approximately $6,000 had been paid by his group for salaries 
which had been verified by the community group overseeing and 
authorizing the expenditure. There is nothing wrong with a public 
accounting, but this was clearly a defensive move taken because a 
fishy light had been cast, not only on Cleveland: NOW!, but on the 
entire Stokes administration. Many businessmen who had made 
pledges to the Cleveland: NOW! Program quietly turned their 
backs, and we could see there would b no support for its 
continuance. The overall mood of distrust was devastating.  
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13 
DISILLUSION  
Much of the hurry I was in, the reason I did things so quickly, was 
because I knew I wasn't going to be in City Hall long. I knew the 
things I had to do were not going to permit me to be around long 
and so I had to move fast, before the day when that white person 
out there who was part of the majority suddenly understood what 
was going on and turned to use his majority against me. 
I knew that it had to mean something to be Carl Stokes, not just 
black, but black in a predominantly white city, and black with 
style, with charisma, and with a hard sense of my own priorities, 
an unwillingness to depart from the path toward what I thought 
ought to be done in the town, knowing that I could use the process 
to get things done but that as I exercised the power there would be 
a reaction that did not occur to whites who had broken through. As 
you try to go ahead, you keep asking yourself, How long am I 
going to have to do these things, how much can I do before the 
combination of all these events come together and make it 
impossible for me to govern as I want to, as I perceive it has to be 
done? 
By the time I took office I had been in Cleveland long enough, 
had been in politics long enough, and had certainly been black long 
enough to know that they would be coming after us, but I did not 
really understand the sophisticated ways it could be done. I had 
expected the critical surveillance and weighing of actions. I had 
not anticipated the lengths people would go to. 
Read the history of Tom Loftin Johnson, the man now revered 
as the greatest mayor in the history of Cleveland, and learn what 
happens when you fight the power structure. A wealthy man when 
he went into office in 1901, he is praised today for what he 
achieved, but few remember he was defeated for reelection, broken 
financially and physically. He died less than a year after he left 
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office, disowned by the establishment from which he had come. He 
fought both of the political parties and was at sword's point with 
the newspapers of his day for almost the entire eight years he was 
in office. Looking at his career, you have to realize that whenever 
you go up against the established structure it is going to be self-
destructive. It happened to Carl Stokes between 1967 and 1971, 
but it also happened to a wealthy white man over fifty years ago. 
The attacks, the antagonism and the hostilities may vary in 
approach, but they come to anyone who works at government as 
we did. 
I am sure they would not have acted as they did if I had not 
governed as I did. When I talked about commitment to housing, 
they thought it was something a politician said to get elected. The 
same of the poor. Politicians have always used poor people, black 
people, to get in, and then gone ahead to do it as it was always 
done. Even the poor people didn't really expect me to do anything. 
They had always been made promises that were not kept. When I 
got in, I tried to do what I had said I would do. But my actions 
brought down the attacks of those who felt threatened, or who were 
deprived of something they had always had. 
And those who had always been on the outside didn't believe it, 
either. They forgot the campaign, the tough days they walked the 
streets, telephoned, gave up their nickels and dimes, because they 
had always done that and never got anything for it. When the jobs 
and opportunities began to flow it was like a child who suddenly is 
given an opportunity to buy all the clothes he wants, to be able to 
stay up as late as he wants, or not to go to school if he chooses not 
to. Many people were ready for the responsibility; some were not. 
They had never been in positions not just of responsibility but 
subject to such close scrutiny; consequently there were holes, and 
they were unable to provide the kind of protection to their own 
jobs and ultimately to me that veteran political appointees 
understand. Here is an example. 
In our earliest days at City Hall there was no one with more 
political savvy than Geraldine Williams. Her devotion to the 
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administration and the things we wanted to do was unsurpassed. 
We were in office less than a month when she blundered. I 
compounded her errors with a mishandling of the situation, and 
those who were ready to attack the infant administration had a field 
day. 
I had named Gerry as one of my administrative aides. Nine 
days after we took office we learned that the Press had been 
checking into complaints of Sunday liquor sales at the 32 Cedar 
Club, a private club owned by Gerry's ex-husband. Gerry had been 
the secretary of the club. It had been a meeting place for us for a 
long time, and much of the 1965 campaign was planned and run 
from there. I had told Gerry before I appointed her that she must be 
free and clear from the club. She assured me that she was. When 
we heard that the state Liquor Department had the club under 
surveillance, I called Gerry in. She swore to me she was 
completely divorced from the club. 
We heard no more about this until after I had left for a vacation 
in January. While I was in the Virgin Islands the Press broke a 
story saying they had linked my aide to a "cheat spot." Dr. Clement 
and Paul White phoned me and told me what the Press had. I told 
them to have Joe McManamon get the facts. Two days later they 
phoned to tell me that McManamon, with the help of a handwriting 
expert, had determined that signatures on permit applications from 
1967 back to 1952 indicated that Gerry was still with the club. 
More, the club minutes submitted after the story broke appeared to 
be new minutes, trying to establish a prior resignation by Gerry. 
All of this was known to the press.  
Meanwhile, I was weighing the need to keep my administration 
above reproach and feeling that by acting decisively when 
something like this would come up we could prevent attacks. So I 
said, "Okay, she has to go. Inform her." 
I really regret the way I handled the situation. Apparently she 
did lie to me; she was with the club, and she made it worse by 
dummying up the minutes. But what had she done wrong or in 
dereliction of her duty with the administration? The stories did not 
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say she was at the club selling liquor on Sunday. The only thing 
she did wrong was lie to me. She had done nothing in her role as 
an employee that warranted firing, and certainly not firing by long-
distance telephone. But in an atmosphere of panic over this, the 
first attack on the integrity of the administration, I overreacted. If 
the same thing had happened later in my administration, I would 
have gone on the counterattack, asking why this spurious, yellow-
journalist attack, trying to discredit my administration. I would 
have asked what illegal act she had done. When I think back to the 
nights in 1965 when she and I worked alone making signs by hand 
in that very club or in my law office, I wish I could undo what I 
did. I lost probably one of the four or five most trusted and loyal 
people I have ever had around me in public life. 
We all live under power trees. That's where the goodies grow. 
We all have to decide whether we want to accept what falls from 
the trees and is left there by someone else or whether we shake the 
tree and get our own. There is one problem: those trees belong to 
certain people, and if you shake the wrong tree, they come after 
you. And that is what happened to Carl Stokes in Cleveland. 
Efforts to physically assassinate me were successfully warded off, 
but there was no way to ward off the systematic and determined 
campaign to assassinate me with rumor, conjecture, speculation, 
insinuation and indirect charges that I had no defense against. 
For decades the city had been raped through the system that 
made it possible for Jim Stanton to casually tell me one morning, 
"If I don't make fifty thousand dollars a year, then something 
must be wrong." Why? How could a full-time Council President 
make fifty thousand dollars a year? If what he said is true, then 
despite the technical legality of however it is done, such a system 
is reprehensible. That is why so many of the attacks on Carl Stokes 
by some commercial, business and political interests should not be 
looked on as simple racism. Rather, it was the economic reaction 
of those who had been displaced from the goodies they had 
enjoyed for so long from those previously running the city. They 
had to believe I was now dispensing the goodies and getting the 
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return. Accordingly, I was investigated by everyone from 
Cleveland's lowliest Polish housewife to the highest agencies of 
the United States government: my own Police Department, all the 
Cleveland-area papers, the strike force set up to fight organized 
crime, the Justice Department, the Internal Revenue Service, were 
all in Cleveland and anywhere I'd ever been, investigating me 
because of rumors, allegations and accusations. 
On April 29, 1971, three and a half years after I took office, the 
Press headlined a story "U.S. Finds No Misdeed by Stokes." The 
story read as follows: 
A federal investigative agency has found no evidence of illegal 
activity by Mayor Stokes since he took office, The Press learned 
today. 
The investigations were made by the Justice Department's task 
force on organized crime, whose chief is William J. Tomlinson. 
The task force has authority to investigate complaints about 
alleged corruption by public officeholders as well as organized 
crime involving racket figures. 
Its investigation of Stokes, based on complaints funnelled to the 
task force, was fruitless, The Press learned. 
Investigators could find no evidence to substantiate the 
complaints. Task Force investigators, it was learned, were 
conscious of the possibility that some of the complaints were 
inspired by persons who dislike Stokes for personal or political 
reasons. I took power and gave it to unsophisticated people is they 
don't know how to protect themselves if they have done something 
wrong. They don't know how to take care of themselves like the 
white guy who has been taking money for years but also maintains 
a cash reserve to pay councilmen, police, prosecutors, legislators, 
and sees to it that money gets into a mayor's campaign. But few 
persons stop to think that a black man who understands all of this 
so well also understands not to do it. That's what they can't get 
through their heads. They know I've been down the road. I've 
watched money change hands in this society from level of the 
blackjack dealer who greets the vice squad at 3 A.M., cuts out 
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some money and says, "Fellows, go get yourselves a drink," all the 
way to the legislature where some of the most respected big 
businesses in this country pay for representatives' hotel bills, 
guarantee five thousand dollars for a reelection campaign, provide 
prostitutes and interest-free loans for automobiles and homes. I've 
seen it all. But you don't have to be a chicken to know what an egg 
is. 
Beyond the question of doing wrong and knowing or not 
knowing how to cover it up was the question of just what is 
wrongdoing. Practices that had been going on for years were 
suddenly being investigated during my administration. When so-
called scandals did occur, blacks or people identified as being 
close to me could expect the full attention of the county prosecutor. 
Things that were not crimes were made to seem like crimes to 
discredit my administration. 
You have to keep in mind the great power of a county 
prosecutor. He can do almost anything, from wiretapping to 
surveillance to the getting of records. And he can intimidate. He 
can get people indicted almost at will. A county grand jury relies 
almost exclusively on the county prosecutor or his assistant for 
direction. Since the grand jury sits in secret and its procedures are 
never subsequently available to public scrutiny, the information 
given to the grand jury is whatever the prosecutor wants to present. 
He may not be able to convict you, but he can sure as hell get you 
indicated. And even if he can't prove the case, the public stigma of 
the indictment is enough. I had to go against him because I was 
fighting for what we had labored so hard to put together and 
whenever there was a blemish I knew the only way to clear it up 
was to force the issue to an ultimate conclusion. I hoped that the 
people understood that you can't fight a man like the county 
prosecutor unless you are clean yourself. 
John T. Corrigan became Cuyahoga County prosecutor in 1956. 
He owned his election to a newspaper strike. Corrigan was running 
against Robert Krupanski, a Republican who had the support of 
both newspapers and looked like a sure winner. He had come out 
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of Cleveland's West Side Irish ghetto, where racial hostilities and 
prejudices are part of the West Side Irish-Catholic heritage. 
Corrigan is personally honest, and it is hard to criticize honesty. 
But I happen to think there are things you do and things you don't 
do that can reflect on your consistency. To my knowledge, 
Corrigan has never investigated the activities of the Democrats 
who have dominated the county commissioner's office for decades 
and handle budgets twice the size of Cleveland's. As far as I know, 
he never investigated the activities at City Hall until the Stokes 
administration, yet nothing happened during my two terms that did 
not happen long before I got there. 
In 1970 when we told the top men in the County Democratic 
Party that we wanted black Councilman George Forbes to be a 
vice-chairman, most of them agreed except Corrigan. He alluded to 
some corruptness on the part of Forbes and declared Forbes was 
not going to be an officer in the party, and the others fell into line 
behind him. They could not buck him, because he could turn loose 
his office on any one of them and make life very uncomfortable. 
Two years later in 1972, Forbes aligned himself with the white 
Democrats, and John Corrigan supported him to be one of the three 
county co-chairmen of the Democratic Party. In April 1973 the 
white Democratic councilmen voted for Forbes to become the first 
black President of Cleveland's City Council. Had Corrigan's 
opinion of Forbes changed so profoundly in three years? 
The three men I appointed to the Civil Service Commission -- 
Jay B. White, Charles L. Butts and Marvin Chernoff -- understood 
the need to get more black policemen on the force. The 
commission gave its first recruitment test October 16, 1968, to 
almost twelve hundred applicants. The criticism had started even 
before the test was administered. The NAACP had sponsored a 
three day course giving tests similar to those that the applicants 
would actually be taking. This was attacked by those who just 
didn't want any more blacks on the force. Then immediately after 
the test there was criticism by some that it had been too easy, that 
the Stokes administration was out to lower the standards for getting 
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onto the police force. But when the results of the tests were 
examined, a startling 41.7 percent pass rate was revealed, the 
lowest pass rate anyone could recall. 
Meanwhile, the commission was preparing a promotion exam 
to be given November 16. My three members, in designing the test, 
made an effort to take it beyond the traditional simplistic test of the 
policeman's memorizing the Ohio Code and the city ordinances. 
After complaints from the Fraternal Order of Police, the 
commission postponed the test, first until December 14, then until 
December 21. That test was to be nullified after Chief Gerity 
charged that "proper security was not maintained." His original 
charge was that there was cheating, but that reflected poorly on the 
policemen taking the test, so he changed it to a security failure, to 
make it reflect poorly on the commission. The commission gave 
another promotion exam January 23, 1969, after which the FOP 
filed suit in Common Pleas Court asking that the commission be 
enjoined from using the results for departmental promotions. The 
case was heard in March by Judge Thomas W. Mitchell, a visiting 
judge from Jackson County. Judge Mitchell nullified the results of 
the exam, stating that the test was unreasonable, not practical and 
not related to the positions sought. He also called on Corrigan to 
have the grand jury investigate possible violations of the law in 
connection with the January 23 test. At that time I praised Judge 
Mitchell's action and urged Corrigan to go forth with the 
investigation. 
There were reports that twenty-one policemen had purchased 
the exam and the answers. The prices quoted ranged up to $1,500. 
A white police lieutenant, John Apanites, produced a copy of the 
exam paper and claimed that a policeman's wife had given it to 
him. Obviously there was some wrong-doing and it involved more 
than the failures of Stokes's Civil Service Commission. White 
policemen had been cheating. 
In May the grand jury began its investigation into the two 
promotion tests and the appointment test for new policemen. 
Corrigan and his assistant George Moscarino carefully orchestrated 
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the proceedings, stretching them out over months, leaking 
information that would indicate wrongdoing on the part of certain 
blacks, Stokes appointees, and, by implication, me. Meanwhile, we 
were unable to put needed policemen on the streets, so I was 
getting the crime-in-the-streets bit on the other end. 
After months of investigation, the grand jury returned with 
three indictments. Jay B. White, the president of the commission, 
who is black, and Charles L. Butts, the secretary, were indicted on 
several felony counts, and Lieutenant Apanites was charged with 
lying under oath about where he had obtained a copy of the 
January 23 exam. He had maintained he got the exam from the 
wife of a policeman but vowed he would go to jail rather than 
reveal who the woman was. Despite the indictment, the 
newspapers pictured his criminal act more as an act of chivalry 
than anything else. It was Jay White and Charles Butts they kept in 
a criminal posture. 
The whole involvement of Jay in this made me sick. When he 
or other blacks I had brought into City Hall let themselves get 
mixed up in things like this I would sit and think, The sons of 
bitches, here I am trying as hard as I can to put something together 
for all of us, and they go and get involved in something like this. I 
would feel so helpless. I had known Jay a long time; we grew up 
together. I had talked specifically with him, as I talked with others 
I appointed to significant positions, saying, "You are going to have 
great latitude, and persons are going to try to influence you and 
literally want to purchase favors from you. You will have a chance 
to make money, but I want you to understand, I can't stop you from 
taking a dollar but if I find out about it I will be harder on you than 
anyone else." I wanted people to understand that when I told them 
don't do something they shouldn't do it, or at least, if they did, it 
was their baby. 
However, I did not want my people singled out for persecution 
for something of which they were merely a part. The whites always 
managed to extricate themselves. On two occasions I managed to 
persuade all three television stations to allow me to go on at a 
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prime time to pressure Corrigan to go after everybody. For all 
practical purposes, he had already maligned and prosecuted the 
black community. Along with the actual indictments of Butts and 
White, Carl Stokes was indicted in the public mind. I was fighting 
desperately the tradition of blaming black people while white 
people benefit. It is like the numbers game, where whites benefit 
from the numbers and policy exploitation in the black community, 
yet when one talks about numbers and policy the onus is on blacks. 
The same thing was happening here. 
I challenged Corrigan. I watched the newspapers play up the 
way he ridiculed me, saying I ought to go back to law school after 
I told him to push the investigation. I talked to Tom Vail, William 
Ware, and Tom Guthrie at the Plain Dealer, explaining to them 
that it was my belief that white policemen had benefited from these 
examinations and we must press Corrigan to continue his 
investigation. They agreed and did nothing. I told Tom Boardman 
and Herb Kamm at the Press that this was an effort on the part of 
John T. Corrigan to malign the Stokes administration and black 
people, that he must be urged to go forward in the investigation to 
reach the men who initiated the whole thing, who had been getting 
the tests over the years and getting the promotions through the use 
of stolen and purchased tests -- the white policemen. Everyone 
would sit there and agree with me and say that something must be 
done, and then do nothing. 
Meanwhile I was being urged by the black community to stop 
pressing for further investigation. They were fearful that more 
black people would be involved. Yet I had to stand above this,  
  
because I understood better than they did that you are not going to 
get equal justice in the United States until you make those black 
people who are doing wrong pay for it and at the same time get the 
white people who are in there with them. 
All this time the reaction from the white community was that I 
was trying to cover up for the black people and attempting to shift 
blame to white policemen. Corrigan was selectively releasing the 
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names of the other blacks suspected of some involvement, and the 
media was playing it up. 
I had Sergeant Mack conducted an investigation, and it 
indicated that about twenty-seven policemen had been in 
possession of those tests. They were almost exclusively white 
policemen -- some of the worst white policemen and best-known 
racists in the department. Many also happened to be members of 
the vice squad in East Side areas where they were selling 
protection to policy and numbers people and to operators of after-
hours places. These were the kind of men who apparently knew 
how to get the tests. When you look at the manifest evidence that 
there was something wrong, and finally at the recommendation of 
the prosecutor, that White and Butts plead guilty to the 
misdemeanor of destroying public papers (felony charges were 
dropped), then you know a deliberate decision was made on the 
part of someone not to continue. While Jay was eager to plead to a 
misdemeanor, the pressure was on Butts, who saw no reason to 
plead guilty to any charge. He admitted destroying the papers -- 
answer and identification sheets used in the exam -- but he did it at 
Jay's instruction, and the papers were not connected with the 
commission of any crime. 
Early in 1971, the prosecutor's office and the media combined 
again to give the appearance that I was personally involved in 
something illegal. Following a series of Press articles, five city 
employees and eight employees of private trucking firms were 
indicted by the county grand jury on the largest number of counts 
I've ever known anyone indicted on in the United States. There 
were 476 counts of defrauding the city through contracts the 
Utilities Department independently let to a trucking company for 
hauling sludge from a waste-treatment plant. The charges included 
conspiracy to defraud the city, larceny by trick, forgery, 
falsification of records and a couple of counts relating to a black 
employee who used city lumber in repairing the side of his house. 
The charges carried a potential of hundreds of years in jail. 
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This time, Corrigan's operative was Assistant Prosecutor 
Charles Laurie, a man with a burning desire to be elected judge 
and a reputation in the black community of being one of Corrigan's 
most biased prosecutors. (Fortunately, the voters thought the two 
things didn't go well together and defeated him in his election 
efforts.) One of the black city employees Laurie was prosecuting 
came to my office and told me he'd been advised he could avoid 
prosecution if he'd "just give up Carl Stokes." "But to do that, 
you'd have to lie," I told him. He agreed and went on to defend his 
case. (I can't vouch for the truth of this story but Laurie's hostility 
toward me is well known.) 
A year after I left office, the highly publicized case of 476 
serious criminal indictments of Carl Stokes's administration 
strangely melted away. All charges against two of the city 
employees and three of the trucking-firm workers were dismissed; 
and the remaining defendants were given money fines. No one was 
jailed. The man drawing the heaviest fine, $3,500, for what the 
judge must have thought was the most serious violation, was the 
black city employee convicted of using city lumber. 
 While I was fighting these battles with the county prosecutor's 
office, trying to protect the administration and the things we 
wanted to do, I was facing other fights too. 
The suburbs around Cleveland have grown in population and 
resources and in leadership people who reside there, leaving the 
central city with its dwindling resources, its ever-diminishing tax 
base, its high concentration of the poor, the elderly and the 
politically impotent. As mayor you are in control of territorial 
boundaries, but you have nothing with which to sustain yourself. 
You cannot look to the people in the central city, for they have 
more needs than they have resources. You cannot look to the 
people in the suburbs, because that is why they are out there. You 
cannot look to the state, because the legislature is controlled by a 
suburban-rural coalition. The central-city representatives in the 
legislature are a minority group, whether they are black or white. 
Then you have a governor who responds as most public officials 
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do, in line with our whole theory of government, and that is that 
you please or appease the majority. The majority is not in the 
central city. The only recourse is to look to the federal government, 
not just for resources to pay the operating costs of government , 
but in order to enforce the things that mean life or death to your 
city. That government is the only one that can reach the suburbs, 
make them part of a health or transportation or air-and-water-
pollution control system, make them help support the city. The 
federal government is the only source that can provide the money 
while providing protection against a complete takeover of those 
systems by suburban people, with their built-in hostility toward the 
central city. 
It is not just the drain of financial resources by businesses and 
industries that are locating outside the city, it is the drain of human 
resources. When the interests of the city come into conflict with 
the interests of the suburbs, you find this great wealth of people of 
substance able to articulate and fight for their position, whereas in 
that central city you almost literally have only the mayor and his 
handful of City Hall people. The suburbanites mouth slogans about 
the need to save the city and they are always there to tell you how 
to run it, but their first and final loyalty is to the place where they 
have chosen to move their families, invest in homes, have their 
children educated, and be safe. 
The basic understanding of the needs of a city like Cleveland, 
and the reality that the central city has some thirty percent of its tax 
duplicate exempt from taxation, makes it obvious that you are 
going to have to expand your tax base to fiscally survive. The 
federal government is more and more understanding of that need, 
but it also understands you cannot have cities as total welfare 
clients; that you also have to get people out to where the jobs are; 
that health factors know no boundary lines and must be treated on 
a regional basis or area-wide basis, and so must water pollution 
and rat control; and therefore it must help the cities, but to do it 
realistically by combining them in some formal way with the ever-
expanding, greater population outside the central area. The 
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government's present effort to do this is in creating area or regional 
councils composed of the central city and the areas immediately 
surrounding them. But the antagonism between these groups is 
intense. 
The lineup of forces in this battle between a city and the 
surrounding area can be seen in our fight NOACA (Northeast Ohio 
Area Coordinating Agency). In that body Cleveland, which has 
twenty-five percent of the population of the seven-county area that 
is part of NOACA, was being given some fourteen percent of the 
representation on its board. There you had county commissioners, 
mayors and city managers from seven counties, all of them 
basically one of mind, against one man from one city who 
understood that once such a council of governments is formed, the 
federal government will not spend any money in that area that does 
not go through the council. If you are not represented adequately in 
there, at the beginning, obviously your interests are not going to be 
protected. NOACA was determined that the central city would not 
be equitably represented. The issue was joined. I had a City 
Council so dedicated to diminishing the political presence of the 
mayor that paradoxically they were part of those calling for 
acceptance of lack of representation of their city on a board that 
has to be against the interests of their constituents and themselves. 
Extraordinary. Eventually I had to go to the federal government 
and explain to both the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development and the U.S. Civil Rights Commission how federal 
dollars were being used by an organization that was fostering 
blatant discrimination in housing. The federal government 
decertified NOACA as the agency for spending money in northeast 
Ohio. That is the kind of protection that only the federal 
government can give. 
It is worse for a black mayor, but it is tough for any mayor who 
has a real commitment to his city. At one point, my successor, 
Ralph Perk, was tempted to talk about the suburban noose that 
strangles the city. Word got out that he was preparing to deliver a 
speech along that line, and the newspaper reaction to it sent Perk 
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scurrying for cover, denying he planned to make the speech and 
blaming his aides. Perk knows they are out there and what they 
mean to the city. But when the powerful people who live in those 
suburbs prepared to come down on him, he ducked and ran. 
Mayors must fight for cities today in a way that has never been 
necessary before. It is a fight for the survival of the city and its 
people. The alternative is to give away the sewers and the water, 
give away control of your sewage treatment system, give away 
control -- and control sounds bad, but we are talking about 
protection of the interests of those who have the ownership, the 
use, and the need of these things -- to those who will use them for 
their own benefit, not the benefit of those from whom they are 
coming. My prediction is that Perk will be unable to sustain these 
fights. It takes too much personal commitment and acceptance of 
the costs you have to pay, politically and personally. 
Many of my dreams had died when one stupid, phony so-called 
revolutionary had decided to shoot it out with the police one night 
in Glenville. Some six thousand dollars of Cleveland: NOW! 
money had been allocated to Ahmed Evans and some of his 
followers as part of the summer employment program. We had 
spent over five million dollars in other badly needed community 
programs without a single bad incident. The positive aspects of the 
program were forgotten after Glenville, and soon it became 
increasingly burdensome for the trustees to get the business 
community to honor the pledges that had been made. 
I knew enough about the people of Cleveland to know that what 
we had lost would never be put together again. I knew that from 
then on it was going to be tough going to get any kind of positive 
response out of the business community, the City Council, the 
media and most of the people. Fear, hatred, all the emotions that 
had been pushed to the backs of people's minds for almost a year, 
were now going to come forth. 
 I approached the 1969 mayoral election with mixed emotions 
about running. When John Little and Sidney Spector came to me 
about organizing a $100-a-plate dinner for me, I told them it was 
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all right but I wanted them to understand that there was no 
obligation on me about running again. 
I went to the dinner still uncommitted, still undecided. I sat 
there until about 11 p.m. and then got up from the table and went 
into a back hallway. I had the security men keep everybody out 
and I just walked around back there, trying to figure out what I 
could do other than run. People thought later on that it was the fact 
that two thousand people paid $100 a plate that caused me to 
decide to run. That was one of the least considerations. Most of the 
people who brought those tables were people who could afford it 
and were there for calculated political reasons. Most of them 
assumed their presence would redound to their benefit when it 
came time to award contracts. The only reason we had an 
extraordinary mixture of people -- welfare mothers, black 
militants, others who could not afford to pay a hundred dollars -- 
was that we made people who could afford it buy tables for those 
who could not. 
The real reason I decided to run was that I could not conceive 
of anyone who could take over the city. I kept asking myself was 
there anyone who could continue what had been the crucial battle 
with Jim Stanton and those he represented in the city and in the 
Council, or with the newspapers and their continued contribution 
to the resistance to change, or with the business community. I 
asked myself, Is there anyone to fight for the guy in the street who 
needs a decent home and is the victim of this class and race 
struggle? Is there anybody who can demand a response and make it 
difficult not to respond? The answer always came back no. There 
was no one who could win and who was more concerned about 
producing than about being liked. At midnight I walked up to the 
microphone and declared I would run again. 
 It was that night that I really began to think seriously about an 
organization. I realized that after close to two years in office I had 
not prepared anybody or anything to carry on. I went on to defeat 
Ralph Perk and win reelection in November by twice the margin 
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that I had won in 1967, and early in February 1970 I organized the 
Twenty-first Congressional District Caucus. 
The Caucus's name and its membership boundaries cam from 
my brother Louis' congressional district. The concept came from 
Charley Carr and William O. Walker. The motivation came from 
my wanting to leave my people a vehicle to continue the political 
thrust I had taught them and to leave my brother a solid political 
base not dependent upon my presence and muscle. All black 
elected officials who had been loyal to me were named to the 
executive board. A number of ward leaders were also elected to the 
board. Later, we expanded the board to include ministers of 
different faiths and civic leaders. Louis was chairman. I was 
honorary chairman. We were organized. We found a home at the 
Club Center on East Eighty-ninth Street at Quincy Avenue, a large 
neighborhood meeting center owned by Walter Burks, one of my 
later appointees to the Civil Service Commission. Reception from 
the community was wonderful. From four to six hundred people 
turned out at meetings. There was great pride in being a member of 
the Caucus. It added another dimension to the political growth of 
Cleveland's black people and came to serve as a model for the 
nation of organized black political power. 
The Cuyahoga County Democratic Party gave us our first 
confrontation. In May 1970 the party held its first county 
convention to elect new officers. Charley Carr attended Bert 
Porter's policy committee meeting a few days prior to the 
convention, at which they were determining what slate of officers 
to run. Carr proposed George Forbes for vice-chairman. John T. 
Corrigan led the opposition to Forbes. They decided that a black 
should not be named vice-chairman, because he could succeed to 
chairman. They created a special vice-chairmanship for a Negro 
and agreed to elect Dr. Kenneth Clement to it. Dr. Clement 
accepted it. I rejected this proposal out of hand when Carr reported 
back to me. It was preposterous in 1970 that a Democratic Party 
group would be creating a "Negro" position. In addition, we had 
just defeated Dr. Clement soundly in his primary race for U.S. 
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Senate; we had backed Howard Metzenbaum, a liberal Jewish 
lawyer, and thrashed Clement five to three in his own ward. 
Clement did not carry a single black ward in Cleveland. We 
destroyed him and the myth the white media kept alive of his being 
a black leader. This was the first of several instances to follow in 
which the black community learned to discipline its errant 
members. 
We called a meeting of all black councilmen, ward leaders and 
precinct committeemen for the same Saturday morning and the 
same time the Democratic county convention was being held. We 
boycotted the convention and declared that the Caucus and its 
members were no longer part of the regular Democratic Party. We 
would be free agents, and nonpartisan, supporting candidates of 
either party, depending on what their election meant to the black 
community. 
The two white daily papers assailed us unmercifully. White 
Democrats who had been enjoying free black votes for years wrote 
letters of outrage to the papers. White West Siders who wouldn't 
let a black person live on their street bemoaned this political self-
segregation by the blacks. White liberals who had their separate 
Americans for Democratic Action chapters and New Democratic 
Coalition clubs mourned over our action and demanded our return 
to the party. But the black people understood it and gloried in this 
new political independence. 
The result of every election from that time on depended on 
what the Caucus with its great solidarity in voting did. Any 
candidate, black or white, campaigning in the black community 
had to answer the question "Is the twenty-first District Caucus 
supporting you?" If not, he lost his audience. 
We had great victories. We controlled virtually every City 
Council and state legislative seat in the district. Our people 
followed us as we swung our votes to Republicans over 
Democrats, occasionally a white man over an underserving black 
candidate and in September 1971 we soundly thrashed mayoral 
candidate City Council President Anthony J. Garofoli, who had the 
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endorsement of the county Democratic Party, organized labor and 
the Plain Dealer. With his ethnic background and those 
endorsements, Garofoli would have been a tougher apponent for 
the black candidate in the general election than James Carney. That 
and our other victories and what the Caucus was all about are well 
summed up in a Plain Dealer editorial of September 30, 1971: 
Mayor Carl B. Stokes and his 21st Congressional District 
Caucus won a momentous victory in Tuesday's primary elections. 
It is they who capsized the Democratic organization and 
nominated James M. Carney for mayor. They got out a near 
unanimous bloc vote for him in the biggest surprise in Cleveland's 
political history. 
But also they were invincible in every Council contest they got 
into. They plowed Democratic regulars under. Examples: Warren 
Gilliam, in midtown, Mrs. Mary E. Yates in Glenville, Clarence R. 
Thompson out near Lee-Seville. They either won or put into the 
November runoffs their entire slate, including a former foe, Ceasar 
Moss, and others brought into line and then approved. 
Thus the Stokes-21st district Caucus party humbled the 
Democratic party. Mayor Stokes and his group showed up the 
part's weakness. They taught Democrats, political prophets, 
newspapermen and poll takers some lessons in political strategy. 
In City Council the Stokes group seems sure to control a much 
firmer block of votes, at least 11, possibly 14. All will owe more 
now to the Stokes-21st District Caucus, which hand-picked and 
then backed them. 
This makes the Stokes-Caucus group into the real opposition 
party, the only real second party in Council. It could control 40% 
of Council in Challenges to the bare 17-vote majority which the 
Democrats will manage to muster. 
Anyone who calls the upsets of Tuesday's primaries fluke or a 
mere trick is refuted by the ward-by-ward vote on the East Side. It 
took long, deep, thorough work to produce big, solid votes for 
caucus candidates in wards which, to complicate things further, 
had just been redistricted by the Democratic organization. 
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The party led by Mayor Stokes and the 21st District Caucus has 
proved what an important force it is in city's most politically 
conscious residents. 
My second term was almost total war between the mayor and 
the Council, between the mayor and the newspapers, between the 
mayor and everyone. I took my cabinet out of the Monday night 
City Council meetings because I refused to follow a tradition that 
merely allowed councilmen to attack and impugn the integrity of 
the chief executive of the city. I was determined that the bigots and 
the haters in the Council were not going to get away with what 
they had been getting away with it in the past. I attempted to make 
them recognize the administrative branch of the city government as 
the equal of the legislative, not the whipping boy. I took the city's 
black population out of the Democratic Party because the party 
refused to recognize and reward blacks for years of service and 
votes. I went after the newspapers, challenging them as no one had 
done before on their racism and their reluctance or inability to 
understand the needs of a city and actually work to solve problems, 
not mutter about the evils of confrontation. I took the city out of 
NOACA because that organization was working against the 
interest of Cleveland. I fought for an income tax increase against 
people who were thinking they deserved more services for less 
money. 
All this time everyone was digging in, determined that there 
would be no change that would benefit black people. I became the 
focus of affection and anger, depending on which side of the river 
you lived on. The presence of Carl Stokes began to override all 
other considerations. Activists just attract a certain amount of 
hostility. Add to that the reaction to a man who carries himself a 
certain way, who ostensibly lives a certain way, and you can see 
that Cleveland was not about to love me for very long. The way I 
dress and the fact that obviously 
I am hip, that I obviously understand things -- this disturbs 
some people. People wonder, How did he learn those things? How 
did he get hip? How does he understand these things without 
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having done them? I know of no one who can attest to any 
swinging life style of Carl Stokes. If I had publicly lived like 
Adam Clayton Powell the speculation would make more sense. I 
hate to protest so damn much, but I hate paying so much for 
something I am not enjoying. Now, if you say to me, "Stokes, have 
you ever gotten away?" -- well, sure I have. But now I only wish I 
had to the extent I've been blamed. 
I have a style for politics. Unfortunately, I pay an additional 
price because people really think that the guy who swings so well 
out there on the platform, kisses the girls, jokes around, has to be 
doing a lot of other things. Those trappings help you get to the 
mayor's office, but they don't help you once you are there. There 
are people who understand the level of mentality in Cleveland and 
who know how to use those things against you. 
Politics requires that a man compromise with the existing 
conditions. But the problems in Cleveland and the other large cities 
of this country can no longer afford the luxury of compromise. I 
choose not to compromise with those who went to keep the system 
running as it is. For four years in Cleveland those who did want to 
keep the system running the same old way knew they had to fight 
me and beat me. Civic leaders, especially newspaper editors, were 
constantly writing their hands and prattling about the evils of 
confrontation politics and the need to avoid conflict. Problems 
come from conflict between the haves and the have-nots. They 
were exacerbated by the city government that was resistant to 
change and people who refused to respond to overall city 
problems. 
I have my way of fighting, and I understand it. I understand that 
if you have a sore that is festering under the scab, the only way to 
treat it is to pull away the scab, give the sore some medical 
attention, some light and fresh air, and let it heal. To believe that 
because you do not disturb the scab or because you wrap the sore 
in a very fresh, sanitary, pure white bandage you are healing the 
wound is wrong. You can't treat that sore unless you expose it. 
There is no way around it. You must grab the scab, pull it off, and 
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expose the sore in all if its ugliness, its rot, it stench, its own kind 
of sickness. That is the way I approached Cleveland politics and 
national politics. 
But in the process you can survive only so long. You disturb 
too many things. You take a councilman who is close to you and 
who for years has enjoyed the production of the police for his 
numbers and policy operation, and you tell him this battle you are 
in does not permit him to go to the police chief and seek the 
protection he had enjoyed for the operation he had made money off 
of and the police have had made money off of. You can't fight for 
reform in the Police Department and at the same time be involved 
with them in the protection of numbers and policy. There is only so 
long that you can hold that man. He is following you because he 
has to, not because he has committed to your philosophy of 
government or to you or to things you want to do for people. Or 
take the councilman who used to make money on zoning changes. 
This man has learned to sustain his family's style on additional 
sources of income. He can't live on $12,500 a year. But when he 
joins you in a fight against the president of City council, he can't 
get his zoning legislation passed; he has to forgo that income. 
There is only so long you can hold him. It is sheer economics. You 
realized after a while that it will be only so long that you can 
pursue the fight with the confrontation of issues and 
uncompromising position. You know at the same time you were 
making the fight that someday you will have to give it up and get 
out or stay there and be defeated in what you are trying to do, and 
you must never let those whom you are fighting have that victory. I 
was fighting on many fronts, and that alone took its toll. 
I knew the end was coming. It never diminished my struggle, 
but I had to carry two diametrically opposed positions -- I had to 
fight them and I had to get out. Sometimes one position would start 
to temper the other. I felt the city was entering a period when there 
could be no more change or movement; the need was for someone 
to hold what we had won until the mood changed and someone 
else came along to build on it. I wanted it to be a black man. 
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I had sought out Arnold Pinkney, my black former 
administrative assistant who was then president of the School 
Board, and asked him to run. But I couldn't put it all together for 
him. He had no base of his own. The black ministers didn't like 
him and wouldn't support him. Community leaders active in the 
fight for better schools had been disappointed in his service on the 
School Board. He had no white votes of his own to go with the 
November 1971 general election. Second to Ralph Perk, the man I 
had twice run ahead of. 
I had decided as early as October of 1970 that I would not run 
again. At that time, no one else knew it, not even Shirley. It was 
February before I talked with her about it. I have never let the 
media in on my personal life. I have never talked about the threats 
and the fear I used to have about my family and their welfare. The 
cost my children had to pay at school each morning was great. 
Each day Carl Junior had to answer for my actions as reported on 
the nightly news broadcast or in the morning paper. It took a 
terrible toll on him. The same was true of Cordi each morning 
when she got on the school bus. And my wife. 
On several occasions men with guns appeared at City Hall and 
at my home. The most frightening incident occurred one day after 
a black youth had stabbed a white youth to death at 110th and 
Woodland. The black youth had escaped, and the neighborhood 
was up in arms. As always when violence threatened, I personally 
went into the area. The white boy's father confronted Tony 
Garofoli, the councilman from the area, and me on the street in 
front of a grocery store. He wagged his finger in my face and said 
"You're responsible, Stokes. These black people are running 
around here killing people." It was summer and the street was 
packed. This was formerly a heavily Italian neighborhood and was 
now heavily Appalachian. There were some poor Italians who had 
not been able to move out. The blacks lived nearby in the projects. 
This fellow was doing all he could to get a rise from me. The 
ingredients for a real riot were there. 
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I took the hand he was waving in my face and said, "You don't 
have to put your hand on my face. I came out here to talk with you. 
Just talk with me. I am the mayor of this city and I am here to find 
out what happened." I spoke in a calm voice. I understand fellows 
like that. I understood the response he wanted to evoke and I 
wasn't going to give it to him. At the same time, I wasn't going to 
let him humiliate me there. I could go only far in handling this, and 
I was not going to do it at my total personal expense. We just let 
him talk it out. I then told everyone that the Police Department was 
doing all that it could and we had confidence that the young fellow 
would be found, at which point it would be a question for the 
courts. We told them we were leaving and in order for us to leave 
the crowd would have to stop aside. We did not want to get the 
police involved in getting us through the crowd. 
The crowds parted and we got back into the car. Tony was 
absolutely white. He was trembling. He said, "Mayor, I am not 
going to run again. I cannot handle these people." 
I ordered the area cordoned off and put it under a curfew. When 
I got home there must have been seven police cars in the street. 
The house was dark. A policeman came up to me and said, "Mayor, 
we got word that some if the 110th and Woodland people are coming up 
here." 
I said, "Well, if they're going to do that, let me go inside and get 
prepared for them." 
He did not understand that, "No," he said, "we don't want you to face 
those people." I wasn't talking about facing them at all. I was talking about 
going into the house to get something they would understand when they got 
there. 
"That's all right. I don't intend to talk with them," I said. 
"Mayor, would you do this for us? We have already asked your wife to 
turn the lights off. Could you ask your family to lay down on the floor?" 
I said, "You have to be kidding." 
"No. We don't know what's going to happen here. We have three more 
cars on the back street." 
I went into the house. Then occurred about three hours of the 
damnedest period of my life. All around my house are policemen 
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with rifles and shotguns. I could hear the walkie-talkies. The house 
is dark. Shirley, six months pregnant with our third child, is lying 
on the floor with our two children and my sister-in-law, Doris 
Sitgraves, from El Paso. I'm sitting downstairs. We could hear the 
crowd as it came from 110th Street. There were more than two 
hundred of them, a committee of my neighbors. The police laid 
down a smoke barrage on them abut three hundred feet from the 
house. It drove them back. The family is upstairs now, scared. The 
children are frightened and don't understand what is going on. The 
yard is filled with police to protect me, not from foreign enemy but 
from the mob of people who live twenty blocks away from me. I 
am the mayor, and my family is hiding on the floor in a dark 
house. I have been out riding the area to see that there will be no 
disturbances and I get home to find the disturbance at my own 
house. My house is under siege by a gang of white hoodlums. That 
is the kind of experience in which your family pays a cost they 
never asked for. They didn't run for mayor. Yet they must endure 
all of this. Families always get sacrificed, but if the other factors 
are different, then perhaps you can hold out. But when you reach 
certain conclusions about the other part, the personal and family 
considerations only propel you toward what you know you have to 
do. Leave. 
In March of 1971, after talking it over with John Little, I called 
W. O. Walker and Charles Lucas, veteran civil rights leader, over 
to my house. I had relied heavily on Lucas's counsel when I was in 
legislature. I explained to them I would not run again. Both said, 
"Carl, you cannot do that. We don't have anyone who can hold 
what we have and can pull the black community together behind 
him and keep up this fight." I knew I had the support of the black 
community and a sufficient number if the white community. The 
problem went deeper. The decision had to be made not to whether 
or not I could get reelected, and this is hard to explain to people, 
but on what being reelected would mean. Being reelected has to 
mean an opportunity to affect change. If that opportunity isn't 
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there, then being elected mayor of Cleveland would have no 
significance. 
For months before I announced that I would not run again I had 
been trying to tell my people that should prepare for the day I 
would no longer be around. I told them of that importance of the 
organization of the 21st District Caucus and the movement we had 
started must not depend on one man. None of them wanted to think 
about it. None of them wanted to think of a time when I wouldn't 
be here. 
I happen to understand why Adam Clayton Powell didn't 
campaign for Congress the last time his name was on the ballot. 
What is it that you would ask of Adam? The one thing he did most 
wrong in his career was to exercise raw, naked power in a white 
society. He didn't sublimate it. He didn't disguise it. When Adam 
died, a nationally respected daily newspaper carried an editorial 
comparing Adam to Martin Luther King. The editorial concluded 
that Martin had left a great contribution to mankind whereas Adam 
had responded to the grossest of the things in the white man's 
world. Well, if doing like white folks in the highest positions of 
our country do isn't right, what standard of human behavior do you 
have? He did it like Huey Long did it. Like James Eastland does it. 
Like Ronald Reagan does it. But Powell had declared himself a 
black man who understood power of black people's needs and 
exercised it. You cannot compare the contributions of an Adam 
Clayton Powell and a Martin Luther King. Their contributions are 
in different areas. King stirred the conscience of this nation and 
gave all of us -- black and white -- moral courage. Adam left a 
legacy of laws that will benefit old people, working people, black 
people, for generations to come. The man passed sixty pieces of 
the most vital social-welfare legislation, affecting minimum wage, 
health standards, education, civil rights, but he was destroyed by 
white racism and black indifference. 
Carl Stokes could have been mayor of Cleveland from now on, 
with flamboyance and fun and being a good nigger; and if riots 
happen then give them hell for having riots, and cooperate with 
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Jim Stanton. There is no telling how wealthy Stanton and I could 
be. Or I could have been like former Mayor Anthony J. 
Celebrezze. One night at dinner he said something to me that I will 
never forget. 
"Carl," he said, "are you enjoying the job?" 
"Sure, Tony. It's got its tough moments, but I enjoy it." 
He said, "I notice all the big businessmen coming up here to shake your 
hand to make sure that you see them and that they see you. Well, go out of 
office at twelve o'clock and try to call one of them at twelve-five and see 
what happens to you. Your call won't get through." 
"Tony, I understand that." 
We talked some more and then got on the subject of the 
increase in the income tax that was coming up for a vote. He said, 
"You know, in nine and a half years I wasn't able to get a tax passed in this 
city. Don't let it bother you. If they don't want it, don't give it to them. If they 
want to cut back on services, go ahead and cut back." 
"But, Tony," I said, "the town can't survive like that." 
"Right," he said, "but that's what they want. Always give them what they 
want." 
But I am not built in the way that I can "give them what they 
want." On Friday, April 16, 1971, I invited to dinner at my home 
those who had been my closest advisers and supporters. After 
dinner, I told them I would not run again. Leaving them briefly, I 
went to the WEWS television station, where I announced my 
decision to the city. 
Interestingly, as close as I had guarded my intentions about 
running or not, we found out the next week that my ten-year old 
daughter, Cordi, had predicted over a month previously that I 
would not run again. Mrs. Feder, Cordi's English teacher, produced 
a theme paper Cordi had written on March 10 which, after 
predicting I would not run for reelection and would return to the 
practice of law, stated: 
 
My father has worked a long time and people do not respect him. He tried his best 
but people always blame him saying the streets aren't clean and silly things like that. But 
mostly what the paper says about my dad is not true. I think my dad will be smart not to 
run again. Besides, my whole family will have more time to be with him. 
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I have always understood the depth of this country's hostility 
and resistance when it comes to dealing with the basic functions of 
the nation. When you start dealing with the real change you are 
talking about interfering with those who are in possession of 
something. Power never gives up anything without a struggle. You 
can get laws passed. You can get expressed and resolutions and 
even condolences in the proper cases on matters of human concern. 
But when you start dealing with the basic fundamentals of housing 
and schools and jobs, then you are talking about fundamental 
change and you are dealing with a resistance that is not going to 
yield peacefully. How do you deal with it? There is only one way: 
power against power. That's what I did. I took the power of 
mayor's office and a solid constituency and went head on against 
those who didn't want the poor in their neighborhood, were 
determined to exclude blacks from jobs and new economic 
opportunities. 
But I knew I couldn't survive. And when I talk about going 
against those in power, I don't mean just the newspapers and the 
business and industrial concern; I also mean those who are in 
possession, the middle-class people who have the jobs, who live in 
the neighborhoods with the nice decent housing and the 
recreational areas that are well maintained. I am talking about the 
people who have and who are not willing to give up what they 
have. You have to make them give it up. You are asking for a 
struggle. Out of that struggle the cutting edge has to be blunted, 
dulled and even sacrificed. That's what happened to Carl Stokes in 
Cleveland. I accept it. I'll go on the next thing and let someone 
who is constitutes differently from me come back one day and 
begin the process again. Someone will come, I don't know who it 
will be. But someone will come. 
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14 
PRESIDENTIAL MATTERS 
 
On Lincoln's birthday in 1961. President Kennedy had a cocktail 
party in the White House for black leadership around the country. 
For this party, the Kennedy's used the entire first floor, putting a 
bar and a buffet in every room. When the President and the First 
Lady made their entrance, they began to circulate among the 
rooms, shaking hands with everybody. When Shirley saw what 
they were doing, she left me and went to the room where the 
Kennedys were at the time and maneuvered herself into a position 
to shake their hands. As soon as she saw which room they were 
headed for next, she would circle the entire floor and get into that 
room from the other side and shake their hands again. She did that 
all around the building. She came back to me and says, "Honey, 
just now I shook his hand, and you know he said, 'I remember 
you'!" 
"Hell," I said, "if I had just shaken your hand six times in forty 
minutes, I would have remembered you, too." 
I had no particular love for John Kennedy, but Shirley certainly 
did. She was in love with both Jack and Jackie, as were many 
black people, and she got what we all at that time so badly needed: 
recognition. 
My own national recognition came in somewhat different form.  
Although as early as 1965 I had become a national celebrity of 
sorts because of the extremely close mayoral race in Cleveland, it 
was not until after I was elected in 1967 that my voice began to 
mean something. 
There are two organizations that serve as the voice of the 
nation's mayors: the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National 
League of Cities. A quick glance at the two might leave the 
impression that they exist only to provide mayors a few days away 
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from home a couple of times a year. In fact, though, the two 
organizations exert a great deal of influence on federal domestic 
policy, and their position papers on major issues are important. The 
U.S. Conference of Mayors is the smaller group, about 750 strong. 
It is limited to mayors. The National League of Cities includes 
most of the smaller-city mayors, council presidents, and 
representatives from county and even state governments. The 
annual meeting of the league usually draws about five thousand 
members. Both groups are usually dominated by the mayors of the 
biggest cities, a group that by the late 1960s was so homogenous in 
its political philosophy that it was almost a clique. Chicago's 
Richard Daley, Henry Maier of Milwaukee, John Lindsay of New 
York, Thomas D'Alessandro of Baltimore, Joseph Alioto of San 
Francisco, Atlanta's Ivan Allen and Detroit's Jerry Cavanagh -- 
these men formed a central group whose most colorful and 
persuasive spokesmen were Cavanagh and Lindsay. They were all 
progressive, activist types, all bright and most young. It was an 
exciting time to be a mayor. As bad as things were in the cities, it 
seemed that there were some able men who understood the 
problems and that something could be done that would make a 
difference. 
Boston's new mayor, Kevin White, Pittsburgh's Pete Flaherty 
and I were warmly welcomed by the clique of big-city mayors, and 
each of us soon moved into leadership roles in both of the national 
groups. From the group of mayors and their organizations came the 
national thrust for revenue sharing, welfare reform, a guaranteed 
minimum income and tax reform. 
We formed what came to be known as "the Mayors' Traveling 
Road Show," which used as its prime drawing card the media's 
fascination with charismatic John Lindsay and his 1972 
Presidential intentions. With the media in tow, we'd travel the slum 
and blighted neighborhood of one of our cities, pointing out the 
vacant houses, the unemployed men standing on street corners, the 
closed health centers and the insufficient and inadequate recreation 
areas. Then at a later press conference, we'd explain in detail our 
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lack of local resources to create jobs, build housing, provide 
adequate health care and educational and recreational facilities. 
We took the "road show" to Washington, where we testified 
before congressional committees, had three meetings with 
President Nixon, and had two turbulent sessions with the 
Democratic leadership of Congress, whom we accused outright of 
failing to use their power to help the cities. The strategy worked. 
National sentiment and political support was built up. President 
Nixon and members of Congress raced one another to introduce 
revenue-sharing and welfare-reform bills. Tax reform was placed 
on the front burner. 
Though John Lindsay was our most valuable public-relations 
gimmick, he was not well liked by most of the mayors. Envy 
counted for part of the hostility. But Lindsay himself was 
responsible for the general dislike. He played the elitist and 
dilettante role at most of the national conferences. He'd fly into 
town, deliver his main speech, and fly out, leaving the grubby and 
tedious work to the other mayors. He always carried his New York 
entourage of assistants with him (which never included a black 
man), and whatever social time he had he'd spend with them rather 
than with the mayors. He got his comeuppance for that kind of 
behavior at the December 1969 meeting of the National League of 
Cities in San Diego. Lindsay ran for vice-president of the league 
against Mayor Richard Lugar of Indianapolis and was soundly 
defeated. It was no contest. Part of Lugar's big vote was due to 
President Nixon's support, but most of it came from the hundreds 
of small-city mayors who felt this was their chance to get back at 
Lindsay for what they felt was an Eastern Republican, white 
Anglo-Saxon privileged arrogance. Henry Maier and I had warned 
Lindsay that this was going to happen. But he insisted that we 
nominate him for the office, so we did. He lost. The next year, at 
the league's meeting in Atlanta, I was nominated for vice-president 
and elected unanimously. No one thought I was a WASP elitist. 
A national voice is sometimes, though, a voice in a void, 
through nobody's fault but the damn media. At the 1968 
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Democratic national convention I was staying in a suburban motel 
with a swimming pool, because I had taken my family, and I was 
spending part of each day with my kids. About six o'clock the 
night of the nominations, I got a call from Vice-President Hubert 
H. Humphrey's campaign adviser, Bill Connell. He said that the 
Vice-President wanted me to be one of the nominators, to make a 
seconding speech. 
I said, "I'm not even coming down to that convention tonight -- 
I'm going to watch this one on television." 
He said, "Well, it's what the Vice-President wants, and he asked 
me to ask you." 
"I don't know," I said. "The convention gets under way at 
seven-thirty, doesn't it?" He said yes, and I said, "Well, hell, it's six 
o'clock now and I'm well over an hour from the convention and it's 
rush hour. I don't see how in the world I could get there." 
"Will you talk to Senator Fred Harris?" he asked. 
I got on the phone with Harris and he said, "Carl, we'd like 
awfully much for you to make one of the nominating speeches." 
"It's just so late, Fred. When did you guys put this together?" 
"It's been a hell of a fight putting votes together. We haven't 
had time to even think about what we would do once we got them 
together." 
Hubert Humphrey was a great friend of mine. I believed in him, 
I believed he could beat Nixon. I agreed to make the speech and 
hastily changed clothes, and Sid Spector, John Little and I started 
down to the convention center. We got there just at seven-thirty 
and went to Humphrey's headquarters above the arena. I talked 
briefly with the guys and they told me to keep my speech to three 
minutes. I went over to a seat and there was Julian Bond, writing 
his speech for Eugene McCarthy. 
I said, "Well, Julian, we'll each have one going." He said, 
"Yup." Julian was making the nominating speech for McCarthy. 
So we came out. San Francisco's Mayor Joseph Alioto nominated 
Humphrey in a very fine speech, and the delegates went into their 
demonstration routine, with the horns and rattles and what not, and 
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then I came out. I launched into a fervent speech on behalf of my 
man. I wasn't talking to the few thousand in the arena. There were 
more than twenty million Americans watching this on television, 
and I was trying to reach them. People of all walks of life, all 
colors, were watching and listening to Carl Stokes. I was 
determined to reach into their hearts. When it was over I got back 
into my car, and they told me as soon I was got on the podium the 
cameras had switched to the street action outside the arena. 
I worked hard for Hubert Humphrey in 1968, both at home and 
on campaign trips to San Francisco and Los Angeles. When Nixon 
was elected, I stated that the election was over, we had a new 
President, and we all had to help him. I received a call from Daniel 
P. Moynihan, telling me he was considering going with Nixon to 
the White House. I suggested to him that the President-elect should 
meet with the big-city mayors and let us tell him some of the 
things he needed to know about the cities. We had to live with this 
man for four years, I told him, and we should get off to the right 
start. Moynihan said, "I think it's a hell of a good idea. Let me get 
back to you." He did call back, and we arranged a meeting at the 
Hotel Pierre in New York. I then turned to Pat Healey and John 
Gunther of the National League of Cities and Conference of 
Mayors, and we put together a list of mayors for the conference. 
A group of us, mayors of small and large cities, had the initial 
meeting with Nixon one morning in December. We met in a small 
sitting room in the President-elect's beautifully decorated 
penthouse apartment. We were with him for about an hour and a 
half. I sat next to him and was surprised at how fresh and vigorous 
he looked after having just gone through a tough campaign. The 
talk was very general, he could make no commitments, he hadn't 
even been inaugurated yet. We made it clear to him that the men 
there reflected the leadership of the mayors of the country. After 
some talk about general problems that affect all of the nation's 
cities, I told him that there are some unique problems that the 
twelve to fifteen largest cites have that differ not only in intensity 
but almost in kind from the problems of smaller cites. I urged him 
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to schedule a full-scale conference of big-city mayors, men who 
could bring these special problems to him. He said, "Well, I think I 
understand generally what you men have told me here today, and if 
there are no objections, we can plan for that meeting on the largest 
urban centers with what you think are the unique problems." The 
problems of America's smaller cities had pretty well been spelled 
out, so there was no objection to the future meeting on bigger 
cities. With that we closed, and he graciously showed us out. 
Nixon is a very disarming man. What you may have read about 
his being a good listener is quite true. Some people can look like 
they are listening, but they are really not. At no point where some 
response was indicated did I not find him coming in with a 
reaction. He seemed to me inordinately at ease. If I were 
approaching Presidency and had just come through a tough 
campaign I'm not sure how liberal with my time I would be, but he 
seemed to have no problems. I was impressed. 
We had our meeting in April in the Cabinet Room of the White 
House. I was sitting immediately across from the President, to the 
right side of Vice-President Agnew. Dick Lugar sat next to the 
President. Some distance down the table sat John Lindsay. On the 
other side of Agnew was Dick Daley, and Joe Alioto was next to 
him. For about an hour we talked about what I thought were the 
unique problems. For instance, I went into the subject of Glenville. 
No small cities had had the kind of guerrilla warfare we were 
facing. Lindsay detailed the ambushings of police in New York. 
We talked about the problems we were having in dealing with state 
legislatures controlled by rural interests and our need to bypass 
them and go to the federal government for help. But more than 
anything else we talked about the black-white confrontation and 
the terrible class struggle going on. The people with enough money 
to live on but not enough money to enable them to move out were 
pitted daily now against the ever-increasing numbers of very poor. 
The movement of the black people into the formerly Jewish 
neighborhoods and the clashes between what had traditionally been 
allies in the civil-rights struggles were occurring more and more 
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often. Jews had been important in the fight for open-housing laws 
and equal-employment laws. Suddenly those very laws were the 
source, legally at least, of the clash. The blacks were moving into 
the Jewish neighborhoods because they were the neighborhoods 
economically closest to them. And the economic competition was 
creating great hostility among the classes of people, even within 
minority groups themselves. These problems just don't exist to a 
significant degree in little towns. 
The President's responses generally were of the type to elicit 
more information. He did not try to profess knowledge or 
understanding of the problems, he seemed to want to learn. The 
man impressed me as a guy who really wanted to understand what 
we were saying. He asked a lot of good sound questions. 
Then came the interesting part. We had talked for about an 
hour, none of us felt rushed, and at the point at which he asked to 
be excused we really thought we had got the basic issues on the 
table. He asked if we could continue the discussion with Vice-
President Agnew, and we all rose and he left. Now, I had led those 
mayors there. When I walked with the President to the door, I was 
able to se the press room outside. It was as if they were in tiers. 
There is no press corps in the world like the one in Washington. 
I went back into the room. Vice-President Agnew suddenly 
stood up. Up to that point the whole meeting had been conducted 
comfortably, with everyone relaxed around the table. Agnew 
launched into a fifteen-minute set of remarks, some of which were 
even facts, based on his own experience putting through a revenue-
sharing tax plan as governor of Maryland. But he went further. He 
said something like "Carl, you and people like Lindsay and Alioto 
are going to have to at some point stop trying to understand these 
people and start doing something about them and put some of them 
in jail and do whatever else is necessary." He said the same thing 
in two or three different ways about housing and welfare, mixing 
in a few good things he did do as governor to give his diatribe a 
patina of authority. 
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We endured that for fifteen minutes. Then I said, "I've talked 
enough today gentlemen, but I assume there will be some 
responses here." Joe Alioto stood and gave the automatic mayor's 
response that we all shared. Agnew then retorted, in a sense putting 
Joe down, and that's not easy to do. Joe was one of the brightest 
people in the room, but he refrained from indulging in a head-to-
head clash with the Vice-President. 
But there was one man in the room who was ready, and that 
was that blue-eyed, white wavy-haired patriarch of the Old South, 
Ivan Allen. I saw in that moment what writers mean when they talk 
about his eyes flashing. Allen stood up and with the protection of a 
couple of centuries of American tradition behind him said, "Mr. 
Vice-President, I came to this meeting concerned about my city. 
But after listening to you here, I am now worried about my 
country. Everything we have said here has gone in one of your ears 
and out the other. You have no more understanding of what we are 
talking about than the man in the moon. I think this meeting ought 
to adjourn right now." 
Agnew's face flushed bright red. Very angry, he told Allen, 
"Don't tell me I don't understand, you're not listening. The whole 
trouble is you people think you have the only approach and it is the 
right way and that is what has gotten this country into trouble." 
Then he went back over his remarks about people not obeying the 
law and what not. 
Here I am trying to keep order, saying, "We ought to let the 
Vice-President talk." But by this time Tommy D'Alessandro wants 
to take him on. Lindsay is enjoying the whole thing, sitting back 
with that bemused smile on his face. Alioto was really quiet. He 
had been very much the gentleman and he had been handled pretty 
roughly. As far as Ivan Allen was concerned, the meeting was 
over. He sat down, did not look at Agnew or anybody else. He had 
said his piece. He had said that as far as he was concerned the 
meeting should be adjourned and he had personally adjourned it 
for himself. 
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I then told them I thought we had met sufficiently and we 
weren't going to get much further. I thanked the Vice-President for 
being candid with us and sharing his views and said we would take 
only a few minutes more with the press officer to work up a 
statement for the media. The Vice-President went around shaking 
everybody's hand, including Allen's but Ivan wasn't really in the 
room. Amazing. You can do that only with a certain kind of 
security. 
The press secretary then came in and asked if Ivan Allen and I 
would come into the President's office. I asked Allen and he said 
certainly he would and I told the fellows we would be right back. 
We went down the hall and into the oval office. It was late spring, 
but he had a fire going. He was seated at his desk, working. We sat 
down in front of this desk and he said, "I've just been informed 
about what occurred in the meeting after I left. I want you to know 
I am very distressed about it. I think that probably it was the result 
of misunderstandings of positions on everybody's side, because I 
know of the Vice-President's concern for local government. We all 
have a big job ahead of us and we want to do it together. I know 
you gentlemen are going on to a press conference; I don't think it 
would help the causes of any of us if we had things like this spread 
across the front pages. I just wanted to know if you felt in your 
judgement this had to be discussed before the press."  
I said, "Mr. President, I think that Mayor Allen has to respond 
to that." 
Allen then looked across at this man who, when compared with 
Allen's lineage, is an immigrant, and said, "Mr. President. Are you 
asking me not to say anything about the discussion I had with the 
Vice-President when I go out to the press conference?" 
"Well, Mayor Allen," the President replied, "I just don't see 
how that would help the causes of any of us. I just thought I would 
raise the issue with you." 
"Mr. President, I am not going to promise you what I will say 
or not say. I am really not sure myself. The only thing I can say to 
you is that Vice-President Agnew seriously concerns me." 
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"Well gentlemen," the President said, "I just appreciate your 
having come in here and I hope we will all continue to have out 
minds on our central problem, which is trying to bring some relief 
to the cities of this country. As we have indicated, we expect to 
have more meetings of this kind." 
We got up, shook hands and left. 
I didn't know what the hell to do next. We went back to the 
room with the mayors. We explained that Agnew would lead off in 
the press conference. I would make some remarks and then we 
would throw it open to questions. 
We went out. Agnew opened things and made a point of saying, 
"Now, of course there were some matters on which we had basic 
fundamental disagreements. There are some feelings the mayors 
have that I don't share and there are some that I have that they don't 
share." 
Whatever else he had to say, the first reporter who asks 
questions is going to zoom in on that one. I didn't even get a 
chance to make my remarks. As soon as Agnew finished, the press 
jumped in on those disagreements. Agnew fudged on the issue and 
said, "Well, they concern all kinds of things. After all, I've been a 
local government official and I have my own ideas about revenue 
sharing and about law and order and such things." The can of 
worms was thus opened, but he did not dig into it. 
Then the fellows turned and said, "Mayor Stokes, can we ask 
you?" 
I stepped up and they asked me about those areas of 
disagreement. I said, "I think the Vice-President has fairly well 
delineated the areas." Pure crap. 
Then a fairly alert reporter said, "With whom was he 
disagreeing?" 
I said, "I wouldn't call it a disagreement that relates to one 
specific individual; we're just talking about difference in 
philosophies of government." All the time I am thinking, Should I 
let this exchange between Agnew and Allen really come out? 
Finally I just figured that a headline that said Allen had called 
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down the Vice-President would only alienate a President who had 
no real allegiance to any of us in that room. Apart from the mayors 
of Phoenix, Wilmington, Indianapolis, and New York, all of us 
were Democrats. And of course the mayor of New York was no 
friend of his. I decided that unless Ivan Allen insisted, I wasn't 
going to let him get to the mike. He was standing next to me. But 
he chose to keep his own counsel. 
Normally, I wade right in. I like to put a man up front, make 
him have to live with his attitudes in public. But here we had been 
able to get Nixon to do something that could mean a great deal to 
the big-city mayors, most of us Democrats, most of us from cities 
that voted against Nixon. To let that impact with the President 
degenerate because of Agnew seemed irresponsible.  
Subsequently Nixon introduced his revenue-sharing bill and 
gave us the specific authority to write the formula for it. The 
welfare reform bill was written right in the White House, not at 
HEW, and he brought our people in on every stage of it. When we 
were having trouble getting HUD money released (this was 
especially true for Joe Alioto, who had some low-income housing 
programs that were stalled), we went right to the White House, and 
he did release it. 
I am an issue-oriented, confrontation politician -- that is the 
only kind of substantive politics there is, as far as I am concerned -
- but a public fight with Agnew would have served no purpose. 
Allen's remarks reflected what all the rest of is in the room felt 
(and it was great that it was Allen, not somebody like me, who 
chose to do it -- there are things we can do to them, but there are 
other things they can do to each other), but Agnew just wasn't the 
right target to take to the public. 
Nixon's strategy in his first term was to introduce bills that were 
personally repugnant to him, knowing he could depend on 
conservative Democrats to block action. They would ruin his 
strategy on any day they chose to pass his welfare-reform bill or 
revenue sharing. But he knew he could depend on them. And when 
they didn't pass the legislation, the responsibility was on them, not 
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him. On the other hand, I've watched him go outside a 
conservative's ordinary approach to foreign affairs. Richard Nixon 
is a master of the art of reflecting the wishes of people, of 
ascertaining the significance of what they feel and want or think 
they want and then joining them, appearing to the head of the 
phalanx. It's a comfortable kind of politics. It is also the kind of 
secure comfortableness that led to Watergate and the other abuses 
of power that Nixon voters let us all in for. 
My kind of guy leads by initiative. Wayne Morse, George 
McGovern, Hubert Humphrey, Birch Bayh -- these men have taken 
personal positions that make no sense as reflections of the general 
feelings of their constituents. These are leaders. Thomas Kuechel 
of California was another one. Eleanor Roosevelt. Michael V. Di 
Salle. One of the tragic failures of the Ohio electorate was the way 
in which they rejected Mike Di Salle. I mean to except the 
Kennedys from this group of leaders. I think that so far they have 
been shallow manipulators. 
I never felt John F. Kennedy was a substantive man. He never 
had the commitment to social programs that his Democratic 
predecessors had or that Lyndon Johnson subsequently 
demonstrated. I know of nothing in his record to distinguish him. 
He used the liberal and minority groups but was never truly their 
friend. History will hack away at his legend until the only thing left 
is the realization that he was the first of those of us who have 
learned to use the media well. He and Bobby gave us a bunch of 
racist Southern judges. It took him two years to sign the executive 
order on housing. A. Philip Randolph had to marshal the famous 
march on Washington before Kennedy would introduce the civil-
rights bill. He escalated the war in Vietnam. As a Senator, he 
ducked being paired in the voting censuring Joseph R. McCarthy. 
Kennedy was a hawk, a Cold Warrior. He, too, was a dilettante. 
When he became President he tried to work his programs into law 
with the same methods he had used to get into office -- public 
relations. It didn't work. Kennedy was disdainful of the Congress, 
contemptuous of the men who served there, and he surrounded 
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himself with men like himself, and so the style of the conduct of 
business was arrogant, often supercilious. And Congress, since it 
wasn't being appealed to in the traditional manner, through the 
trading of favors, the calling up of old debts or the creation of new 
ones, sat on his hands. It didn't actively fight him, it just did 
nothing. The public were the losers. 
People don't seem to remember that just prior to his 
assassination, Kennedy was at an absolute low. He wasn't getting 
legislation through. He was tremendously unpopular. Even the 
liberals had been turned off. The Kennedys understood the use of 
the executive power outside of dealing with Congress. They 
brought the steel industry to its knees and they used the Justice 
Department ruthlessly. In order to "get" James Hoffa, they were as 
abusive of the Constitution as any of the Watergate conspirators 
were. I have to believe that he understood how to deal with 
Congress, but he didn't care to pay the price for those things, and I 
take those things to be the things that mattered, the domestic 
issues. 
Hubert Humphrey is not well thought of since his years as 
Johnson's Vice-President, but that man was for so many years so 
far ahead of this time and yet had such a wealth of ability and drive 
that he was able to survive some of the most virulent attacks ever 
directed at a public figure. From 1946 to 1958, good men, I mean 
very good men, had to endure that sort of thing. He was an 
extraordinary mayor in Minneapolis. What happened to him? 
Perhaps it is easier to understand what happens to a man who 
wants a job like the Presidency very badly if you think about the 
extent to which you can humble yourself when you want a certain 
woman with whom you happen to love. When you have been and 
are a person of vision and of desire to do it your way, and it 
becomes so consuming to you that you begin paying prices (and 
you always pay price when you want something that others must 
give), once you start paying prices and move toward the goal, the 
more prices you are willing to pay, the less observant you become 
of how the prices are getting higher. Like water through the river, 
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the level stays the same, but the water is ever new, ever different. 
For the introspective man of integrity it is comforting to believe, 
"If I can just get there, then I'll be able to turn around and do the 
things I want to do." but you can't. Those prices are irretrievable. 
It's pitiful. You must never want something so much that the 
essence of it becomes just being there, getting it. The process that 
occurs with an obsession to rule or to won or just to belong can 
cost too much and when the cost is too great, the achievement is 
empty. In Hubert's case, the paid the price and still didn't win the 
office. 
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15 
THE FUTURE OF BLACK POLITICS 
 
Shortly after the Hough riot in1966, the local civil-rights and 
community groups practiced a bloodletting secession on the black 
councilmen. They held a meeting in the auditorium of the St. 
James African Methodist Episcopal Church, in which they seated 
the black councilmen in front of the audience and let the people get 
up one by one and verbally flay them for their lack of backbone, 
for their toadying to the local Democratic Party leaders, Bert Porter 
and Jim Stanton, for their tacit cooperation with the police who 
were brutalizing the black community. It was a long and 
humiliating evening for them, but it was merely the community's 
general attitude made manifest; the traditional black politicians in 
Cleveland had come to be held in contempt by their own 
constituents. Their constituents knew that most of them were just 
padding their own pockets and doing nothing of substance, knew 
that they were tied to the graft at City Hall as well as to the vice on 
the street. 
Four years later when we formed the Twenty-first 
Congressional District Caucus, the executive board marched into 
the general meeting room and the crowd stood and cheered in a 
great display of unity and pride. Both the politicians and the people 
had come a long way in a short time. I would occasionally remind 
those councilmen of that long night in 1966 and remind them that, 
insofar as they stood up with us and fought the racism in City Hall, 
in the Council, in the Democratic Party, in the business 
community, in the newspapers, they had gotten respect, they had 
achieved a dimension with their people that was the complete 
reversal of the old image. They finally learned that what the white 
press called defeats were usually victories in the eyes of their own 
people. 
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We had brought the movement into politics and politics into the 
movement. In many significant ways, 1966 was the turning point. 
The civil-rights movement evidenced its era was over when Martin 
Luther King, Jr., went into Cicero, Illinois; its fire was picked up 
by the nationalists and its substance carried on by the discovery of 
black politics. The two were destined for conflict -- a clash that I 
fear has reached dangerous proportions. 
The ability of black politicians to work for the interests of black 
people will not survive an association with extremism in a country 
headed on a conservative course. The forces of reaction are too 
great. If 12 percent of the people were physically to confront the 
other 88, challenging their control, they would be doomed. We 
have not begun to see the kind of repression this country could 
mount against its dissidents. I am talking about systematic, 
government-controlled violence. Terrorism. 
At the national convention of the NAACP in 1966, I made a 
call for coalition politics and took on the volatile issue of black 
power. I rejected separatism as self-defeating; there is no way my 
people can develop economic independence as a geographically 
separate, quasi-sovereign people within the bounds of the United 
States. I told them that the way to better jobs, schools and housing 
was through the political process. The civil-rights laws were on the 
books by that time. The time for marching was over, I told them. It 
was time to move in, time to quit throwing rocks at the ripest 
apples, time to move in and politically shake that tree. In another 
speech that year, this one to the NAACP in Akron, I said we had to 
translate our fervor, our vigor from civil rights into the hard, 
practical struggle of regular politics somewhere within the 
prevailing political system. We could no longer afford to let the 
choice of candidates within the Democratic Party fall to men who 
did not have the interests of black people in mind. 
In both of those speeches I outlined the basis for a coalition of 
blacks, poor whites, Puerto Ricans and liberals, a movement 
politics that would pull the professional politicians, the street-club 
president and the NAACP board member into an organization that 
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would hold force. Four years later, I was able to demonstrate that it 
had been done. We showed the Democratic Party that we were 
united and strong and that it could not operate without us. We went 
out and endorsed my old Republican opponent, Seth Taft, who was 
then running for county commissioner. We got behind him and 
beat the white Democrat in our heavily Democratic county. The 
next year, in the mayoral primary, we set up a strong campaign 
against Anthony Garofoli, who was Stanton's hand-picked 
candidate, and we beat him. We did it mainly to prove to the party 
that it could not operate without us. We were organized and we 
were disciplined, and we would not give quarter. We had had to 
create the Twenty-first District Congressional Caucus so that we 
could translate what had become personal loyalty to me into a 
pride of association with a political force that could prove itself in 
the arena. We did it. 
Talking like this about the success of my own coalition politics 
in Cleveland, it all sounds very crisp and neat, easily translated to 
other cities, other situations. That has, unfortunately, not been the 
case. Since 1965, black people have been going through a state of 
confusion about what road to take, how to combine civil-rights 
goals with political methods. During all that time I was attempting 
to give other men in other cities the benefit of my understanding. I 
am afraid the lessons seldom took hold. The others often didn't 
have enough political experience to grasp the active principles of 
power politics. 
In the spring of 1966, comedian, civil-rights activist Dick 
Gregory and went to Newark, a city with more than fifty-five 
percent black population, to help the campaign of Kenneth Gibson, 
a trained engineer who had never done anything political in his 
life. The civil-rights groups were for him, but the incumbent, Hugh 
Addonizio, had one of those traditional, corrupt political machines 
that seem to be indigenous to New Jersey -- a machine that had 
demoralized and neutralized most of the black population. When 
the oldest and most respected black politician in Newark declared 
for Addonizio, Gregory and I tried to put the heat on him. But 
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there was no heat and he knew it. The people neither understood 
nor cared what the issues were. We met with the black leadership 
and we called rallies. We were lucky to get a hundred people to 
show up for a mass rally, most of them already committed 
campaign workers. I tried to give Gibson some basic lessons in the 
principles of organizing, but there was just nothing in his 
background to prepare him for it. He is personally not built for the 
business. He went on to lose. 
I mention this story because the very next year, all the Black 
Power people -- none of whom had been there to help in 1966 -- 
descended on Newark for the first National Black Power 
Conference and tore the town apart, screaming about how they 
were being excluded from participation in government. There were 
no Imamu Amiri Barakas, no Stokely Carmichaels around in 1966 
when the city could have been taken peacefully, without violence 
and before a second four years of neglect, deterioration and decay 
had made it almost unrehabilitable. 
Baraka has since told me he hadn't thought politics were 
relevant in 1966. It is unfortunate that he hadn't listened to 
Malcolm X, who, two years previously, had advocated ballots over 
bullets. It took his own arrest during the riot, the death of twenty-
four black people, and over twenty million dollars in loss of 
housing for black people and the stores and businesses that once 
served them, before Baraka learned the relevancy of a process to 
gain power that ethnic minorities have used in Newark for over a 
hundred years. 
I have much more respect for the people from Gary, Indiana, 
who came to Cleveland to learn from my 1965 campaign. Four 
men who identified themselves as black businessmen from Gary 
approached me early in the campaign. They told me they had this 
young fellow, Richard Hatcher, they wanted to run for mayor, and 
they wanted to learn how we put a campaign together. They went 
around and talked to most of our people, attending meetings, 
gathering material. I told them about how to deal with the white 
population (this wasn't so important in Gary, with its 
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predominantly black population, but they still had to contend with 
a vitriolic and racist local Democratic Party chairman). On election 
day the returned with some eight or more workers and assisted us 
at the polls. They helped and they learned. In 1967, when Hatcher 
ran for mayor, they put together a smooth operation that elected 
him handily. The lessons are clear. 
By early 1969, a certain tide had turned, and I found myself in 
the position of having to do the reverse of what Martin Luther 
King had wanted to do in Cleveland in 1967. We had had 
Glenville, and my fights with the police were widely known. My 
star had been tarnished among just those people we had to treat 
most delicately, the marginal white voters. In Los Angeles, 
Thomas Bradley, a black, was running for mayor against the white 
incumbent, Sam Yorty. Now, Los Angeles had a black population 
of only eighteen percent. The matter was delicate in the extreme. 
Bradley called and wanted me to come out and campaign for him. I 
said that I would do anything he wanted, but that he should weigh 
carefully what would happen if I came out. There is no question 
but that my appearance would have helped solidify support in his 
black base, but there was also no question about what Yorty, a 
shrewd demagogue, would do with it among white voters. Bradley 
hadn't thought about it like that. He finally agreed that I ought to 
stay away, and I did. Even so, Yorty managed to drag Cleveland 
and its black mayor in as an issue, and he hurt Bradley with it. 
Yorty cried, Watts, Glenville, what next? Bradley was not able to 
get out from under the blanket of white fears. He lost. But he 
learned. 
In 1973, Bradley conducted a low-key campaign in which he 
did not use any black leaders from outside Los Angeles -- as I had 
counseled him in 1969. When Bobby Seale, fresh from his defeat 
for the mayoralty of Oakland, gratuitously endorsed Bradley's 
candidacy, Bradley quickly moved to publicly reject Seale's 
endorsement. He didn't want to do it. But he had to if he wanted to 
keep those white voters whose fears he had so carefully allayed 
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over the four years. Bradley went on to swamp Mayor Yorty with 
almost 50 percent of the white vote. He had learned the game. 
By 1970, I could see the writing on the wall. In 1967 it still 
seemed that the cities could be turned around; three years later the 
economic tide had turned and we were headed for even more 
problems than before. Our lack of resources, the high crime rate, 
the seemingly inexorable slide into decay and deterioration, the 
continued desertion of the cities by even the marginally affluent, 
the increasing unemployment and labor problems -- all these things 
were making cities virtually unmanageable. I could see that, for at 
least the time being, during a disastrous economic slump that was 
eroding our already pitiful tax base, the managers of cities could 
barely hold their ground. 
Richard Austin, a very nice, clean-cut black gentleman who had 
been serving as Wayne County auditor in Michigan, wanted to run 
for mayor of Detroit. Jerome Cavanagh had thrown in the towel 
and announced he wouldn't run again. Austin called and said he 
wanted to come and talk to me. He came down with his wife and 
his campaign manager. They were obviously intelligent, decent 
people, so I advised them to stay out of the mayor's race. Austin 
had been serving successfully at the state level without having to 
grapple with the grit of social problems. Decency and intelligence 
don't win the battles in the jungle of city politics, and I could see 
that Austin was simply not cut out for jungle fights. It is perhaps a 
sad admission, but I know that to really understand the ingrained 
problems of cities, you have to have been part of them, not just the 
victim or the product of them. You are fighting everything, your 
own people, the white people, the police, everyone who wants to 
keep the status quo. 
I told them to stay out, but I was talking to a wall. 
"You see that Jerry Cavanagh is voluntarily not running, don't 
you?" I said. 
"Yes," Austin said, "but we don't think he could win if he did 
run." 
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"That may be true, but he doesn't have to voluntarily step down. 
He could run and lightning could strike and he could get re-elected. 
But do you know of a man who has been a mayor in the country 
who knows cities any better than Jerry Cavanagh?" 
They had to say no. 
"Don't you think that if he had the grandest riot in the history of 
the United States, with damages in excess of fifty million dollars, a 
city that is obviously going downhill, spreading slums, increasing 
unemployment, doesn't this tell you something?" 
I had to talk to him like that. He was not really a politician. He 
wanted to be mayor for the honor of the thing, and I knew it would 
turn out to be just the opposite of honor. 
He laughed nervously and said, "We are sure all of that is true, 
but we're in this race to win." If there is a political phrase that is 
overused by losers, it has to be that one. 
But I saw that I wouldn't convince him, so we spent the next 
hour talking about how to get institutional help, how to get ties into 
the Polish community that is so big in Detroit, how to approach the 
white working class, which could probably be done only through 
organized labor, taking advantage of its traditional strength and 
fairly liberal tradition. He indicated Walter Reuther was behind 
him, Leonard Woodcock was with him, and a black labor group, 
survivor of the old Negro Labor Council, was behind him. We 
talked for a while longer, we took some pictures for the media, and 
he went home to be defeated. 
I later learned that they didn't even do the basic work in the 
black community. Some 57,000 registered black voters had stayed 
home on election day. It was the same thing that had happened in 
Newark in 1966, the same thing that had happened in Atlanta in 
1970, when Andrew Young ran for Congress. Young had all the 
support of the SCLC and Julian Bond, and they still left 52,000 
registered black voters at home. You can't do that. When I ran in 
1967, although blacks made up less than thirty-eight percent 
of the population, we were forty percent of the registered voters, 
and we voted forty percent of the final vote. 
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Dealing with social activists in a professional political world 
has been a continual problem. The 1968 Democratic national 
convention saw the appearance for the first time of a national black 
political caucus. Congressman John Conyers from Detroit, Mayor 
Hatcher of Gary, Harry Belafonte and Mrs. Coretta Scott King 
were running things. They had put together a review board to 
examine the Presidential candidates, and the caucus was in process 
of determining which way to go. They asked me to come in and 
give a little speech. 
I went into that room filled with some four hundred black 
people and received a terrific and loud welcome. I could have kept 
that spirit alive. No one asked me any questions, and all I had to 
say, "Brothers and sisters, I'm glad to see you all here; we gonna 
raise hell and we gonna win." There would have been a lot of 
yelling and hollering; I could have put the soul shake on Dick 
Hatcher and left in a roar of euphoria. 
But that isn't how it happened. For me, politics is a business, 
the most vital business there is. I couldn't indulge in playing at 
politics in order to get my picture in the newspaper and that sort of 
thing at the expense of leaving the vital decision of the Presidency 
to somebody else. Now I was talking to the black people many of 
whom had been in the forefront of the civil-rights movement. They 
had paid their dues, and they knew what was going on in America. 
They were willing to keep up the fight, in their way. But they were 
not politicians. They still were clinging to the memory of the early 
1960s and their marches. I was trying to tell them the hard reality 
we had right in front of us. 
I told them that anything they wanted to do by the way of 
collective strategy on the Vice-Presidency, I would be with them 
all the way. But I said, "You cannot play around with the 
Presidency of the United States." The country was in a terrible 
uproar over Lyndon Johnson's handling of the war in Vietnam, 
over the cities being burned, the campuses being torn up, and I said 
we could not add to this disastrous situation by the way of some 
self-indulgent frivolity over the office that would make the 
275 
difference about what happened to the poor and the black for the 
next four years. The most important thing to face was whether the 
Democratic candidate was a man who could beat Richard Nixon. I 
told them that I was going to support Hubert Humphrey as hard as 
I could, and that they should think very hard before they chose to 
go with a candidate who could not beat Nixon. I reminded them 
that mayors like Dick Hatcher and I would have had no viability at 
all as young untrained managers of government had it not been for 
the support and assistance of President Lyndon Johnson. That was 
it. I repeated my pledge to go along with a strategy on the Vice-
Presidency and walked out, accompanied by a shocked silence and 
scattered applause. 
Richard Nixon did win, and by a margin so small that black 
people, had they been solidly behind Humphrey, could have 
reversed it. I think the men and women in that room have to carry 
part of the responsibility. Richard Nixon's election was as much a 
product of their failure to get the black vote out for Humphrey as 
was the actual vote by Nixon supporters. We could have beaten 
Mr. Nixon in the black neighborhoods. 
In 1970, Louis Harris did an opinion survey for Time magazine 
to determine which black leaders were most respected by black 
people at large. The top two were organizations, the NAACP and 
the SCLC. I was next. No other single man was as respected by the 
people. To deserve that respect has meant that I have had to take 
positions for my people and advise them in ways that were not 
always popular, even with them. 
The role I played in 1972 at the National Black Political 
Convention in Gary was necessarily negative. Before the 
convention, I wrote to the leadership around the country, some 
eighty people, that I was irrevocably against any endorsements of 
candidates. This, admittedly, was to stop them from joining 
Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm on her ego trip in the 
Presidential primaries. The view prevailed, but it was a rough 
fight. I looked at the situation we faced in 1972, and it was exactly 
what it had been in 1968. We faced the probability of four more 
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years of Richard Nixon as President. Yet many people were still 
out there playing games. 
Shirley Chisholm got less than 1 percent of the popular vote. 
She couldn't even elect all her delegates in her own district. But 
attention to the real issue had been diverted. Richard Nixon was 
reelected-once again with an abysmally low black voter turnout. 
I have reached the point of our most tragic and terrifying 
dilemma. Before laying things out further, let me back up and 
come in again from another angle, so that the local situation in 
Cleveland can come to be seen as merely exemplary, or a model of 
the situation I see facing us all. I am trying to avoid here letting 
anyone take an easy view of what conspiracies are. 
Glenville, bad as it was, was a rhetorical prelude. Ahmed was a 
loud neurotic who enjoyed having followers. His actions were 
serious just to the degree that he was incapable of being serious. 
The actions of July 23, 1968, were foolhardy, suicidal; only an 
adolescent could have thought different. 
When General Davis had told me that he could live with Harllel 
Jones but that Baxter Hill had to go, I was confronted with a man 
who was supposed to control the peace-keeping function but who 
didn't know a dog from a wolf. Harllel Jones (later Harllel X) was 
a dangerous man who knew just how dangerous he was, a man 
who had learned to talk softly. He had his power in the ghetto, and 
he learned at some point -- earlier than Huey Newton -- to stop 
talking about hating white people or talking about burning down 
the courthouse and using guns. He learned that if you mean it, you 
don't broadcast it, you are only inviting persecution. The threat of 
violence from Harllel was truly dangerous because he was 
committed to revolution. He was disciplined in the way that 
Bernadette Devlin and the Irish Republican Army are disciplined. 
Men like Harllel are not to be understood in the simple-minded 
sensationalism of crime journalism, but in acknowledging the 
abiding and deeply personal willingness to die that is common to 
the real leaders of any oppressed people. 
277 
I mean the tradition of the Molly Maguires, formed to overthrow 
the oppressions of the coal-mine managers, or the Mafia, originally 
formed to keep a semblance of economic vitality in occupied 
Sicily. And I mean heroes like Patrick Henry, whose famous cry 
has lost so much of its meaning that it can be presented to 
schoolchildren as the remark of a patient martyr. The real import of 
Henry's remark of "give me liberty or give me death" is that a man 
willing to die for his freedom is willing to kill for it. Nobody ever 
presented Patrick Henry as a pacifist or as suicidal. We have in this 
country a peculiar facility for blunting the edges of our own most 
important truths, not wanting to face the fact that they may have to 
become actively true again. On Independence Day we do not 
remind ourselves of the Declaration of Independence, in which 
Thomas Jefferson wrote that, when institutions fail, the people 
have the right to overthrow them. We are reminded of that other, 
seemingly immutable document, the Constitution, which for 
seventy years held a provision counting a slave as two thirds of a 
man. 
With a different orientation, Harllel could have been a great 
leader in this country. He was absolutely without fear, and his 
amazing self-confidence, combined with his brilliant leadership 
abilities, could have brought people together for reform and mutual 
growth. He was absolutely, totally respected and feared in the 
Hough and Superior Avenue areas of Cleveland. He would walk 
up to a crowd on the edge of a fight and say, "Listen, brothers, 
we're going to stop this," and the people would stop. I never heard 
him raise his voice. Everybody knew the Harllel did not play 
games. I regarded him as a valued ally. 
People who do not live under the oppressed conditions of the 
ghetto simply cannot comprehend the force such a man develops, 
nor can they understand that that man has to be understood as a 
member of a social force, not as a criminal. All the Irish in this 
nation who stand up for the murders, the house burnings and the 
shooting of police going on in Northern Ireland, paradoxically turn 
around and demand of their councilmen, police, and other elected 
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officials that they put a stop to the black nationalists in America. 
They are wholly unaware of the irony of their position, an irony 
that masks a dangerous ignorance. The nationalists finally 
recognized this, and we find their leadership now telling the white 
media that they are through with violence, that they are going to 
urge their people to go into politics. What they are really doing is 
going underground. A movement like the Irish Republican Army 
can disappear because its members have the sympathy of the 
people and because they all look alike. The only way the black 
nationalist movement could survive was to become invisible at 
least among black people. 
This is the place we have come to, this is where the black 
movement that split off from politics after 1965 has led us. There 
are people taking up arms, disciplining themselves. I even 
sympathize with them. I see the same things ahead that they do, 
and I am frightened and desperate over the direction I see this 
country headed in. But I can't take the step they have taken. I know 
that sometimes, to protect your people or your movement or to 
enforce discipline, you take a life. I am as capable of killing as 
they are. When I made the decision all those years ago to go back 
into Jinx Green's cheat spot in Toledo, I knew that he had said he 
would kill me, and when I shot him I wasn't shooting merely to 
wound. 
What I am saying is that there is nothing in my own personal 
makeup that would make me shy away from violence just because 
it is violent. If I honestly felt that terrorism, the killing of selected 
people, would result in victory, progress or advancement, I would 
have a gun in my pocket right now. Although I know that the entire 
history of our country is a history of violence, of revolution, of a 
willingness to give up and take life for survival and change, I don't 
believe it will work for black people in this country. The 
nationalists have gone underground, preparing for the eventual 
creation of a black nation. They are preparing for the historic 
violence that goes with such struggles. They have learned not to 
telegraph their intentions to the white community, and have 
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learned that ultimate declarations require a much more 
sophisticated approach than the emotional rhetoric of the 1960s. 
No one should be surprised at this; it has happened before in other 
times, other places. America is going to have to work through it. 
My fear comes from knowing the massive retaliatory powers of 
this country. This country knows how to defend itself. If it takes 
pogroms, there will be pogroms. If it takes concentration camps, 
there will be camps. Genocide practiced by a government is not 
impulsive or emotional. It is systematic. 
The other side is going underground, too. If we could point to a 
Hitler and say, "He's the problem," it would be so much easier. But 
there is no single leader, no known organizer of a national 
conspiracy to oppress black people, just as there is no key figure in 
the nationalist movement. We are not talking about national 
moods. Look at the number of police in American cities who were 
slain last year, not accidentally killed trying to arrest someone, just 
systematically killed. Look at the number of bombings. Each 
bombing is an isolated incident, but together they number in the 
thousands. This is an expression of a change that is coming over 
the country faster and faster. In Cairo, Illinois, in 1972, police and 
blacks were in open warfare almost daily. The police are amassing 
arsenals suitable only for war. The U.S. Supreme Court is 
dismantling the protections of persons accused of crimes. 
Reactionaries are being elected mayors of major cities -- 
Philadelphia, Minneapolis and perhaps New York this year (1973). 
What does it mean for the black politician? When Baraka, Roy 
Innis and other nationalists can use decent politicians like Richard 
Hatcher and Charles Diggs to take over a national black 
Congressional caucus, we can see that the signs are bad. These 
men are not idealists. They learned their lessons in the street, as I 
did. I know they are not playing around. Can regular, traditional 
politicians move far enough to the left to satisfy the new discipline 
that is forming? Even if they could move to the left, could they still 
function in the government? I don't know. I do know that these 
things are happening. I am loath to respond to what the nationalists 
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are doing. For reasons not even clear to me, I have reached this 
point, and I will not take the next step. 
Politics is no box of Crackerjacks, it is not candy and popcorn 
and free prizes. I hope I have given a sense of some of the 
agonizing a politician goes through, and a sense of just how empty 
the big status-carrying positions can be. I would like to think I 
have helped people who are developing interests in government 
understand better how it works and how it fails. Ideally, this book 
should help prepare some people for a life in politics and should 
keep others out of the arena. There are a lot of people in politics 
who should be barbers or machine operators or schoolteachers, 
people who could make solid contributions in other lines of work. I 
have watched Politicians ruin people. An unfortunate legacy of the 
excitement of my early campaigns was that a couple of solid 
businessmen, white liberals, were seduced so far off track of their 
lives that they lost themselves. The glamour and glitter of 
campaigning, especially for a cause you believe in, can go over to 
an obsession with campaigning itself, and that can be ruinous. The 
fact is, politics is one of the most serious endeavors on earth. It 
changes the lives of people. This is something I think I can truly 
say I never forgot. I knew that the burden of my conduct in office 
wasn't sustained by me, it was carried by the people who had to 
have jobs, or welfare, or low-cost housing. Just as I have watched 
white liberals lose their sense of the realities of political 
consequences, so I have seen black leaders believe their own 
revivalist rhetoric and lose themselves-and our people-in 
playacting, while the real politicians were setting fire to the stage. 
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